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In this dissertation I evaluate the efforts of international tribunals to strengthen the 
rule of law from the perspective of the people who were directly involved in the war 
crimes, whether as a victim, perpetrator, or both. My research in a small Croatian 
community is an investigation of the local legal consciousness to understand if tenets of 
the rule of law promoted by the tribunal are compatible with the prevailing norms. The 
focus on a community of Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees highlights the 
concerns of minorities living in Croatia after the 1990s conflict that included ethnic 
cleansing, displacement and destruction of property in this area. The everyday conflicts 
that people must negotiate shape their views of accountability, fairness and security, all 
components of the rule of law.  
Most rule of law initiatives concentrate on institutional reforms, but here I 
emphasize the importance of a transformation of norms at the local level. Only a 
profound understanding of the local legal consciousness will allow initiatives to 
effectively promote change. In this analysis the local legal consciousness in Croatia does 
appear to support many components of the rule of law as it is conceived by the tribunal,  
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but it falls short of being considered a rule of law culture. There are considerable 
obstacles in the form of opposing norms that conflict with rule of law values. Those 
obstacles are: (1) the nature of law, (2) ethno-religious nationalism, (3) the impact of 
insecurity, and (4) the lack of political agency. The role of the Croatian government, 
particularly in its perceived shortcomings by the public, is integral to the relationship 
between the international and local. My research demonstrates that there are elements of 
the local legal consciousness that both reinforce and oppose the strengthening of the rule 
law. This understanding aids an assessment of how salient rule of law initiatives will be 
to local communities. What is at stake in this research is a fuller understanding of the 
apparently limited ability of the ‘international community’ to generate local support for 
international courts engaged in post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and 
accountability.  
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Chapter 1 – The Rule of Law from a Local Perspective 
 
Introduction 
At its heart, this is ethnography of a war-torn community in Croatia that examines 
if and how it may be affected by international efforts to strengthen the rule of law through 
criminal trials for perpetrators of human rights violations. This is an attempt to 
understand how real change may take place as a consequence of the relatively new 
international approach to prosecute individuals for their part in mass atrocities. In 
particular I examine the concept of the rule of law as a critical component of transitional 
justice agendas and the degree to which that concept is reinforced or opposed by the legal 
consciousness of a local community. This research acknowledges that post-conflict 
transition is a long, arduous process and the twenty years or so since the violence began 
in the region allows for some reflection on the methods used to understand and resolve 
the challenges of addressing mass violations of human rights, rather than assuming that 
academic inquiry into these issues is passé in the Former Yugoslavia. In this case the time 
that has passed since the trials began and violence ended is an advantage to assessing 
longer-term repercussions of international trials.  
The period immediately following a major political upheaval is a time when truths 
about the past and directions for the future are established. Leaders of the fledgling 
government must enforce their newfound authority in order to create an image of 
legitimacy and, in a democracy, must have power grounded in popular support. In these 
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tumultuous times people speak of justice, rights and equality, and addressing the wrongs 
suffered in the past as an integral part of building the new nation. One major component 
of such a project that is critical for the development of order and fairness is the rule of 
law. The rule of law is, “the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today 
(Tamanaha 2004:4)” and it is through trials for perpetrators of atrocities that the power of 
legal and political institutions is visibly demonstrated to the citizens of the state and to 
the world. Trials publicly document crimes such as ethnic cleansing, forced displacement 
and genocide and then formally assign responsibility to individuals while recognizing the 
plight of victims. This dissertation challenges the assumption that the rule of law is an 
ideal which follows as a consequence of trials by exposing the difficulties of imposing a 
rule of law where distrust in political and judicial institutions is pervasive. It also 
identifies how trials have contributed to some key successes in the cultivation of a faith in 
the rule of law. 
Of the former member states of Yugoslavia, Croatia is unique for the degree to 
which it took both the roles of victim and aggressor in the 1990s conflict, with local 
experiences being quite diverse and multifaceted. Croatia was also seen as relatively 
well-off in economic terms and its development of civil society, yet corruption and 
discrimination persist. Much of the research presented here was conducted in a village 
near the Bosnian border, part of the Serb Krajina region during the conflict period, that is 
now home to Serb returnees and relocated Bosnian Croat refugees. Both groups have a 
type of minority status in Croatia and their families, homes, health and economic status 
were greatly altered by the events of conflict. They are the people for whom proponents 
of trials attempt to create remedies by bringing the guilty to justice and instilling a faith in 
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the rule of law. The interactions between these groups and the challenges they 
collectively face continue to be shaped by the violence in many ways.  
As anywhere, people in this community negotiate conflicts as part of their daily 
life, ranging from very minor arguments to extreme instances of physical violence. These 
everyday encounters both contribute to and exhibit how people view tenets of the rule of 
law. Most investigations of the rule of law focus on domestic courts, police, and written 
laws – the level of institutions. Instead, this study is an evaluation at the local level for 
the existence (or lack of) a rule of law culture and how that contributes to the success of 
the international tribunal’s initiatives to strengthen the rule of law. More generally, it 
adds to an understanding of how international legal trials during periods of transition are 
viewed by local populations. Is the tribunal successful from a local perspective? The 
analysis of ethnographic research presented here indicates a discrepancy between the 
ideals of a strong rule of law and the reality of corruption and distrust in political and 
legal institutions. 
 
The Research Question 
 The main question of this inquiry was formed in response to claims that 
international tribunals strengthen the rule of law. The International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (its full title is “The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991” and will be referred to 
here as the ICTY or tribunal) states that strengthening of the rule of law is one of its core 
achievements. The list of the ICTY’s self-proclaimed achievements include: holding 
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leaders accountable, bringing justice to victims, giving victims a voice, establishing the 
facts, developing international law, as well as strengthening the rule of law 
(www.icty.org/sid/324 accessed 10/7/12). But how has it contributed to rule of law 
initiatives and is it successful? What does it mean to strengthen the rule of law? Is that 
what people need? Is it what they want?  
In this study I seek to understand the local socio-cultural understanding of law 
and how (and if) it fits with the ICTY’s attempts to achieve justice through trials that are 
based on international human rights law. It investigates the efforts to build a stronger rule 
of law through international human rights courts (such as the ICTY) to see if they match 
the needs and hopes of a local post-conflict community. The main research question I 
pose is: To what degree are the tribunal’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule 
of law in post-conflict Croatia reinforced or opposed by a local experience of the rule of 
law? To break this question down to its smaller and necessary parts I will include 
discussions of: 
• International norms of the rule of law 
• The tribunal’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law 
• The rule of law in the context of Croatia 
• Local experiences of the rule of law 
• Analysis of how local experiences affect rule of law initiatives 
• Broader implications of this local legal consciousness approach 
Thus this dissertation presents the norms of international rule of law initiatives, 
particularly those embodied by the ICTY, and the local perspective of a post-conflict and 
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ethnically mixed community in Croatia to understand if there is local support for a 
stronger rule of law.  
  
The Research Focus 
 My interest in justice for human rights violations developed from my 
undergraduate studies in sociology and peace studies. I decided to apply the holistic 
approach of anthropology to problems of conflict and cooperation in my graduate studies 
and found that much of the current study centered on human rights. Conflicts are often 
categorized by the type of human rights violated and intervention is based on the degree 
to which rights were violated, among other factors. After learning that courts are 
increasingly utilized in the post-conflict transition process and often initiated by 
international organizations I wanted to understand how the courts are viewed by the 
people directly involved in the conflict. In the literature there are many complaints that 
the reality of international trials does not meet the expectations of human rights advocates 
or proponents of international law. If advocates of the trials are not satisfied then is it 
possible to fulfill the expectations of victims?  
The lives of people affected by human rights violations are impacted in a dramatic 
way. What it means to achieve justice for those violations varies greatly from person to 
person and will likely change over time. Desires are often impossible to fulfill as many 
victims sorely want life to be as it was before, at least in terms of a loved one’s life back 
or a destroyed home returned. Trials for perpetrators of human rights violations hold the 
promise of public punishment, recognition of wrong doing, truth finding, and closure for 
victims. The resolution of the wrongdoing has the potential to prevent the perpetuation of 
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violence. In this way, trials as a method of conflict resolution may be a productive way to 
minimize future conflicts and thus aid the understanding of why conflict occurs in the 
first place. This is an exciting prospect for advocates of peace and human rights such as 
myself. I want to learn more and designed this study to do so.  
 This topic interests me on a personal level because of my family’s experience in 
World War II that altered the course of my grandparents’ lives. My mothers’ parents met 
at Cornell University, he studied entomology and she studied math. They married, started 
careers and a family with prospects for a bright future before my grandfather was drafted 
into the American army and shipped overseas. He was stationed in France and Germany 
for several years and for some of that time was in charge of a German prisoner-of-war 
camp. After the war and a joyful return to his family my mother was born. At first it 
seemed that their life would return to its path begun before the war, but signs of a change 
soon showed.  
My grandmother would hear stories that he told people bizarre tales and promised 
to take on projects that he did not have the skills to undertake. It was understood in the 
family that the horrors he witnessed and learned about during the war were 
incomprehensible to him and caused a retreat from reality. Today his altered perception 
of reality would likely have been diagnosed as post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), 
but then the doctors prescribed sedation through medication. He was not able to work so 
my grandmother supported the family financially while living at her parents’ home. My 
mother had an unusual family life for the time with her mother being the breadwinner and 
father at home. He had a calm, pleasant presence and rested often. My grandfather died in 
his sleep due to heart failure that may have been caused by the sedatives soon after my 
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mother married at age twenty-one. His wartime experience clearly had a profound effect 
on his wife and children and I never had the opportunity to meet him or know the person 
he would have been without that experience. Thinking about what must have happened to 
affect him to such an extreme disturbed me. How can people be so cruel to each other? 
How can it be stopped? I realized that this impact on my family was quite small when 
compared to targeted victims of the Nazi regime and people who lost lives during the 
war. Genocide goes well beyond the persecution of one group by another and truly 
affects entire societies, even the world, in so many ways. This drives me to understand 
how lives are changed by mass atrocities and what can meaningfully be done to move 
towards a more positive future for all.  
 I recently learned that my grandfather was chosen to be in charge of the German 
prisoner-of-war camp because of his own German ancestry. I imagine that he wondered 
what would have happened if his family had stayed in Germany. Would he have taken 
part in the crimes or stood up against them? Would he have survived? In mass atrocities 
there is sometimes a fine line or none at all between who is a victim and who is a 
perpetrator of human rights violations. People who were the victims at one point in time 
may become perpetrators later in an attempt to revenge the wrongs. People may feel 
forced to commit crimes in order to avoid becoming a victim when an influential leader 
claims that not joining the cause makes you against it and a target. This type of pressure 
was certainly present as Yugoslavia dissolved into smaller states with contested borders. 
The complexity of victim and perpetrator identities in the 1990s conflict of Croatia 
intrigues me. All sides say they fought because they were victimized, citing recent 
incidents and some a thousand years old. As with most violent conflict there are survivors 
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who are not satisfied with how it ended. It is also likely that continuing emotions felt 
from hurt, loss, and indignities will be manipulated to aid agendas for power and material 
gain. The promise that trials can minimize future violence is certainly worth 
investigation.  
 
Current Debates 
The topic of this dissertation informs several areas of specialization within 
anthropology and the studies of law and society, human rights, globalization and 
transitional justice. The findings of this research that illuminate a local perspective of 
international law are relevant to the anthropological study of legal consciousness 
stemming from theories of a new legal realism (Merry 2006, Silbey 2005). Debates of 
legal consciousness question the relationship between internal and external sources of 
consciousness, both in terms of formulating understandings of the law and in terms of 
how laws are created. This dissertation is a study of legal consciousness in that it searches 
for “the forms of participation and interpretation through which actors construct, sustain, 
reproduce, or amend the circulating (contested or hegemonic) structures of meanings 
concerning law” (Silbey 2005:334). This applies in particular to international human 
rights law and the concept of the rule of law.  
As law is internationalized so is the scope of its study within anthropology, 
stimulating new questions and phenomena to investigate. Avenues of inquiry include the 
nature of its development, grounding of its authority, possible manifestations of law, the 
extent to which it produces real change, and how it might prevent future violations. In 
this dissertation I investigate how international human rights law in the form of criminal 
9 
 
trials translates to local populations of people directly affected by the violation of human 
rights. In character with research in the discipline, I look at the larger social processes 
from a local viewpoint based on ethnographic study. This also adds to our 
anthropological understanding of globalization by examining the reciprocal relationship 
between the global and local perspectives of law and human rights. The findings help to 
demonstrate how (and if) people who are directly affected by human rights violations 
identify themselves as victims and make claims based on those rights.  
The scholarship on transitional justice is rife with debates, many of which relate 
to this research and analysis. One topic is the relative importance of a retributive versus a 
restorative approach to achieving justice. While today this is not often seen as an either/or 
debate, the best way to incorporate the two is actively questioned. Criminal trials are a 
form of retributive justice, but the line between that and restorative justice is not clear cut 
especially considering that the ICTY claims that it gives victims a voice, an outcome 
usually associated with restorative approaches, along with claims of strengthening the 
rule of law. A closely related debate concerns the emphasis placed on building 
institutional capacities and legitimacy versus an emphasis on providing basic needs to 
local populations during transitional periods. The focus on institution-building is also 
juxtaposed with a more ground level approach that seeks to alter local norms regarding 
the rule of law and human rights. This dissertation addresses this debate directly by 
looking closer at the local norms, or local legal consciousness, than most evaluations of 
this subject matter. 
Another topic of contention is the balance needed between remembering and 
forgetting the atrocities that took place. Trials are sometimes criticized for keeping angers 
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alive because they contribute to a continuing public consciousness of the violence and, as 
the thinking goes, potentially leading to further conflict. At the same time trials are 
praised for bringing an end to cycles of violence by publicly declaring responsibility for 
wrongdoing and impartially punishing those acts. Another response to this debate is that 
“forgetting” is a falsehood – people do not forget such wrongdoing and wounds fester, 
thus trials are critical for providing a resolution. The research presented here contributes 
to our understanding of the importance of trials, the salience of rule of law initiatives in 
local populations, and the needs of victims in periods of transition.  
 
Organization 
 The organization of this dissertation first presents the general topic and context 
for the questions addressed by the research I conducted in Croatia. In chapter two the 
research methods are explained, including the preparation, data collection, a description 
of the research site and community, and some history of the conflict that continues to 
shape everyday life. The place of this study in relevant literature is the topic of chapter 
three. There the major concepts are also clarified, such as what is meant by the “rule of 
law” and a summary of the development of international human rights law. Next, in 
chapter four I present the research findings that uncover a local perspective of the 
international tribunal and its agenda to strengthen the rule of law. An examination of the 
components of the rule of law follows in chapter five. This chapter also questions 
whether or not a rule of law culture in line with international human rights norms exists 
in the local community.  In chapter six I explain the obstacles to rule of law initiatives 
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found in my research. The final chapter concludes the dissertation by explaining how the 
research informs the questions posed and applies to scenarios of a larger scope.  
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Chapter 2 – Research Methods 
  
This research was conducted to fill a gap in studies of the rule of law which focus 
primarily on institutional reforms rather than the norms which shape the local legal 
consciousness. The objective of strengthening the rule of law is used as a justification for 
intervention and validation for diverse development projects internationally. It is one of 
reasons the ICTY was established and is claimed to be one of its achievements. Surely 
the perspective that victims of human rights violations have toward the rule of law and 
the ICTY are important elements in an evaluation of the tribunal’s success because they 
are considered to be the main reason for its existence. I use the holistic approach of 
anthropology and the intimate perspective gained from ethnographic methods to 
contribute crucial information to the analysis of rule of law initiatives. The combination 
of qualitative and quantitative data yields significant findings for this subject that has the 
potential to alter the lives of people affected by violations of human rights.  
 
Refining the Scope and Methodology 
My initial thought was to evaluate the ICTY from a local perspective using the 
insight gained from ethnographic research to inform international policy making. I kept 
this purpose, but narrowed it down to the specific goal of the tribunal to strengthen the 
rule of law after realizing how incredibly complicated it is to evaluate the achievement of 
justice. I must acknowledge that the rule of law is also quite complex and people vary 
greatly in what they mean by the term, but, as one element of justice that is directly 
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associated with criminal trials, the rule of law is both central to claims of justice and 
smaller in scope. Strengthening the rule of law is one of the achievements boasted by the 
ICTY and one that warrants attention due to the multitude of outcomes assumed to be 
associated with it.   
Before I started fieldwork in Croatia I explored several ways to approach the 
complex and sensitive topic of human rights violations in conversation and research. In 
2007, I conducted a preliminary project funded by the Human Rights Institute at the 
University of Connecticut with a sample of undergraduate students to help develop the 
research methodology for the current study. The seventy-five interviews targeted 
personal conceptions of justice and knowledge of human rights. The questions gauged 
students’ knowledge of international law and asked them to assess its legitimacy.  Their 
reactions to the subject matter were varied. Most often it appeared that human rights was 
not a subject they had previously considered in much depth, though a few students were 
well informed and carefully explained their stance on controversial issues. I also gained 
experience managing research assistants and conducting qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of ethnographic data on the subject.  
This initial study raised questions about how to define some of the core ideas, for 
example what is justice and how can such egregious wrongs be made right? The 
difficulties of developing a plan to achieve justice when the meaning of the term is so 
personal and pathways multi-faceted were made clear.  I also learned the importance of 
carefully wording survey questions. After an examination of the data collected I saw that 
certain questions were too vague and therefore people had interpreted them in different 
ways. What I did see was that most students thought justice for human rights violations 
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was a topic distanced from their own lives. That would not be the case for the people I 
would speak with in Croatia, so building local connections and spending a prolonged 
period of time in one place was needed to better gain trust and understand local 
perspectives. 
 
Field Sites in Croatia 
I carried out informal and formal research throughout my time in Croatia and 
during travel to neighboring Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and nearby Macedonia. Most of 
my time was spent in Croatia – Zagreb, Gvozd, Osijek, Varaždin, Vukovar, Zadar, and 
Nin – to gain a local perspective. Croatia has a population of approximately 4.5 million 
people of which 58% now live in urban areas (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2009). 
The main field site, Gvozd, is a rural community selected on the basis of its historical role 
in the 1990s conflict for Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia and current social, 
economic and political circumstances. It is also a place of interest because each of the 
two main groups of people now living there have had to alter their idea of “home” due to 
forced displacement and destruction during the conflict, though from different situations. 
The economic hardships felt throughout Croatia are particularly present in Gvozd 
because industries present before the conflict have not rebounded. Minority policies that 
affect treatment of returnees and refugees continue to be a major stumbling block to 
Croatia’s bid for EU membership. In addition to the my time in Gvozd I spent several 
months in Zagreb to meet with leaders of local NGOs, politicians and scholars connected 
to rule of law initiatives. I attended conferences on the tribunal and domestic war crimes 
trials that added other perspectives to my understanding of the research question. 
15 
 
I first came to the village of Gvozd to volunteer at the non-governmental 
organization (NGO) named Suncokret created to address various post-conflict needs of 
the area. This NGO encourages international volunteers to help with community projects 
and share their own cultural knowledge with the community in an effort to expand local 
worldviews. The history of international visitors to the town eased my own introduction. 
Gvozd, known prior to the end on the conflict as Vrginmost, was the location of 
aggression from both Serb and Croat groups at different points in the conflict. Gvozd is 
the name of the county as well as the name of the main town within that county (as the 
name Vrginmost had been used previously). Before 1991 its population was about 90% 
Serb, and when Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia local groups of Serbs 
pushed out the Croat minority. As happened in much of this region, Gvozd, then named 
Vrginmost, became part of Croatia’s interior region called the Krajina that was taken over 
by Croatian Serb groups in an effort to create a “Greater Serbia” for which reason homes 
of non-Serbs were vandalized or destroyed (Goldstein 1999:233).  
During the interviews many of the Serb returnees wanted to correct the town 
name, saying it should be called Vrginmost even though Gvozd has been the official 
name since 1996 when the county lines were also redrawn and this town became a part of 
Sisak municipality rather than Karolvac or Kordun municipality. The name change 
occurred soon after this area was taken back by the Croatian army during “Operation 
Storm”, which included the destruction, murder, and forced displacement of the Serb 
population there. About half of the Serb population has now returned and shares the 
village with Croat refugees from Bosnia. These Bosnian Croat refugees mostly come 
from the area around Banja Luka which is now part of the Republika Srpska political 
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entity within Bosnia that was created by the Dayton Peace Accords. The Croatian 
government gave the Bosnian Croat refugees homes in Gvozd while the Serb population 
was still displaced elsewhere. Today in Gvozd there is a housing shortage, even though 
the population fell to only about 4,000 county residents in 2001 (58% Serb and 40% 
Croat) from 16,599 in 1991, which necessitates families of six to live in cramped, aging 
two room apartments (Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2001). The lack of housing and the 
severe lack of local employment add pressure to the existing tensions between the two 
groups as demonstrated in local politics and by the nationalistic music played in cafés.  
The 2011 census shows that about 3,000 people reside in Gvozd municipality of which 
1,022 live in the town of Gvozd (Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2011). Next I will describe 
my travel and research in detail before giving a description of life in Gvozd.  
 
 
Building Local Connections 
I spent a total of sixteen months in Croatia collecting data from local residents to 
understand the local legal consciousness. My initial trip to Croatia was exploratory and 
structured by a Croatian language course at the University of Zagreb during the summer 
of 2006. Zagreb proved to be an effective starting point for making connections with 
professors, professionals and NGOs. It was through my conversations with Vesna Pusić, 
sociologist and politician, that I became more aware of the internal political divides in 
Croatia regarding refugees which later became a part of my research focus. The research 
design was developed following guidelines for ethnographic research, beginning with the 
review of relevant literature, preliminary travel to the research sites and experience 
conducting research (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999; Bernard 2002).  At the 
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first stage the focus was narrowed through identification of pertinent domains such as life 
conditions prior to 1991 and after the conflicts in 1995, experiences of violence, family 
dynamics, education, political stance, history of the particular research site, knowledge of 
and involvement with legal processes, and life expectations.   
The main research site was established during the second trip from July to 
December 2007. By then I was comfortable traveling around the country and wanted to 
explore more to find a promising research site. It began with a language course in Zadar 
while staying with a local family. I then volunteered for six weeks at an NGO suggested 
by a human rights contact in Zagreb. Suncokret Center for Community Development is 
located in Gvozd, a village in Sisak county close to the Bosnian border. The word 
“suncokret” translates to “sunflower” and likely was chosen to reflect the organization’s 
sunny, positive outlook. Here I worked with adults and youth trying to build bridges 
across ethnic lines which broadened my understanding of current social issues stemming 
from the 1990s conflict. For the next three months while living in Zagreb I kept contact 
with people in Gvozd and started formulating a research plan to be implemented there. 
During this period I lived in the city with two young Croat professionals as roommates 
and took an additional language course at the University of Zagreb. The perspectives of 
my roommates on the war and ethnic relations seemed to differ from my contacts in 
Gvozd in ways that signaled that their social class and urban life were important factors. 
This observation reinforced my decision to concentrate research in the rural setting of 
Gvozd where national politics were rivaled by local agendas and where people were more 
directly involved with the conflict itself. The research domains were explored through 
key informant interviews, unstructured observation and participant observation on this 
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trip, resulting in better definition and identification of those domains and the methods 
needed to proceed.   
Over the next semester I wrote grant proposals and refined the methods to be used 
upon my return to Gvozd for the summer in 2008. The research began with broad open-
ended questions eliciting life stories and opinions which led to the creation of a structured 
interview for the collection of quantitative data. The people who participated in the 
research came from a stratified network sample formed with the assistance of key 
informants of different genders, ages and ethnicities. This longer stay in Gvozd enabled 
me to build new relationships and learn more about the complex interplay of politics, 
economics, religion and ethnicity in everyday lives. This gave me a better view of the 
society as a whole and therefore the issues influencing conceptions of the rule of law. 
Semi-structured and structured interviews conducted during this time collected valuable 
data regarding local legal consciousness to be later supplemented and explored during my 
final stay. 
My fourth trip to Croatia in January 2009 was also spent primarily in Gvozd. For 
six months I extended the research begun during the previous summer by continuing the 
structured interviews and conducting semi-structured interviews with key informants to 
seek more detail and operationalization of the factors and variables related to the analysis 
while testing preliminary conclusions (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999). This 
research design starts out with exploratory methods and proceeds by investigating the 
relationships between identified variables and their ability to explain people’s beliefs 
regarding justice for war crimes and the international efforts to strengthen the rule of law 
(Handwerker 2001). At the end of this period I also traveled to Osijek and Vukovar in the 
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Slavonia region to gain another perspective in this regionally diverse country on the 
pursuit of justice for the crimes of the 1990s conflict. A connection I had made 
previously with one of the NGOs monitoring domestic war crimes enabled this visit and 
shed light on the domestic efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Croatia.  
 
Data Collection 
The research presented here is was conducted through particiapt observation, 
semi-structured interviews and structured interviews/surveys (for overview, see Table 1). 
Throughout the entire research period I gathered data through participant observation by 
living in the communities among local residents and participating in daily activities. In 
Gvozd, the main research site, I spent some time on most days at the Suncokret Center 
interacting with youth who gathered to work on art and educational activities or just to 
spend time with friends. The Center provides internet access, help with navigating 
through municipal and federal bureaucratic procedures, computer classes for kids and 
adults and, primarily, a place where nationalistic ideologies and music are not allowed. 
Also, sharing meals and neighborly coffee visits became a regular occurrence and at other 
times shopping at the local grocery store was a chance to build contacts and get used to a 
limited selection of food and goods. 
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Table 1: Research Methods and Implementation: 
 
Stage Methods Goals Implementation 
1  Literature review, 
preliminary travel 
to research sites 
Understand the 
research problem, 
identify relevant 
domains, and form 
hypotheses 
Began literature review in 2004 
through course work and 
independent study, two trips to 
sites (2006, 2007), conducted 
preliminary research 
2 Key informant 
interviews, 
unstructured 
observation, 
participant 
observation 
Define domains and 
identify related 
factors and variables  
Conducted key informant 
interviews, lived and volunteered 
in the research sites, made 
connections with informants and 
local scholars (2007) 
3 Semi-structured and 
structured 
interviews, 
participant 
observation 
Operationalization of 
factors and variables, 
build rapport with the 
community 
Lived in Gvozd and took part in 
community activities, conducted 
15 semi-structured and 85 
structured interviews (2008) 
 4 Semi-structured and 
structured 
interviews, 
participant 
observation 
Further testing of 
hypotheses, 
operationalization of 
relevant variables and 
their relationships 
Continued participant 
observation, conducted 15 
additional semi-structured and 
49 structured interviews (2009) 
 
Building on my research through particpiant observation I developed semi-
structured interviews to gain a deeper understanding of the local legal consciousness. The 
semi-structured interviews allowed people to use their own terminology to explore the 
variability of opinions.  Some of the questions that I posed were: (1) What do you 
understand as ‘justice’ for war crimes?  What do you see as the biggest obstacles to 
achieving justice for war crimes? (2) What kind of impact has the ICTY had on everyday 
life in Croatia?  (3) What are the most important changes needed to improve your life?  
(4) Where do you find trustworthy information about the ICTY? (5) Do you agree with 
ICTY judgements? For this stage, a quota sample was sought by including people from 
diverse groups, of various ages and different socio-economic background. Some of these 
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thirty interviews were conducted with lawyers, teachers, and government personnel. The 
settings for these interviews included coffee shops, the Suncokret center and the person’s 
home. The interviews were conducted with the aid of a local research assistant for added 
rapport with participants and accuracy of translation when needed.   
In order to gather data to make quantitative comparisons I chose to conduct 
structured interviews as a main component of the research. Participants for the structured 
interviews were selected by quota network samples as used for the semi-structured 
interviews.  It was restricted to local residents aged twenty and older so that they would 
have some personal memory of the conflict and aftermath.  An equal number of men and 
women were successfully sought to limit a gender bias simply by working with key 
informants of both genders that had different networks. Roughly half of the participants 
were self-identified as Croat and the other half as Serb by using the same strategy. A total 
of 134 structured interviews were conducted between June 2008 and June 2009.  
Different procedures were used to conduct these interviews based on the informants’ 
language skills, comfort level, and timing. On some occasions the interview was 
conducted by me asking the questions and recording the answers, other times a research 
assistant took this role and in some cases the informant wrote down their own responses. 
The interviews included: 1) demographic data, 2) attitude toward ICTY activities, 3) 
attitude toward EU (ICTY compliance effects EU membership), 4) legitimacy of various 
judicial entities, 5) dilemmas that demonstrate moral reasoning, 6) How ICTY decisions 
affect feeling of personal safety.  These interviews enhanced the qualitative data by 
building on the findings of semi-structured interviews and allow for quantitative analysis.   
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Data collected from each step is used to build cultural models for comparison 
with the international conceptions of the rule of law (D’Andrade and Strauss 1992). The 
participants defined the variables, such as ethnicity, identity, nationality, and economic 
well-being, throughout the research process, rather than having my own ideas impose a 
specific definition.  The evidence required to address the research question consists of 
people’s attitudes toward the ICTY, perceptions of accountability, fairness and security 
and their own methods of negotiating conflict to ascertain the local legal consciousness.  
It also consists of conceptualizing the rule of law from an international legal perspective 
to evaluate the convergence between the two. This research was funded at different stages 
by the Anthropology Department, Human Rights Institute and Graduate School at the 
University of Connecticut and by the National Science Foundation.  
 
 
Analytical Constraints 
It is important to recognize the limitations of the research presented here. Like 
any research endeavor the circumstances and methods yield information that must be 
interpreted carefully without over-generalization. Participant observation was aided by a 
few key informants who shared invaluable insights, personal stories, and helped me to 
make connections in the community. Some of these people were what Bernard refers to 
as “solid insiders” who “say they feel somewhat marginal to their culture by virtue of 
their intellectualizing of and disenchantment with their culture” (2002:190). That critical 
perspective helps an outsider like myself understand things better. It also brings the 
potential to miss some of the variety of local perspectives. 
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The structured data collection took place only in Gvozd with a non-probability 
sample of that population. The people who participated were largely chosen due to their 
connection with the local NGO Suncokret or through their network of family and friends. 
That connection likely biased the sample to include people more likely to be tolerant of 
inter-ethnic socialization, a goal of the organization, and a somewhat higher awareness of 
human rights and general international issues. The surveys inform us about how those 
particular people answered particular questions that to a degree is also informative about 
the wider population in Gvozd and Croatia. The questions of the survey themselves have 
their own limitations and were possibly interpreted differently by the people who 
answered them, thus some error is inherent to the survey process.  
While I believe the data from Gvozd sheds an important light on larger issues 
relevant throughout Croatia, the background of the people in this location is not typical of 
Croatia. The Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees will differ in some ways from the 
“Croatian Croats” who are the majority of the country. The survey data can be 
generalized to Gvozd, the counties of Sisak and nearby Karlovac, and the country of 
Croatia with cautions about how much the data truly reflects the people in those larger 
groupings. For reference, the 134 people who completed the surveys come from the 
municipality of Gvozd that has a population of about 3,000 which means about 4% of the 
people participated.  
The quantitative data is evaluated using univariate and bivariate analysis methods 
to look closely at the data itself and explore correlations between variables. The software 
used for quantitative analysis is SPSS, statistical analysis software for the social sciences. 
I use the data to describe the sample of people that completed the surveys more than to 
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infer generalizations. Where I do think the data represents something shared beyond the 
sample population I often reference other data sources to demonstrate that similarity. As 
with any correlations a causal link is not implied from the statistics alone. Unidentified 
and unknown intervening variables may affect the correlations presented from the survey 
data. In my analysis of the research findings I use my own judgment along with statistical 
calculations of likelihood and significance to make interpretations.  
 
Local History 
It is useful to begin with some explanation of how Croatia became the newly 
independent state that is currently vying for accession to the European Union. The 
development of political pressures that exist today will be clarified in the process of this 
explanation. Croatia is considered a part of Southeastern Europe and has long been 
considered a borderland to the Muslim world for Western Europeans (Goldstein 1999: 
30). It is situated on the Adriatic Sea to the east of Italy and south of Slovenia, Hungary 
and Austria. Croatia’s eastern border is shared with Serbia and to the south it is bordered 
by Bosnia Herzegovina. It is an oddly shaped state with an extensive coastline to the west 
and narrower territory extending to the east. In the past, this land was under the control of 
the Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. It formed a 
part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the early 1900s, that later became 
the Republic of Yugoslavia (Goldstein 1999:112, 153). This republic was a federation of 
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.  
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During World War II, the German Nazi regime occupied much of this area and 
the involvement of some Croats with this regime was later used to incite Serb nationalism 
in the ethnic cleansing of the early 1990s. These Croats participated in the genocide of 
people targeted by the Nazis (including Jews, Roma, and homosexuals) and extended the 
massacres to ethnic Serbs (Goldstein 1999: 136-9). According to Hagan, “a half-million 
Serbian lives were lost to the Nazi-inspired Croatian ‘Ustasha,’ many at the infamous 
Jasenovac extermination camp (Hagan 2003: 10)”. Josip Tito’s partisans and Soviet 
forces freed the area from German control, and then performed their own mass 
executions of the Croats who supported the Nazis and of Germans within Yugoslav 
borders. “In retaliation, more than a hundred thousand Croatians were killed by Tito-led 
forces (Hagan 2003: 10).” The military success over the Nazi puppet regime is mainly 
credited to Tito and not the Soviet aid, which helps to explain some of Yugoslavia’s 
distance (in terms of control) from Soviet influence despite the installation of a 
communist government after WWII. Many socialist policies were put in place at this 
time, though Yugoslavs were allowed some private ownership rights to property, goods 
and small business. Under Tito’s four decade-long reign the Yugoslav identity was 
publicly placed before “nationalist” identities such as Serb, Croat or Muslim (Bringa 
1995:77).   
 In the 1970’s, Croat intellectuals and younger political hopefuls that felt Croats 
were not given a strong enough voice in government headed a nationalist movement 
known as the “Croatian Spring” (Goldstein 1999:180). Tito displayed no tolerance for 
this dissent and many Croats involved in the movement were jailed, exiled or left the 
country of their own accord. There exists speculation that if these Croats had been 
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allowed to stay involved in the political sphere, the events after Tito’s death would have 
taken a more peaceful course (Pusić 1998:112). Tito’s purging is one source of the 
extensive Croat diaspora that exists today with significant ethnic populations in 
neighboring states, Australia, and the United States (Peisker 1999:354). The suppression 
of nationalist ideologies went in conjunction with a suppression of religious practices, 
whether Orthodox, Catholic or Muslim. This placement of communism over religion led 
to the association of communism with atheists and a Yugoslav identity opposed to ethno-
religious identities of the area (Bringa 1995:164).   
 The motto of Tito’s rule, “Brotherhood and Unity”, was tested when Tito’s death 
in 1980 left open a coveted position of power. Nationalist identities became a rallying 
point for political support (Silber and Little 1996:25-27). Verdery makes the case that 
Tito’s policies created this importance of ethno-religious national identity, even when he 
sought to equalize power between the Yugoslav states (Verdery 1998:7). Tito mandated 
political representation of ethno-religious minorities in all the states, for example Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims (Muslim was considered by Tito to be a political category, not a 
religious one) each were recognized and proportionately represented in Bosnia’s 
government by law (Bringa 1995:9). The disintegration of communism in the late 1980s 
compounded the struggle for government control within Yugoslavia.  Serbs were the 
majority ethno-religious group and Slobodan Milošević was seen to be heading a 
movement to make Serbia the dominant power in the Yugoslav government (Gagnon 
2006; 2004:84). In response, Slovenes, Croats, and later Bosnians saw a dismal future for 
themselves in this federation of states and declared independence as autonomous states. 
They were recognized as such by the international community in 1992 as a military clash 
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took place between Croatia and the Yugoslav army, the JNA, (mostly made up of people 
with a Serb ethno-religious identity) in a fight over borderlines (Silber and Little 
1996:201).   
The ethno-religious identities recognized by Tito did not equate to any geographic 
reality (Bringa 1995:27). People self-identified as Croats lived in Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and Bosnia Herzegovina (and other states). By many accounts, the conflict was 
a political attempt to seize power in which nationalist rhetoric was used to garner public 
support. The seizure of power included a reorganization of the borders to conform to the 
identity of people living on the land and movement or destruction of people to conform to 
borders, which was further complicated by the fact that most villages consisted of 
multiple ethno-religious nationalities (Verdery 1998:11). It was also complicated by the 
fact that many people have mixed ethnic ancestries. Other accounts, also numerous, 
attribute the conflict to “ancient ethnic hatreds” and the “backwardness” of the Balkans, 
explaining that, “hatreds of and resentment against members of other ethnic groups, 
rooted very deeply in the culture and society of the region and submerged for fifty years, 
[that] suddenly burst to the surface with the weakening of communist rule (Gagnon 
2006:Appendix). The violence did not fall neatly along ethnic lines and so any accounts 
that use ethnicity as an explanation for the conflict fall short of a complete (and accurate) 
description. Gagnon’s analysis identifies a strategy of demobilization that used fear to 
keep opposition at bay by labeling people who questioned the nationalist agendas as 
traitors (Gagnon 2006:182).  
During this time many Croats also fled the state to escape the violence, 
contributing to the growing number of Croats outside of Croatia’s border. This 
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contributed to the changing composition of the area due to the displacement of Serbs in 
1995. “The mass exodus of about 180,000 Croatian Serbs before, during and after the 
fighting made Croatia more ethnically homogenous by reducing the ethnic-Serb share of 
Croatia’s population from 12 percent to less than 5 percent,” though these numbers are 
debated (Pusić 1998:115). Croats participated in the conflict both as aggressors (towards 
Serbs and Muslims), and as victims (mostly at the hands of Serbs) (Silber and Little 
1996:246). Conflicts between Croats and ethnic Serbs living within Croat borders began 
soon after the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. “Thousands were killed and 
wounded; hundreds of thousands became refugees (Pusić 1998:114).” The cities of 
Vukovar and Dubrovnik were all but destroyed and Serb forces occupied much of the 
interior section of Croatia on the Bosnian border, a third of the state’s territory (Bideleux 
and Jeffries 2007:202).     
Croatian Croat forces in conjunction with ethnic-Croat forces in Bosnia led 
attacks on Serbs, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Pusić describes the role-reversal 
from the Croat perspective, “Their country, which had so recently been the victim of 
aggression, was now acting as an aggressor in neighboring Bosnia. Croats were 
committing atrocities not unlike those that had been committed against their compatriots 
only a few months earlier (Pusić 1998:114)”. In the mid-1990s, the greatest number of 
deaths and injuries took place in Bosnia, mostly of Bosnian Muslims at the hands of 
Serbs and Croats (Silber and Little 1996:27). Most of Croatia’s territory in the Krajina 
region was taken back from Croatian Serb forces during Operation Storm led by General 
Ante Gotovina after Milošević withdrew support for the Serb groups in Croatia. Pillaging 
and murder of the remaining Serbs by the Croat forces accompanied the campaign for 
29 
 
control of this territory, adding to the violence (Pusić 1998:115). The conflict ended in 
1995 as a result of international intervention with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accords that created a situation in which there were no real winners and many were left 
feeling like losers (Silber and Little 1996:377). The Republic of Croatia continues to 
debate treatment of refugees from the ethnic cleansing and many Croats deny that the 
state played an aggressive role in the conflict. The new Croatian state is a struggling 
democracy seeking economic development and a way to deal with its past.    
 
Current Life, Needs and Challenges 
Nearly everywhere that I traveled in Croatia people exclaimed how wonderful 
Croatia is and how I must understand that it is the most beautiful country and is steeped 
in tradition. Those traditions vary by region and the particular history of each area. After 
Slovenia (EU member in 2004), Croatia is considered to be the most economically 
developed of the former Yugoslav states. Geography has influenced the exposure to 
cultural influences from existing member states and how those states perceive Croatia. 
There has been a strong Italian influence in the coastal areas where the culture is 
considered to be more Mediterranean, while the inland areas share more similarities with 
central Europe. Croats tend to view themselves as more “Western European” than other 
former members of Yugoslavia (with the sometime exception of Slovenia).  
Through my travels I noticed a meaningful distinction between urban and rural 
culture. This dichotomy often came up in interviews when people in the cities were 
viewed as having different priorities than those from the village. Some differences in 
wealth are apparent based on physical appearance and activities. In Zagreb and other 
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cities people wear expensive brand name clothes and seem very appearance oriented. 
Women generally wear very feminine and form fitting clothing (dresses or skirts), while 
men stick to more business-like attire. Saturday morning coffee at the right café is 
practically a mandatory social gathering. My discussions in Zagreb often turned to 
international politics, Croatia’s ascension to EU membership, and shopping. In Gvozd 
and other small towns some women and men did dress with the trends, but more often the 
stereotypical clothing for the oldest generation was wearing business jackets and dark 
colors (black head scarves for women), for the middle generation house or work clothing 
was common, and the youngest dress something like American skaters or punks with 
asymmetrical haircuts and skinny jeans. Conversations in Gvozd centered on the lack of 
opportunities in the region, but frequently people stated that they preferred the rural 
landscape and lifestyle over cramped, loud city life. 
Men of all ages are often drinking kava (coffee) or beer at the café. For a small 
village Gvozd has many cafés, about six in the town center. There is, however, only one 
restaurant along with two bakeries and five small grocery stores. The cafés are each 
informally affiliated with a particular ethnic identity with the only exception being also 
the largest and most modern facility. Nationalistic music is not uncommon in the cafes, 
nor are arguments and physical violence. The newest café is located in the recently 
renovated market area where several new businesses opened shops in the permanent outer 
ring building that circles the open market tables. A hair salon, insurance office, and 
bakery share the space and there are vacant sections for future use. Gvozd does not have 
a bank branch and most financial transactions are conducted at the post office by using 
the one ATM located in front of a café, or by traveling to Topusko or Karlovac. On 
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certain days there is a large line out the post office door when people come from all over 
the municipality to pay for their utilities or pick up government assistance funds.  
Many people do not own a car and will walk miles to do their errands; some even 
take a cart pulled by horses to town. Buses are a major mode of transportation locally and 
regionally. Many people commute to work in the surrounding towns via bus or take it to 
shop at the larger markets. School children beyond 8th grade must travel at least 20 
minutes, sometimes an hour, to reach their school daily on the public bus which is 
crowded and loud. For many families the children attend the school for which the parents 
can afford the daily bus fare, rather than based on the school’s specialization or quality of 
education. Students are asked to choose a particular career much earlier than in the 
United States. Many students in Gvozd choose to specialize in being a waiter or waitress 
or to enter the hospitality industry at the age of fourteen based on the school they attend.   
Only 54% (n=72) of participants in the survey were employed at the time of this 
research. This was at least partly due to the high proportion of older residents in the 
population, but there is also a major lack of employment opportunities. Many younger 
Serbs who were displaced from this area during Operation Storm in 1995 chose to stay in 
Serbia or seek refugee in other countries in the hopes of greater employment 
opportunities and so most returnees were older adults that had grown up in Gvozd (then 
Vrginmost) and had many memories there. The high rate of unemployment is also a 
product of the lack of industry revitalization in this region after the conflict. The Croatian 
government has offered economic incentives to bring more industry back (prior to the 
conflict there was a furniture factory in Gvozd, now all wood is exported in raw form), 
but, according to key informants, this strategy has yielded mostly corrupt endeavors that 
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fail to provide jobs or stimulate the local economy.  The jobs available locally included 
forestry department work, skilled trades, shop clerks, wait staff, local government and 
school positions (K-8 only). Landing a government job is a prized achievement because 
of the job security and a perception of invincibility. Somewhat as a carryover from 
communism, government workers often have a great deal of control and leeway in the 
service they give. Having a friend or relative was and is critical for getting approvals or 
permissions granted. The bureaucracy is very imposing. My own experience getting visa 
approval nearly altered this research project. Clerks at the police stations continually 
demanded paperwork beyond that required at the national level and continued review past 
deadlines for my stay without the visa approval. Going to the police office was a chaotic, 
exhaustive event where people literally elbow in front of you in line and service was not 
with a smile. The atmosphere at post offices and stores that were once government 
operated is similar.  
 Homes often consist of multiple generations who pool resources. One of my key 
informants was a smart, college-educated young woman dating a local young man with a 
steady job. They considered marriage, but couldn’t afford a home of their own. Living 
separately with their parents each had good food and family support that they did not 
want to give up. Due to the fall of communism and displacement of Serbs from the area 
and of Croats from other regions rights to homes in Gvozd are not clear cut. Some 
Bosnian refugees who were given permission by the Croatian government to take up 
residence in houses and apartments previously occupied by Serbs were required to 
relocate when the Serb owner returned, others were not and the Serb owner had to deal 
with the loss. As can be imagined, disputes regarding ownership abound. The situation 
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with apartments is even more complicated because having previously been jointly owned 
by “the people” under communism the right to property ownership is now contested. 
Under some agreements the Croatian government gave the use of a particular apartment 
to a family with the stipulation that it is a temporary arrangement, but with no end date. 
Families live in fear that they may be kicked out of their homes at any time.  
The housing conditions are often crowded with two rooms for a family of five, 
including the kitchen. Much needed renovation of select apartment buildings took place 
during my stay. In these cases occupants were moved to other housing while the building 
was torn down and rebuilt from scratch. In some of the older apartments conditions were 
quite difficult. One had no working water in the kitchen so dishes must be washed in the 
bathroom. Common area windows are broken allowing drafts and rain to enter. When it is 
cold outside homes are heated with wood from the local forests. Chopping firewood is a 
year-round activity and women often stay home all day and tend the fires throughout the 
cold season in addition to cooking and taking care of children. The family structure 
remains somewhat patriarchal, though modernization, urbanization and the disruptive 
effects of violent conflict have led to many different types of living arrangements.  
Some research questions were oriented to gauge perceived quality of life, often 
comparing different time periods and thus linked to various historical events such as the 
end of communism in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the violent 
conflict which led to Croatia’s independence. This line of questioning was stimulated by 
preliminary, informal conversations with people in Croatia during which two strong and 
opposing views were expressed: one insisted on the great equality, stability and lack of 
crime during communist times and the other portrayed the same era as repressive and 
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corrupt. Some variability is likely based on the person’s socio-economic status and 
association (or disassociation) with the Communist Party. Many people referred to an 
inability to alter the political system, often characterized as grossly corrupt, and the 
prevalence of nepotism both today and during the past several decades under Tito’s rule.  
There was close to an equal divide regarding the question asking which statement 
is more true: “If you work hard you can succeed in life” or “Who you know is more 
important than how hard you work,” though slightly more people, 52% (n=70), chose the 
statement that who you know is more important. There appears to be a feeling of inability 
to change, almost that the society is more powerful than the individual. One informant 
explained it as, “They (the politicians) play the music and then we must dance to it, we 
don’t pick the music.” In the surveys I asked what would most significantly improve 
participant’s life in Gvozd with the following options: more job opportunities, owning a 
home, greater trust within the community, better health and an option allowing people to 
write in their own ideas. The most common answer given by 42% (n=56) of people was 
for more job opportunities. Many people chose to select multiple answers and 25% 
(n=33) more people included more job opportunities in their answer, indicating that in 
total 67% (n=89) believed this to be of significant importance to their life quality. In 
interviews many people said that they didn’t want to be rich or famous, just to have 
enough money and security to live a decent life.  
Another question asked for a comparison between ethnic relations among Croats, 
Muslims and Serbs in the 1980s and today. Of the 124 people that responded to this 
question 17% (n=23) said ethnic relations are better today, 20% (n=27) answered that 
they were the same, and 58% (n=78) replied that ethnic relations are worse today (see 
35 
 
Graph 1.1). Opinions of this statement did not differ significantly by the gender of the 
informant, but their ethnic identity did appear to have an influence. There are obviously 
still tensions that play out of local social life and politics.  
 
Graph 1.1: Comparing ethnic relations between the 1980s and today  
 
 
The definition of a Croat is not a purely political identity as is usually meant by 
the term American (a citizen of the United States of America). An identity is a term of 
belonging to a group that has some common element. Self-identity is often made in 
relation to what you don’t identify with as much as what you do (ex. Croat equals not-
Serb or Muslim). Anderson focuses on national identities as “imagined communities” that 
contain the paradox of “the ‘political’ power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical 
poverty and even incoherence (Anderson 1991: 5)”. This paradox certainly exists for the 
Croat nationalist identity which has only recently been attached to an independent state, 
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though a powerful term for hundreds of years. The definition of a Croat has more to do 
with religious association (Catholic) and common descent than a defined territory.  The 
importance of language in creating and empowering nationalities is stressed by Anderson 
through an account of how Western Europe’s nations (among others) developed.  In 
Croatia, previous to the conflict, the predominant language spoken was called Serbo-
Croatian.  This was essentially the same language spoken in Serbia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina; though Serbs used a Cyrillic alphabet as opposed to the Croats’ Latin 
alphabet (Bosnian publications generally used both or switched frequently). Once Croatia 
declared independence their language was renamed “Croatian” and differences were 
accentuated to define it as a distinct language. In this way, history was rewritten to the 
extent that this name change was validated by citing distinctions between Serbian and 
Croatian language as proof of irreconcilable differences between Serbs and Croats.  
I find it interesting that distinctions like those used to separate a Serbian language 
from a Croatian language exist in a similar way within Croatian regional dialects. There 
are three main dialects of Croatian that are defined by their term for the word “what”.  
The što dialect is associated with the capital, Zagreb, and is considered a more formal 
version of Croatian, though there are even variations within this dialect.  The formal 
version is taught in schools across the country, but people often use a regional dialect in 
conversation. The existence of such a high degree of language variation may be 
representative of the many different conceptualizations of Croatian culture. 
The implications of applying Anderson’s theory to the Croat case are most 
significant on the subject of forming class identities. Anderson concentrates on 
nationalism, but there are many other forms of “imagined communities”. If we see 
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different dialects being used in rural and urban (and supposedly by elite versus working 
class) areas this supports a division beyond language that unifies these groups. The Croat 
Diaspora is another aspect of Croat identity that has been formed through mass 
emigrations, first during the “Croatian Spring” in the 1970’s when mostly elite and upper 
class Croats fled persecution from Tito, and secondly during the Serb-Croat conflict 
when working class Croats fled from Serb forces (Tanner 1997). In some respects the 
individuals considered to be Croat are more likely to include people who emigrated 
during these times than Serbs or Muslims living within Croatia’s borders. Croatia’s 
imagined community is then extended beyond a geographic boundary and becomes even 
more “imagined.”  
 Leonard and Kaneff (2002) make connections between categories of urban/rural, 
public/private and upper/lower class in post-socialist countries. They start with 
examining the term “peasant” in situations where socialist policies are being replaced by 
capitalist privatization. Peasants are not only agricultural workers but include industrial 
wage laborers and other occupations usually considered to be working class. Leonard and 
Kaneff review historical interpretations of peasantry as divisions of ‘modes of thought’ 
between “science and rationality’ and peasantry as representing the primitive.  They see a 
disregard for the interests of peasants as capitalism unfolds, “Capitalism progresses by 
playing to tensions already present within the peasant communities, for example the 
interests of provincial elites against others; and ultimately, market development means 
peasants are displaced as land is commoditized (Leonard and Kaneff 2002:23)”.  The 
same type of phenomenon is happening in Croatia as capitalism is pushed by the elite, 
even though property was never communal in Croatia to the extent it was in other 
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socialist states. Many of the people who came out the 1990s conflict with power and 
wealth were the ones that bypassed trade embargos to smuggle in weapons and goods and 
took part in theft and destruction.  
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Chapter 3 – Anthropology and the Rule of Law 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I review the literature that informed this research and explain how 
my findings contribute to this knowledge. It relates to many sub-disciplines within 
anthropology and to other disciplines due to the focus on human rights, local legal 
consciousness and transitional justice. As discussed below, most literature on the rule of 
law examines institutional level reforms and compliance, a structural approach. I build on 
some calls for a more norms-based approach that seeks to understand how the rule of law 
is perceived in the local legal consciousness and strengthen the rule of law by creating 
real changes to existing power relationships.  
 
Anthropology and Law 
 From the time that the discipline took shape, anthropologists took an interest in 
the variety of rules and norms found in societies. The content of legal anthropology 
ranges from more informal customs to the formal, written laws that dictate how to behave 
and the repercussions for stepping outside the line of accepted behavior. “Law is a basic, 
constitutive attribute of our social consciousness. It is a particular way of organizing 
meaning and force, and it is out of this that both law in action and law on the books 
proceed (Silbey 2005:37).” The focus of anthropology expanded from the “other” to 
include “ourselves” as the discipline grew and with this move more attention was given 
40 
 
to understanding legal systems previously assumed to embody fairness (i.e. American 
and European legal institutions), but after investigation appeared to be biased and 
perpetuate structural inequalities. Written law and law as it is experienced by the 
individual social actor became understood as distinct aspects of the law. Anthropological 
studies of colonialism also contributed to an expansion of our understanding of what is 
law by demonstrating that imposed legal systems do not replace existing methods of 
conflict resolution. Rather, particular legal pathways are chosen by or imposed upon 
people based on factors such as the domain (ex. taxes, family or property dispute), 
convenience, and possible outcomes. This concept of legal pluralism recognizes that legal 
systems coexist, and perhaps they do so now more than ever because as international law 
grows the layers of law that govern any individual become more complex.  
The anthropological study of law that is interested in how (and if) people 
maneuver through legal domains, stake claims, and internalize legal norms – the social 
context of law – was first labeled as legal realism in the early twentieth century. At the 
turn of the twenty-first century a renewed interest in legal realism surfaced, labeled the 
new legal realism, which shares the perspective of “law as it is practiced in everyday life, 
focusing on ordinary people as well as legal elites” with the previous incarnation (Merry 
2006:975). Merry describes new legal realism as an extension of its first form to include 
the phenomena of an increasingly global world. She asserts that it encompasses 
transnational and multi-national sited ethnography, takes on the subjects of international 
law and human rights law, and builds on new dimensions of legal inquiry such as legal 
consciousness (Merry 2006:976). The current study attempts to address many of these 
components of a new legal realism. In particular, I use a methodology that “tracks the 
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flows of people, ideas, laws, and institutions across national boundaries and examines 
particular nodes and sites within this field of transnational circulation” (Merry 2006:976). 
In this case the site is a village in Croatia consisting of people with various roles in the 
1990s violence and the subject of analysis is the flow of rule of law norms between the 
international and local levels. This is a study of the local legal consciousness to ascertain 
if it is consistent with international agendas to strengthen the rule of law. According to 
Silbey, “The study of legal consciousness is the search for the forms of participation and 
interpretation through which actors construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend the 
circulating (contested or hegemonic) structures of meanings concerning law (Silbey 
2005:334).” Here I seek to understand if members of a rural, post-conflict community 
“construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend” the tenets of a rule of law system currently 
being advocated by international actors.  
The discussion of a gap between people’s expectations of justice and the reality of 
legal processes has a precedent in theoretical debates regarding popular legal 
consciousness in U.S. domestic courts (Merry 2003, Silbey 2005). Legal anthropologists 
document that plaintiffs’ expectations and conceptions of justice change over time 
through their participation in the legal process (Merry 2003). Individuals approach a legal 
system with expectations of a specific result that will satisfy their personal sense of 
justice, but often, by the end of the process, they have internalized the view that the law is 
for upholding rules without real questioning of the law’s validity or moral basis. Whether 
this same internalization of legal norms occurs when justice is pursued by an 
international tribunal is part of the question posed by this research. People may develop 
conceptions of justice and beliefs regarding the rule of law based on the actions (and 
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perhaps simply the existence) of the ICTY, but that cannot be the sole source. Conflicts 
and wrongdoing occur at all levels of society and people deal with them as part of their 
everyday life. The means that are effective at resolving those conflicts, those that people 
directly experience, certainly contribute to their overall cultural understanding of what 
the rule of law is and how it fits into their lives. There is also a gap between people’s 
expectations of international human rights law and the reality of what outcomes that law 
can produce in regards to actual change and achieving justice. The idea of justice in and 
of itself is so difficult to define in a manner that all victims could agree upon that its 
attainment is nearly impossible. Still, even the attempt to achieve justice can be 
extremely meaningful and I do not take the pessimistic view that efforts to achieve justice 
are destined to be fruitless. In fact, the research here suggests the efforts do make an 
impact as will be detailed in the analysis below. 
 
International Human Rights Law 
International human rights law is defined by a web of treaties, declarations, 
agreements and custom. While this area of law may be described to be in a state of 
development there is a strong trend of recognition for human rights and public support for 
their protection to the point that non-compliance with human rights standards often 
results in international pressures to comply or even intervention. Some aspects of the law 
have a more solid grounding than others in terms of a global consensus and perceived 
legitimacy. Early examples of protections include anti-piracy agreements and restriction 
on the power of rulers. Rights are categorized as civil, political, economic or social. 
Today, human rights may refer to more basic rights such as a right to be free from torture 
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and arbitrary detainment or extend to other types of rights such as a right to food and 
work. Merry (2006) and Wilson (2006) examine the intersection of anthropology and 
human rights and give direction for future research that focuses on the “culture of human 
rights” and the “social life of rights,” respectively.  This research will complement and 
extend further the insights of both of these approaches by examining how daily life in a 
Croatian community affected by political violence is framed and influenced by 
developments in international human rights law.   
The pursuit of judicial accountability for human rights violations is, in many 
respects, a recent development in international and domestic law. In the past heads of 
state were protected by observances of sovereign immunity for actions against their own 
people and those that carried out their orders have stood behind a “duty to obey” to evade 
responsibility (Robertson 2000). The trials at Nuremberg after World War II represent the 
first shift in paradigm on issues of sovereignty and individual responsibility. Leaders of 
the Nazi regime were held accountable through trials for their commands that led to 
hundreds of thousands of deaths. The mass atrocities of the Holocaust caused the world 
to reflect upon minimum standards of living and a respect for life that should apply to all.  
In consequence, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was written and has 
become the foundation of human rights law in combination with the legal proceedings of 
the Nuremberg trials (Robertson 2000). In terms of impartiality the Nuremberg trials did 
not meet ideals, often criticized as an example of “victor’s justice”, and much time passed 
before there was another attempt to hold leaders accountable at the international level. 
The record of human rights law application in domestic courts is sparse and, when it has 
occurred, the trials are often deemed more of a spectacle than a just prosecution (Wilson 
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2005: 908). The ICTY was formed as an ad-hoc international criminal court for the 
violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia. This mechanism of judicial 
accountability for the violations of human rights represents another important step for 
human rights law, despite its imperfections. In response to the violence of Yugoslavia’s 
break-up war crimes prosecutions are conducted internationally by the ICTY and 
domestically in Croatia and other states of the former Yugoslavia. It is one example of 
what is now termed as transitional justice, attempts to right the wrongs of a previous 
regime that abused the human rights of its citizens and others as a new government is 
built.  
Transitional justice programmes can involve truth-seeking processes that 
map patterns of past violence, and unearth the causes and consequences of 
such destructive events; prosecution initiatives that ensure a fair trial 
of those accused of committing crimes, including serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and crimes involving human rights 
violations; reparations programmes that provide a range of material and 
symbolic benefits to victims; and institutional reform that includes vetting 
the public service to remove from office those public employees 
personally responsible for gross violations of human rights 
(www.unrol.org accessed 9/9/12). 
 
In response to genocide, apartheid, mass “disappearances” and torture in Latin America, 
Africa and Eastern Europe, a dispute has arisen over how to best address the rights of 
victims in periods of transition.  
The Nuremberg trials established a model of retributive justice which has been 
built upon in various contexts since (Borneman 1997, Robertson 2000, Bass 2000, 
Hayner 2003). Following a retributive justice approach, perpetrators are punished in 
some form to compensate for the wrongs they have inflicted on others. Retributive justice 
in the form of a criminal trial is critical because it is a public acknowledgement that 
leaders are responsible for wrongdoing and a public recognition that the victim’s were 
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harmed wrongly. In addition it provides a negative consequence for abusing human 
rights, there is a potential deterrent effect (by its nature this is complicated to assess), it 
creates documentation and a professional assessment of the events that took place and 
provides some resolution to the conflict. The other main approach to justice in periods of 
transition is that of restorative justice championed by Desmond Tutu and others in post-
apartheid South Africa. A restorative approach is more victim-centered in that the 
primary focus is restoring the victims’ dignity and providing victims with a public forum 
to voice their side of events. It usually includes a type of truth commission with varying 
degrees of domestic and international involvement to uncover the truth about the crimes 
which took place such as what happened to lost relatives, where bodies are buried, and 
who was responsible for the crimes (though usually not with the intention to prosecute 
those responsible). Both of these approaches may include demotions, bars from 
government office, and the reparations to victims in their pursuit of justice. The success 
of any approach will be influenced by the nature of the tranistion and degree to which 
positions of power are still held by leaders of the previous regime responsible for the 
crimes.  
Critiques of retributive and restorative justice have led to debates about one or the 
other being the best model, but today most transitional justice planning explicitly 
includes elements of both in recognition of the benefits each brings to the turmoil of 
transitions. During mass atrocities people have extremely varied experiences and even 
those with similar situations may diverge greatly in how they conceive of justice for the 
harms that occurred. Each transition is unique so the pursuit of justice must take the local 
context into consideration, in other words a model successful in one particular situation 
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will likely not work in the same way elsewhere. Justice may take place in the public 
realm through trials, but often justice at the individual level requires a more restorative 
approach. Therefore these approaches are complimentary and need not be seen in 
opposition. There is, however, a continuing argument about the relative importance of 
components within each approach. Proponents of restorative justice sometimes challenge 
the ideals of retributive justice by claiming that trials incite further conflict and emotional 
distress, even perpetuating cycles of violence, by keeping the feelings of hurt and anger 
alive in the minds of all survivors (Minow 1998, Roht-Arriaza and Gibson 1998, Popkin 
and Bhuta 1999). Proponents of retributive justice claim that trials are required to end 
cycles of violence because they represent an impartial judgment and legitimate resolution 
to the conflict without which feelings of hurt and resentment will fester and resurface 
(Borneman 1997, Robertson 2000).  
The choices a new regime makes in its early stages of development will certainly 
shape the direction of its future and international intervention is increasingly an 
influential part of that process. Certain crimes, such as those considered to be crimes 
against humanity, motivate an international response simply due to the level of atrocity 
(at least in some instances). In most transitional periods after mass violations of human 
rights there is a major focus on building institutions that is now being questioned. The 
need for institution building is clear, but the degree to which this is a focus in comparison 
to providing basic needs for the people who lived through the conflict is contested. The 
provision of housing, food, jobs and health care (including mental health care) may make 
much more of a real difference in peoples’ lives. If these needs are better met it is 
conceivable that it could affect whether or not victims hold onto feelings of anger and 
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pain that continue tensions. International human rights law is reinforced through trials for 
individuals who violate those laws with increasing frequency, making it difficult for 
crimes against humanity to be swept under the rug.  
A new regime must balance remembering the past with moving toward the future. 
At one extreme regimes purposefully “forget” the past by erasing or rewriting it in school 
texts and the media along with barring it from public discussion (for example Franco’s 
Spain). At the other end of the spectrum a new regime may imprint the crimes on the 
national psyche to the degree that people become overwhelmed by the past through 
continual reminders like public holidays, monuments, and repetition in public discourse 
(as may be said for post-Holocaust Germany). It is unavoidable that any approach to 
justice for the crimes will require some re-evaluation of what exactly took place. 
Remembering the past is also critical for the prevention of a re-occurrence, it is 
something to learn from and use to guide future decision-making. The key is not to get 
stuck in the past with the feelings of hurt, pain and resentment, but to build a new and 
more peaceful future.  
 
Interaction between the Local and Global 
 This is a study of local legal consciousness as much as it is an examination of 
international agendas to influence that legal consciousness. It is an intersection of the 
local and the global conceptions of the rule of law and human rights. In this way it 
informs the study of globalization by tracking a certain flow of ideas – the importance of 
a strong rule of law – between the local and global. The anthropology of globalization 
describes how culture becomes both deterritorialized and reterritorialized by the 
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movement of ideas, technology, economics, media and people across all types of 
boundaries (Inda and Rosaldo 2002:12). The research question of this study examines the 
flow of an attempt to territorialize a specific rule of law conception. Although I set out to 
understand how international processes are understood locally there is also another 
dimension to explore by looking at how local conceptions affect international processes. 
Surely there is already a greater emphasis in the anthropology of human rights, as 
characteristic of anthropology in general, to understand the life and needs of local 
populations to inform theories and therefore shape international policies. The conclusions 
of this study can also be taken to that next step, adding to the circular influence that the 
local and global have on each other.  
 Another way that this study informs processes of globalization is regarding Lutz 
and Sikkink’s idea of a “justice cascade” for human rights violations (2001). They 
describe it to be part of a larger human rights norms cascade in Latin America spurred on 
by events within Latin America and internationally (for example, the creation and 
successes of the ICTY) (2001:29). This cascade is described as a real change in society’s 
norms, values and ideas when it comes to human rights, or a “significant norms 
transformation” (2001:30). This change means that perpetrators of human rights 
violations are more likely to face real consequences for their crimes than they would have 
ten, twenty or fifty years ago – in Latin America and beyond. In the case of Argentina 
Sikkink explains that the combination of internal and external demands for individual 
accountability was needed to gain enough momentum to reach a tipping point in support 
that enabled trials to take place domestically (Sikkink 2011). Nettelfield relates Lutz and 
Sikkink’s justice cascade to her study of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s local perspective of 
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the ICTY (2010:277). She finds evidence of a justice cascade in the sense that the ICTY 
has helped to equip domestic courts in Bosnia to conduct impartial trials for war crimes, 
though the transfer of cases has had difficulties. She proposes that local initiatives can 
complement international attempts to provide justice such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda 
working in conjunction with the ICTR, the ICTY’s sister court at The Hague.   
Some critiques of international interventions in periods of transition and otherwise 
question the validity of international agendas. They claim that initiatives like the ICTY’s 
campaign to strengthen the rule of law in the Former Yugoslavia are really “Western” 
ideas being imposed on the rest of the world in a form of cultural imperialism. While 
there are credible arguments against those critiques (see Carothers 2003, Sen 2006) 
organizations like the United Nations take careful steps to demonstrate the validity of 
their agendas by pointing out instances of local support and successes. This is largely to 
negate claims that the UN’s actions are an outside imposition rather than provision of 
needed intervention. If a local culture of the rule of law exists in Croatia that is similar to 
what the ICTY condones then the UN’s undertaking here may be validated. Challenges 
faced by the ICTY, as well as successes, have and will continue to shape future 
international criminal courts.  
 
The Many Conceptions of “the Rule of Law” 
 What is the rule of law? In this paper I seek to understand the connection, if any, 
between international agendas to strengthen the rule of law and local communities 
targeted by those agendas. It is therefore important to clarify what is meant by “the rule 
of law” and how it is defined for the purposes of this evaluation. It is commonly 
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recognized among scholars that there is not a clear agreement on what the term “rule of 
law” specifically refers to although it is often cited as a justification for major political 
and economic strategies (See Tamanaha 2004:3, Carothers 2009:51, Nelson and 
Cabatingan 2009:2). In fact the term “rule of law” may be used to describe a wide range 
of judicial standards, accountability practices, and measures to enforce fairness. There are 
five recurrent themes identified by Kleinfeld Belton as, “making the state abide by law, 
ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing efficient and 
impartial justice, and upholding human rights” (2005:7). Tamanaha’s historical analysis 
starts with classical and medieval roots of restraint on the power of sovereigns, such as 
the Magna Carta of 1215, and some consensus required by the people to validate laws, 
such as with Germanic customary law (2004). Most definitions include this idea that 
leaders should be held accountable, though the form and degree greatly vary. In his 
discussion of developing democracies in Africa, Sklar looks for origins of a modern rule 
of law concept entwined with ideas of constitutionalism in the mid-1600s when the 
Levellers in England demanded accountability by, “establishing the rule of law as an 
alternative to either executive or legislative despotism” (Sklar 1987:694). In this version 
a separation of powers is inferred and additional danger seen in overstepping legislative 
authority.  
Tamanaha cites Hayek’s definition from The Road to Serfdom (1944) to be, “a 
concise and highly influential definition of the rule of law: ‘Stripped of all technicalities, 
this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced 
before-hand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual 
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affairs on the basis of this knowledge’” (Tamanaha 2004:65-66).  In Hayek’s definition 
there are allusions to a rule by law, restrictions on the use of power and a consistency in 
the application of law which promotes greater security in many respects. For Hayek, laws 
must be general (not made for a specific individual), equal (applied to all) and certain 
(always applied) to qualify as a rule of law system (Tamanaha 2004:66).   
Tamanaha’s own classification of the many versions of “rule of law” is divided 
into formal/procedural versions (concerned with the source of law) and substantive 
versions (additionally requiring a moral aspect) as well as placed upon a spectrum of thin 
to thick, meaning they include less to more cumulative requirements. He goes beyond 
issues of accountability to add the more recently associated moral dimension to the rule 
of law that requires the law to be just (Tamanaha 2004:91-92). From this classification he 
finds three “clusters of meaning” which are: 
1) Law placing limits on government power – This is the concept that law puts 
some restrictions on those in power, limiting the ability to treat citizens in an 
arbitrary fashion. This includes restricting a government leader’s capacity to 
change existing laws and their capacity to create laws. This notion of the rule 
of law refers to a government’s duties and obligations to its citizens, predating 
liberalism. 
2) Formal legality (rule by rules) – In this sense the rule of law is something that 
creates and maintains order in government. Here consistency in the 
application of law is crucial, allowing for people to know consequences of 
their actions beforehand and act accordingly. This also includes generality and 
equality before the law and excludes retroactive application of law. Formal 
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legality is the most commonly held meaning of the rule of law by liberalism 
and capitalism.  
3) Rule of law, as opposed to rule by people’s whims – In this view law is 
objective, not subjective as an emotional, biased, or irrational person’s rule 
could be. The most important protectors of the rule of law in this case are 
judges who personify the law by interpreting it rather than proclaiming it. 
Since people cannot be wholly objective this is an ideal that has the potential 
to be abused by individuals. (Tamanaha 2004:114-126) 
These “clusters of meaning” represent a variety of definitions for the term “rule of law” 
and in their adoption can lead to very different legal, political and economic systems. So, 
what then is the rule of law? As with many widely used terms the disagreement on a 
definition makes it challenging to evaluate. Generally, when referring to the rule of law in 
this writing I will use Hayek’s definition which incorporates accountability, consistency, 
impartiality, and security.  
Several points made by Tamanaha regarding the current discourse on the rule of 
law relate well to the current study and analysis. The first is a caution about assuming 
that a rule of law implies the law embodies fairness as seen in his description of the three 
clusters of meaning: “Neither democracy, nor individual rights, nor justice is necessarily 
implicated in any of these themes. This reminder is important because often the rule of 
law is discussed in a manner that claims its own legitimacy without respect to whether 
the law is just or conforms to the interests of the people (Tamanaha 2004:140)”. This 
statement warns us that an agenda to strengthen the rule of law may be strengthening 
laws that go against other possible objectives such as building a democracy and enforcing 
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human rights standards. The laws themselves may only serve the interests of the elite 
concerned with monopolizing power and still qualify as a rule of law system under some 
definitions of the term. For example, apartheid South Africa fits some definitions of a 
rule of law, except when equality before the law is taken to mean equal rights and 
treatment, regardless of skin color, as in more substantive versions. In any historical 
analysis of the rule of law definition attention to the era in question is critical to 
understanding what is meant by the term because in the past the rule of law was 
associated with more conservative political and economic views and today the more 
substantive version is associated with more liberal agendas and human rights.  
The second point from Tamanaha stresses the significance of public support for 
the rule of law. He states that, “Pervasive societal attitudes about fidelity to the rule of 
law – in each of the three meanings – is the mysterious quality that makes the rule of law 
work (Tamanaha 2004:141).” While an exact assessment of such attitudes is indeed 
difficult to assess, public support for rule of law initiatives does appear to be a necessary 
ingredient. For example; if judicial reforms are viewed as mere words on paper rather 
than actual changes to how law is applied, people may not show confidence in the new 
regime by invoking the courts to enforce rights. Instead, alternative methods to maintain 
their security may be chosen, perhaps by reinforcing internal ethnic divisions. My own 
research in Croatia includes some factors that contribute to such societal attitudes toward 
the rule of law – trust in institutions, levels of corruption, feelings of safety, and beliefs in 
the importance of impartiality – which will be analyzed below in regard to how they 
might demonstrate public support for the ideal of a rule of law.  
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Levi and Epperly (2009) recognize the importance of this “mysterious quality” 
that legitimates a rule of law and, consequentially, legitimates the state authority. They 
present a genuine rule of law regime to be in opposition to a coercive authority because 
there is a certain degree of voluntary compliance to the former. Beliefs which legitimate a 
rule of law regime, “are a consequence of other prior factors, most importantly the 
credible commitment of principled leadership, bureaucratic performance and integrity, 
and institutional arrangements that ensure the continued observance by leaders and 
bureaucrats to principles of the culture of law they are trying to realize (Levi and Epperly 
2009:208).” Levi and Epperly’s argument centers on the impact of “principled principals” 
which they describe to be leaders that transparently commit to a set of principals that 
uphold the rule of law and create restraints to their own power of their own accord to 
display that commitment – to the degree that it constitutes a costly signal (Levi and 
Epperly 2009:200). The need to legitimate a new government order is indeed a major 
challenge in all post-conflict societies that are cutting ties with the old regime that was 
often the source of past violence. An agenda to legitimate the new authority is critical for 
its longevity, so when strengthening the rule of law is a stated goal, public belief in the 
commitment by leaders will influence public belief in a working rule of law system.  
The idea that a rule of law system (particularly one with a moral dimension) 
requires transformative change to gain legitimacy has substantial support. Borneman 
shares the view that rule of law development is complicated and transformative by nature 
in his evaluation of transitions in post-socialist Europe (Borneman 1997). “Not only do 
regimes transform in different ways, but some states are transforming better than others; 
better because they are more successful at establishing themselves as legitimate moral 
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authorities that provide the possibility of justice; better because it is more likely that those 
political communities that invoke the principles of the rule of law will not disintegrate 
into cycles of violence (Borneman 1997:165).” He stresses that political and personal 
accountability is of primary concern when developing a rule of law during transitional 
periods, especially in conjunction with democracy building as is taking place in Croatia. 
A third point comes from Tamanaha’s discussion of formal legality’s applicability 
to various situations. He describes formal legality’s emphasis on rule by rules, 
prioritizing objectivity and consistency, as being valuable in some situations and 
detrimental in others. “In all instances where social ties and shared understandings are 
thin, leading to less security and predictability, as is the case in urban areas around the 
world, formal legality will offer important advantages (Tamanaha 2004:139-140).” As in 
urban areas, post-conflict Croatia (and other areas of the Former Yugoslavia) certainly 
can be considered a place where “social ties and shared understandings are thin” that 
would, therefore, benefit from a clearly impartial application of law to improve relations. 
This idea is central to my analysis of support for the international tribunal and its rule of 
law agenda below. The situations where formal legality may hinder justice are those that, 
“require discretion, judgment, compromise, or context-specific adjustments (Tamanaha 
2004:140).” For instance, communal approaches to resolving conflict benefit more from 
an understanding of the people and circumstances than an objective guilty or innocent 
type of pronouncement. The example of Croatia falls under this category as well, at least 
in some respects. However, it does not need to be an either-or proposition as is 
recognized by Tamanaha  in his statement that, “Rule of law systems can also 
accommodate doing justice in an individual case, so long as the rules of law are departed 
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from to achieve justice infrequently, under compelling circumstances (Tamanaha 
2004:120).” These two approaches are similar to those debated in transitional justice in 
which criminal proceedings that publicly declare responsibility for wrongdoing are 
weighed next to truth-seeking that allows individuals to have their voices heard.   
As noted above, more recently analysts of post-conflict transitions give preference 
to an approach that is mixed, incorporating some elements of both approaches and 
recognizing the merits and downfalls of each (UN Secretary-General 2011:4-6). In this 
analysis I am evaluating the tribunal and its agenda to strengthen the rule of law in 
Croatia from a local perspective – the tribunal embodies the ideal of rule by rules in 
formal legality and strengthening the rule of law includes the building of institutions that 
follow the same principles. Tamanaha’s statement that positive change can come from 
the incorporation of formal legality where feelings of security are low and government 
actions are unpredictable indicate that such trials may be a key part of transitions. The 
next task of this evaluation is to identify the definition of the rule of law most consistent 
with international human rights law and discuss the components of the rule of law singled 
out for study.  
 
International Perspectives 
What do international organizations, proponents of human rights and development 
initiatives say about the rule of law? In short, many cite it as a major source of concern 
and an impetus for intervention. “Rule of law at the international level is the very 
foundation of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Secretary-General 2011:4).” Over 
150 member states are provided rule of law assistance by the United Nations which 
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established a “Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group” and “Rule of Law Unit” 
in 2006 with the motto, “Towards a just, secure and peaceful world, governed by the rule 
of law” (www.unrol.org accessed 9/9/12) to coordinate rule of law related activities 
within the UN and between the UN and other entities. One main focus is the coordination 
of transitional justice initiatives to be in line with rule of law development. “National 
consultations are a critical element as successful transitional justice programmes 
necessitate meaningful public participation, particularly of victims. These efforts are 
linked to and should be coordinated with broader assistance aimed at strengthening the 
overall rule of law in the country (www.un.rol.org accessed 9/9/12).” These coordination 
efforts include several UN sub-sections such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) who specify that strengthening the rule of law is 
integral to their missions. Several people in Gvozd worked as local liaisons to these 
organizations (UNDP and UNHCR) at some point during projects related to the post-
conflict transition in Croatia. For the UN, the rule of law is defined by the Secretary 
General as, 
…a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (UN Secretary-
General 2004:4) 
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This is a high ideal - the definition explicitly includes a moral dimension by requiring 
laws to be “consistent with international human rights norms and standards” as well as 
provisions for equality, fairness and transparency that are consistent with Tamanaha’s 
more substantive versions of the rule of rule (Tamanaha 2004:102). The United Nations 
Security Council created the ICTY in part because of its declared commitment to the rule 
of law. This is stated in the 1994 UN Commission of Experts Report: 
The Commission would be remiss if it did not emphasize the high 
expectation of justice conveyed by the parties to the conflict, as well as by 
victims, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, the media and world public opinion. Consequently, the 
International Tribunal must be given the necessary resources and support 
to meet these expectations and accomplish its task. Furthermore, popular 
expectations of a new world order based on the international rule of law 
require no less than effective and permanent institutions of international 
justice. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 must, 
therefore, be given the opportunity to produce the momentum for this 
future evolution.(United Nations Commission of Experts 1994:320) 
 
This statement is also an example of how justice, peace and the rule of law have come to 
be grouped together in international agendas. The tribunal continues to equate 
strengthening the rule of law with pursuing justice for mass atrocities as it nears the 
conclusion of its mandate and reports on its achievements.  
The World Bank, a major source of funding for global development initiatives, 
approaches the subject of defining the rule of law in a very different way. It provides a 
statement that outlines the various categories of definitions along with pros and cons of 
each and then refrains from choosing a specific definition to guide donors, recipients and 
policymakers (Stephenson 2005). Instead, the World Bank urges that each initiative 
clarify its particular goals rather than use language about the rule of law that may mislead 
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or confuse. In some ways this approach makes a great deal of sense considering the 
variation found in definitions, in others ways it seems like an easy way out of defining a 
critical concept that inspires extensive reforms, be they deemed positive or negative. Still, 
even with this hesitation to define the term, the World Bank funds projects around the 
globe that declare strengthening the rule of law as a major goal.  
From the sources presented here, the prevailing conception of the rule of law by 
proponents of human rights, political and economic development and transitional justice 
does go beyond a minimal degree of accountability and rule by rules to a “thicker” 
version which idealizes equal treatment to all, transparency in government, and a genuine 
commitment to follow the law by people in positions of power.  
Rule-of-law aid providers seem confident that they know what the rule of 
law looks like in practice. Stated in shorthand form, they want to see law 
applied fairly, uniformly, and efficiently throughout the society in 
question, to both public officials as well as ordinary citizens, and to have 
law protect various rights that ensure the autonomy of the individual in the 
face of state power in both the political and economic spheres. (Carothers 
2003:6) 
 
The ICTY has directly and indirectly taken on some rule of law improvements in the 
areas outlined here, whose impact is discussed below.  
 
Transitional Justice, Development and the Rule of Law 
While efforts to strengthen the rule of law can be independent of transitional 
justice, economic and political development initiatives, they are often pursued 
concurrently and overlap in many areas. Strengthening the rule of law continues to be a 
top priority in a wide variety of initiatives because it is viewed as a panacea for 
corruption and ordinary crimes that plague transitional periods (Carothers 2009:49). The 
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logic behind this connection is that the provision of a set of rules to be followed 
consistently allows people to better organize themselves and envision what tomorrow 
will hold for them against the uncertainty that is characteristic of these periods. 
Consequently it is also considered to be a deterrent of power-grabbing and behind-the-
scenes deals that may undermine a new regime. Any new regime faces challenges to the 
establishment of itself as a legitimate authority and provider of justice. The longevity of 
its tenuous hold on power will depend on numerous factors, but a strengthening of the 
rule of law promises to be a real asset. Rule of law initiatives address the challenges 
faced by new regimes through their leadership’s commitment to public accountability, the 
consistent and impartial application of rule by law, and the ability to predict 
consequences of actions. These elements can be vital for new governments and citizens 
alike.  
The need to establish legitimacy is discussed by Wilson in the context of post-
apartheid South Africa (Wilson 2001). He critiques the Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee’s (“TRC”) decision to emphasize a restorative approach for justice as a useful 
way to legitimize the new regime at the time because it validated a unification of the 
opposing fronts, but a poor means to provide justice for the victims in a way that 
provided real resolution and faith in government to punish wrongdoing (Wilson 
2001:227). The TRC is given as an example of a balance weighed heavily on a restorative 
approach with the consequence that many were left feeling justice did not take place and 
it did not further respect for the rule of law. Borneman recognizes the importance of 
strengthening the rule of law during transitions in his analysis of post-socialist Europe 
(Borneman 1997).  
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Not only do regimes transform in different ways, but some states are 
transforming better than others: better because they are more successful at 
establishing themselves as legitimate moral authorities that provide the 
possibility of justice; better because it is more likely that those political 
communities that invoke principles of the rule of law will not disintegrate 
into cycles of violence. (Borneman 1997:165) 
 
Does the new regime hold wrongdoers accountable? Is there a fair attempt at 
providing justice? Though the current study focuses on the ICTY from a local 
perspective, a major measure of the ICTY’s success in strengthening the rule of 
law is taken by examining what is occurring at the domestic level - the Croatian 
government’s support of the tribunal, adoption of rule of law principles advocated 
by the ICTY and a commitment of politicians to adhere to consistent and 
impartial rule of law. To leave an injustice without correction would open up the 
authority to a loss of public confidence and legitimacy. This is recognized by 
Scherer in his assertion that, “no sociopolitical system regulating human social 
association and interaction can afford to neglect the maintenance of perceived 
justice and the need for corrective action in a situation of perceived injustice, at 
least for any length of time (Scherer 1992: 3).” It is important to point out that the 
perception of justice (or injustice) is of consequence, whether or not this 
perception is attributed to norms, ethics or predispositions. 
 The idea of a justice cascade first proposed by Lutz and Sikkink (2001) is 
further reiterated by Sikkink to say that, “there has been a shift in the legitimacy 
of the norm of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and 
an increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm (Sikkink 2011:5)”. 
The justice cascade follows one element of the rule of law – individual criminal 
accountability – in governments transitioning from a non-democratic to a more 
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democratic state, particularly the accountability of political and military leaders 
for human rights violations in the previous regime. Here, again, transitional 
justice, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are linked together. Sikkink 
(2011) presents evidence of a change in norms away from sovereign immunity 
and accountability of the state as a whole to one favoring criminal trials for the 
individual orchestrators of human rights violations and even applying human 
rights protections to the accused. Her account follows the diffusion of norms of 
accountability from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to a history of political trials 
in Greece that was fundamentally altered when Karamanlis denied the death 
penalty as an option in trials of former junta leaders in 1974 (Sikkink 2011:47). 
The international trials of the ICTY and ICTR are considered to be a development 
building on the history of domestic prosecutions that has gathered momentum 
along with trials in Latin America. Sikkink is hopeful that norms of individual 
criminal accountability will continue to gain support internationally and 
ultimately contribute to a decline in violence based on its deterrence effect and the 
alteration of what is acceptable behavior.  
Though strengthening the rule of law is a key component of transitional justice, 
economic and political development efforts, Carothers identifies four “temptations” of 
the rule of law based on how such transitions have unfolded in the recent past – 
consensus, reductionism, sequencing and ease (Carothers 2009:51).  He warns us that 
even though many leaders and societies proclaim an aspiration for stronger rule of law, 
the assumption that there is a consensus by all is more than stretching the truth, partly 
because there is not a agreement on what is meant by the rule of law or how is should be 
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realized. Two people professing to advocate the rule of law may have very different ideas 
of how that translates to real changes to law, institutions and norms.  
This relates to Carothers’ second temptation of reductionism which he uses to 
refer to a more recent trend of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaders to publicly 
support the inclusion of rule of law measures, but, in doing so, they define the rule of law 
in reductionist terms – excluding political and civic rights or other challenges to control 
while enforcing a rule by law. This differs from the prevailing meaning intended by 
international development, human rights and democracy proponents. This warning ties in 
with Tamanaha’s point above that we should not assume support for the rule of law 
implies fairness or agreement on what rights (if any) are central to a strong rule of law. 
What one person or state means by declaring a priority to strengthen the rule of law may 
be quite different from what is meant by another.  
Thirdly, the lesson given regarding sequentialism is that current calls to sequence 
rule of law building before beginning democracy building have a flawed rationality. This 
is so because these processes are not distinct, but rather reinforce one another. Also, 
promises to create a democratic political system in the future may be empty and the 
sequentialist approach used as a convenient excuse for not working on democracy 
building immediately. There are some cases when the process actually happens in 
reverse, democracy building, primarily through elections, comes first and later rule of law 
initiatives are prioritized.  
The fourth temptation is to think that rule of law development is an easy task. It is 
a much more complex and long-term endeavor than presumed by many proponents. 
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While explaining the challenges to building a rule of law Carothers names what he 
considers to be critical elements of the rule of law: 
What Western policymakers, diplomats, military officials, political 
observers, and others are overlooking in their enthusiasm for the rule of 
law as a response to troubled transitions is that achieving the rule of law 
involves far more than getting judges trained, putting modern police 
equipment in place, and reprinting and distributing legal texts. It is a 
transformative process that changes how power is both exercised and 
distributed in a society and thus a process inherently threatening to 
existing power-holders. It also involves basic changes in how citizens 
relate to state authority and also to one another. (Carothers 2009:59-60) 
 
As with attempts for justice during transitions, Carothers’ temptation against seeing the 
strengthening of the rule of law as a simple exercise in training and reorganization 
teaches that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead careful understanding of the 
local context is required to assess existing power relationships and reconfigure them so 
that they stand by the tenets of the rule of law. Nelson and Cabatingan reinforce this 
caution by stating that, “While courts, constitutions, written laws and other institutions 
may have the potential to contribute to a rule-of-law society and the development of the 
economy and democracy, there is some agreement that these institutions cannot succeed 
without careful forethought, precise tailoring, and a certain degree of luck (Nelson and 
Cabatingan 2009:13).” Regardless of any concurrent initiatives the challenges faced by 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law begin with clarifying what is meant by the term and, 
while making that clarification does allow specific areas to be targeted and real change 
made, the complexity only grows when the expectation is a genuine alteration of the 
social psyche.  
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Strengthening the Rule of Law 
Questions about what is meant by the rule of law lead to questions about how the 
rule of law can be strengthened. These are also contested. Generally there is an emphasis 
on building institutions rather than altering the local legal consciousness. Some initiatives 
focus on judicial reforms, legal reforms, creating equality, the police or combating 
corruption. The ICTY publicly states how it has strengthened the rule of law in the 
Former Yugoslavia on its website and elsewhere (www.icty.org). One way is that the 
ICTY has “served as an incentive to authorities in the former Yugoslavia to reform their 
judiciaries,” though it is easy to debate the success and methods of these incentives which 
could be a study in of itself. The ICTY also claims that it has aided the development of 
specialized war crimes courts in the former Yugoslavia. This has happened most clearly 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and more recently in Serbia, but Croatia has made efforts to 
equip select domestic courts to handle war crimes trials in accordance with international 
human rights standards.  
In addition to demonstrating that the international community will take action and 
recourse when human rights violations occur (again, this is contentious on many fronts), 
the ICTY states: 
To further support the process of strengthening the rule of law, the 
Tribunal is actively involved in transferring its expertise to legal 
professionals from the former Yugoslavia so as to assist them in dealing 
with war crimes cases and enforcing international legal standards in their 
local systems. In implementing its completion strategy, the Tribunal has 
transferred several ICTY cases, as well as numerous investigative files, to 
national authorities and courts in the former Yugoslavia. 
(icty.org/sid/324#strengthening accessed 11/5/12) 
 
In his quote in the previous section Carothers lays out some ways to strengthen the rule of 
law that complement what the ICTY states – training judges, modernizing the police 
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force, and publicizing the law. Then he says it goes beyond that to change “how power is 
both exercised and distributed in a society (Carothers 2003:60).” In Weingast’s analysis 
of the challenges to building a rule of law he states that, “creating the rule of law requires 
two separate institutional changes: institutions to provide for the law; and a set of credible 
commitments that protect those institutions and ensure that they survive” (Weingast 
2009: 29). These additional requirements for strengthening the rule of law proposed by 
Carothers and Weingast go beyond an emphasis on institutional reforms to require the 
type of transformation outlined by Tamanaha, Borneman and others in previous 
discussions above.  
When a transformation of power relationships is included in an analysis of the 
rule of law the existence of a local legal consciousness that supports rule of law 
initiatives becomes vital. The vast majority of rule of law initiatives set out to alter 
institutions with an assumption that social change will follow. That assumption goes too 
far and lacks evidence. Institutional reforms may take place, but without those credible 
commitments discussed by Weingast and the transformation of power relations proposed 
by Borneman they will not lead to meaningful change. In order to convince the people 
that faith in the rule of law, and therefore the state’s commitment to the rule of law, is 
grounded there needs to be a clear communication of the law and peoples’ rights, reforms 
that visibly alter everyday interactions with government representatives, efficient and fair 
dispute resolution, and safe channels to report corrupt practices.  
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The Rule of Law as Accountability, Fairness and Security 
 In this study I focus on three aspects of the rule of law identified by Hayek and 
others: accountability, fairness (including consistency and impartiality), and security. The 
forms of accountability under consideration here are the accountability of political 
leaders to the public, the accountability of courts and law enforcement to the people, and 
personal accountability for wrongdoing. I place consistency and impartiality under the 
umbrella term of fairness because they are so inter-related. Consistency refers to the 
consistent application of laws and the consistent consequence of punishment for 
wrongdoing. Impartiality has to do with the unbiased and fair application of law and 
punishment. Security is a critical aspect of the rule of law because it highlights the 
juxtaposition of what the rule of law is not – actions without known consequences. In this 
study I refer to security as personal security against wrongdoing, economic security 
(including housing, jobs finances), and security against the unknown (as is possible). 
Next I will present the findings of research in Croatia and examine how a local 
perspective can inform international law and policies by putting rule of law initiatives in 
context. 
 
68 
 
Chapter 4 - A Local Perspective 
 
 
 
In this chapter I describe a local perspective on the rule of law based on my 
research in Gvozd and other areas of Croatia in order to examine the success of initiatives 
that promote international norms of the rule of law from a local perspective rather than 
primarily by an evaluation of state laws and institutions. This chapter presents ways in 
which Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees navigate conflict in the course of their 
daily lives which, in turn, shapes local conceptions of the rule of law and influences 
views of the international tribunal. It begins with the interaction between the independent 
state of Croatia and the ICTY over the course of their existence. What is the Croatian 
state’s perspective on the international tribunal? Official support for the ICTY has 
changed with time and circumstance and is complicated by the state’s multiple roles in 
the 1990s conflict, in some instances labeled as a victim and in others as an aggressor. 
Support also varied with the different approaches of the ICTY prosecutors at The Hague 
and the strategies of political leadership in Croatia. 
 
Croatia’s Relationship with the ICTY 
Soon after Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991 violence 
began in the eastern area of the country bordering Serbia and the Krajina region to the 
south (Peskin 2008:95). At the early stages of the conflict Croatia was a strong proponent 
of the tribunal, citing the need for justice after the horrific mass killing at Ovčara of 
people taken from Vukovar’s hospital by the Yugoslav army and paramilitary. One of the 
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people killed at Ovčara was a journalist, Siniša Glavašević, who reported events as he 
was able to during the time they sought refuge at the hospital. His death and the death of 
hospital staff and patients brought this instance of violence under international scrutiny 
and condemnation (Silber and Little 1996:180). I met with Glavašević’s son at the 
University of Zagreb where he was studying socio-linguistics. He expressed a desire to 
work toward a positive future rather than dwell on the past when we spoke of the conflict. 
The basement of the hospital in Vukovar is now open to the public to educate visitors and 
memorialize the people who sought refuge there. Much of the city still has visible signs 
of the physical damage done by the shelling and attacks, which is rumored to be left in 
that condition by the government to remind the world of Croatia’s victim status which 
stands in contrast to the rebuilding of Dubrovnik, a major tourist attraction on the coast 
and revenue source for the state.  
For some people in Croatia the case of the “Vukovar Three” shapes overall 
opinions of the tribunal. Vukovar’s status as a symbol of Croatia’s victimhood during the 
conflict caused the combined trials of Mrkšić, Sljivančanin and Radić, leaders in the 
Yugoslav Army (JNA), to be given special attention from the media. The judgment and 
sentencing was heavily criticized in Croatia: Mrkšić received 20 years, Sljivančanin five 
years and Radić was acquitted of all charges. Later appeals altered Sljivančanin's 
sentence up to 17 years and then down to ten years. In response to the initial sentencing 
Prime Minister Ivo Sanander joined protesters at the mass grave site and said “I would 
like to say that, in my opinion, this is a defeat for the idea of the Hague tribunal“ 
(Jungvirth 2007). People I spoke with in Gvozd echoed Sanader's sentiment, often citing 
the Vukovar Three judgment, which was passed during my research, as evidence that the 
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tribunal was not providing real justice and must be biased. The tribunal justified its 
decision by stating that the three people on trial were members of the JNA that should 
have taken steps to ensure the massacre did not take place, but it was local Serb defense 
and paramilitary groups that committed the physical crimes. This distinction did not seem 
to alter public opinion. 
Other early instances of violence include the shelling of Dubrovnik, a world 
heritage site, and numerous small-scale skirmishes by local Serb groups to oust non-
Serbs in response to fear for their future in a Croatia that was no longer part of 
Yugoslavia. The JNA occupation of Plitvice National Park was a major loss for the new 
state because it helped join areas of the Serb-held Krajina and this impressive landmark 
was a point of pride for Croatia. Peskin speculates that Croatia’s apparent lack of 
preparation for a violent conflict when declaring independence, particularly in 
comparison to Slovenia, to be part of a predetermined strategy to claim victimhood and 
thus greater international support for its separation from Yugoslavia (Peskin 2008:99). 
The recognition of the Republic of Croatia as an independent state by the European 
Union in 1992 was a critical point in the nation’s departure from Yugoslavia (Goldstein 
1999:238).  
Croatia’s call for justice in conjunction with evidence of human rights violations 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina convinced the UN to create the ICTY. However, as the 
conflict unfolded Croatia had a hand in violence outside its newly declared borders and it 
came to light that crimes also occurred domestically. Tuñman and other leaders of the 
HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) political party supported Bosnian Croat control of 
territories in Bosnia. The government’s role in violence there became apparent over time 
71 
 
and Croatia’s victim status was questioned. Allegations arose (and were later confirmed) 
that Tuñman and other political leaders shared a goal of creating Croat-controlled areas in 
Bosnia to be incorporated with a “Greater Croatia” similar to Milošević’s notion of a 
“Greater Serbia” (Silber and Little 1996:132). Aggressive actions were also taken to 
reclaim the Serb-controlled Krajina region along Croatia’s southern border with Bosnia 
during Operation Storm and to the east with Operation Flash.  
The image of Croatia’s innocence and victimhood was altered despite claims of 
self-defense because these military fronts included ethnic cleansing, plunder, murder and 
destruction of property. “Croatia’s shift from victim to victimizer raised the likelihood 
that the tribunal would investigate Bosnian Croat war crimes suspects and complicit high-
level Croatian officials in Zagreb (Peskin 2008: 100).” As the tribunal began to criticize 
Croatia’s actions the state’s support for the tribunal waned and there were even periods of 
overt non-cooperation and opposition. During Tuñman’s presidency the Croatian 
government did hand over evidence of war crimes committed by Bosnian Croats and 
brought some indicted Bosnian Croats to The Hague after much pressure to do so, but 
any allegations of Croatia’s wrongdoing during the “Homeland War” were dismissed. 
The need for cooperation, particularly to gain evidence and people to put on trial, made it 
difficult for the tribunal to push for indictments of Tuñman and other political and 
military leaders in Croatia.  
After Tuñman’s death in 1999 the tribunal voiced more criticism of Croatia’s 
homeland war and its role in Bosnia. The leadership of Prime Minister Račan and 
President Mesić often claimed to cooperate with demands from the tribunal, but then 
delayed actual compliance or criticized the tribunal (Peskin 2008:121). In 2005, Judge 
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Meron reported a negative assessment of Croatia’s cooperation due to the harboring of 
Ante Gotovina, initially indicted in 2001, “contrary to expectations and despite numerous 
promises” (ICTY 2005:35). General Gotovina was charged with crimes against humanity 
and violations of the laws or customs of war during “Operation Storm” to take back the 
Krajina region from Serb forces (ICTY 2012). In Croatia he is widely viewed as a hero, 
though the public has become more tolerable of criticism regarding his military tactics. 
During a stay in Zadar I saw many trinkets for sale (pillows, t-shirts, etc.) and graffiti 
around the city depicting Gotovina in military uniform next to the word “hero”. Support 
for Gotovina is especially strong in this area where he was born. For many years the 
Croatian government told the ICTY it was doing its best to locate and hand over 
Gotovina as per his indictment, but claimed he could not be found. However, soon after 
this failure to produce Gotovina put the state’s European Union membership processes on 
hold, he was located. He was arrested and transferred to The Hague in December 2005 by 
Spanish authorities that identified him in the Canary Islands based on communication 
from the Croatian government and some luck. In April 2011 he was found guilty and 
sentenced to 24 years imprisonment which is pending appeal by the defense (ICTY 
2012).  
Public support for General Gotovina is characteristic of the attitudes many 
(though certainly not all) Croats hold toward Croatia’s actions during the conflict that 
justify the use of violence as self-defense and consider it to be negligible in comparison 
with the crimes of Serbs. A group of young adults I spoke with in Zagreb took this stance 
and were adamant that Croatia’s use of violence was only treating the Serbs as Croats had 
been treated by them and therefore could not be condemned – they said the Serbs had 
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started it. They also were generally suspicious of the ICTY as a source of facts about the 
conflict period. Croatia has been cooperative with the tribunal in other respects, but the 
delay of action on Gotovina, even after Tuñman’s death, demonstrated only partial 
commitment to the purposes of the ICTY. 
Since its inception the ICTY has had several chief prosecutors that used different 
tactics to gain the cooperation of the former Yugoslav republics. Goldstone and Arbour 
were at the tribunal during Tuñman’s presidency when Croatia was adamant that all its 
actions were legal self-defense. In order to get Bosnian Croat Blaškić in custody 
Gladstone sought international pressures and shaming in conjunction with efforts to 
placate Tuñman (Peskin 2008:108). Later, one strategy of Del Ponte’s was to indict 
members of each faction to avoid accusations that the tribunal was biased and enacting 
victor’s justice as Croatia alleged. Peskin points out that Prosecutor Del Ponte’s choice to 
indict Gotovina soon after Serbia handed over Milošević to the tribunal “reflected an 
adept understanding of the interrelatedness of Balkan politics” (Peskin 2008:128). Part of 
that understanding was that the political leadership in Zagreb, particularly after Tuñman, 
had to tread carefully between a show of support for the tribunal and keeping the political 
support of Croat nationalists (or at least avoid their opposition). Del Ponte says that, “It 
took most of a decade, two cancer deaths, and a political upheaval in the Republic of 
Croatia before the Office of the Prosecutor’s analytical staff was able to gather sufficient 
documentation to report to me in detail what Tuñman and his protégés had been doing for 
years to thwart the tribunal’s efforts and to secure impunity for themselves and Croat 
military leaders.” (Del Ponte 2009:243). The hesitation of the prosecutors and lack of 
information to indict Croats for actions within the country’s borders had allowed many of 
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those responsible to avoid trial and punishment though this strategy had facilitated 
cooperation regarding several Bosnian Croats wanted by the tribunal.   
Any discussion of Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY must include the 
influence of the European Union. Croatia’s membership in the EU is contingent upon 
compliance with the ICTY and Croatia’s adoption of international human rights standards 
in its politics, laws and institutions. The EU began considering Croatian accession with 
the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001 and negotiations for 
accession began in October of 2005 (Commission of European Communities 2009). 
Negotiations continue despite anticipation that Croatia would have completed accession 
requirements by the end of 2009, prolonged due to border disputes with neighboring EU 
member and former Yugoslav republic Slovenia and a lack of compliance with EU 
standards in the categories of judiciary and fundamental rights, competition and transport. 
Delays in cooperation with the ICTY and treatment of refugees have also played a role. 
Surveys conducted by the EU show that Croatian citizens’ support for EU accession has 
increased and decreased at different periods during the accession process (European 
Commission 2005, 2007, 2009). In 2009, the majority of Croatians (52%) did not think 
joining the EU would be beneficial and more people believed joining the EU would be a 
bad thing (37%) rather than a good thing (24%) (European Commission 2009). In several 
of my discussions with people in Croatia they represented EU as another overseeing 
bureaucracy (like Yugoslvia was) that would compromise Croatian identity and tradition. 
They viewed joining the EU to mean losing their autonomy that was so newly won. Still, 
most people viewed accession as inevitable since Croatia is such a small country with big 
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and powerful neighbors (referring to past struggles for control of this border zone 
between Christian and the Muslim forces).  
When asked if Croatia should join the EU during my research 59% of the people 
said yes (n=79) and 37% said no (n=50). To follow-up, I also asked how joining the EU 
would affect them, to which 22% answered positively (n=30), 64% answered not very 
much (n=86), and 13% answered negatively (n=17). In comparison, the results from 
Gvozd show a more positive view of the Croatia joining the EU than that of the overall 
country surveyed by the European Commission. This may be at least partially accounted 
for by the minority status of local citizens (Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees) 
who are likely to have more rights as part of the EU than otherwise.  
 A Ministry of European Integration was formed to coordinate the integration of 
EU favored policies and laws and to communicate those changes to the Croat public.  
Prime Minister Ivo Sanader ends his introduction to the National Programme for the 
Integration of the Republic of Croatia into the EU by stating, “The European Union and 
the Republic of Croatia share the same values, the same principles and the same 
commitment, and I am confident that by harmonizing our legislation and practices we 
prove that Croatia needs the European Union just as the European Union needs Croatia 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration 2005:3).” While it was originally 
thought Croatia would be an EU and NATO member by the year 2009, it only joined the 
NATO alliance by that time. EU membership is still in limbo with current projections of 
membership in 2013. The benefits of EU membership are emphasized in the Ministry of 
European Integration’s formal EU Integration Communication Strategy.  It explicitly 
targets teachers, politicians, public employees and trade unions to communicate what EU 
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membership will do for Croatian citizens.  Within this document, the government 
recognizes that not all citizens are in favor of joining the EU. The concern about a 
negative economic impact and a loss of national sovereignty are acknowledged and the 
strategy to change those opinions is educating the public about the EU.  
Information from a public opinion poll conducted by the Croatian government 
provides some insight into which Croats fall into the category of approving EU 
integration (Republic of Croatia 2003). In 2003 those people with the most positive views 
towards accession are from households with average and above-average incomes. They 
are also more likely to have a middle or higher level of education as compared to the state 
as a whole.  Most of the EU supporters are from younger generations or middle-aged 
population (the poll included informants aged 15 and up). Even President Mesić 
recognizes that Croat support for EU accession is not unified. In a speech given San 
Francisco, Mesić states, “We had major support for Croatia's membership in the EU -- it 
was over 80 percent, but due to the delay of opening negotiations as well as certain 
obstacles and pressures we faced, euro skepticism got off the ground (HINA News 
Agency 2006)”. These obstacles and pressures aren’t detailed by Mesić, but other polls 
do identify Croat’s concerns.  A 2005 public opinion poll found the four top concerns to 
be: 1) the impact of Croatia’s EU membership on the economy (86.7%), 2) the impact of 
EU membership on everyday life (84.4%, 3) the rights and obligations stemming from 
Croatia’s EU membership (84.4%), 4) the impact of the EU membership on sovereignty 
(83.8%) (Republic of Croatia 2005). The high percentages show that these opinions are 
shared by people who support and those that oppose accession to the EU. The concerns 
certainly tie into Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY, particularly the third concern 
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about “obligations stemming from Croatia’s EU membership”. Cooperation with the 
tribunal is complicated by this connection to the EU, NATO membership, international 
pressures and shaming (ex. requirement for economic assistance and threatened bar from 
Olympic events), domestic power struggles, and continuing post-conflict issues (ex. 
refugees, minority rights, housing).  
 
Local Perceptions of the ICTY 
Trials for human rights violations are taking place at the international tribunal, but 
what to people in Croatia think of them? What do people in the local communities 
directly involved in the conflict think of the tribunal itself? The ICTY boasts that it 
provides justice, gives a voice to the victims and strengthens the rule of law, but is that 
what people want? In my initial interviews many people were supportive of the ICTY, 
though with multiple reservations. They stated that the tribunal was the best option for 
pursuing justice (over Croatian courts particularly), though only partially effective at 
achieving justice. Some of the factors voiced as preventing the success of the tribunal 
were problems securing firsthand witnesses, a lack of information shared by states of the 
former Yugoslavia, the slow pace of trials, putting the wrong people on trial (said should 
focus on major political and military leaders), legal technicalities preventing convictions 
or adequate punishment, political bias in judgments, and the harboring of war criminals. 
A few people said they didn’t know much about the trials and weren’t interested, but 
most do pay some attention to it in the newspapers, on television and through discussions 
with family and friends.    
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Are trials the best choice for pursuing justice? When asked for her opinion one 
Gvozd woman repeated a common sentiment that the tribunal “is not enough”, though 
what would be enough is unclear. One of my key informants expressed thoughts similar 
to what was expressed by many others. She said, “I suppose that it is a good thing that 
trials are taking place, but they are too slow, some sentences are not fair, such as in 
Srebrenica, and it is impossible to have a trial for everyone who committed a crime.” 
Based on these sentiments the ICTY appears to play a critical role in post-conflict 
Croatia, though with a flawed performance. Some of the flaws may be inherent to legal 
processes in general and to the fact that the ICTY is the first court of its kind and other 
flaws may be a consequence of people’s valid or misguided expectations of justice for 
human rights violations. As noted earlier, a quarter (25%, n=33) of the people who 
completed surveys said that the ICTY is effectively achieving justice for the violations of 
human rights that occurred during the war of the 1990s. In those surveys the tribunal’s 
top two obstacles to achieving justice were “political biases in the courts” (46%, n=62) 
and “witnesses scared to testify” (33%, n=44). In order to better understand what the 
political biases were perceived to be I talked with several people in Gvozd and members 
of human rights NGOs throughout Croatia.  
Sometimes the political biases of concern were of the judges and lawyers thought 
to be holding America and European interests over those of the people in the Former 
Yugoslavia. A few people extended this explanation to a criticism of the American 
actions in Iraq and the refusal to subject American military personnel to international 
human rights standards. To other people the political biases were based on ethnicity, 
often complaining that Serbs were overly targeted or that Croats should not be targeted 
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by the tribunal because their actions were in self-defense. It was also said that the tribunal 
focused too much on crimes against Muslims in Bosnia, a population almost absent from 
Gvozd (I knew of only two people who identified as Muslim).  
The problem of safeguarding witnesses to war crimes is well documented for both 
domestic trials and those at the tribunal. There are incidents of witnesses being threatened 
and even killed after talking publicly against suspects. In Croatia, witnesses against 
Croats considered to be national heroes like General Ante Gotovina face great pressure to 
keep quiet. Since the death of President Tuñman that pressure has gradually lessened, but 
it still exists. In Gvozd, many of the Serb returnees took part in holding the territory as a 
separate Serb-controlled Krajina region after the declaration of independence of Croatia 
from Yugoslavia. That control included forcing non-Serbs to leave the area and covering 
much of the land with mines to keep them out. During a social gathering in the town hall, 
one friend pointed out to me that most of the men in the room were responsible for some 
form of war crime. They knew what each other did during that time and choose to stay 
quiet. I imagine that speaking out would have a devastating effect on your future in the 
community.  
 When I began to interview people in Gvozd it quickly became clear that some 
questions were too abstract to illicit helpful responses. When I asked how people would 
define justice or what constituted a just punishment I mostly received shrugs in response. 
When directly asked if the tribunal affected their lives most people didn’t see a 
connection. During the development of the surveys I found that questions which 
compared a few alternatives were more successful. Questions that asked about a specific 
way the tribunal might affect their lives also yielded better results. Responses to two 
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questions in particular indicate the tribunal’s actions are meaningful to people directly 
involved in the conflict. The first asked, “How much do you care about the decisions the 
ICTY makes in war crimes trials?” About three quarters (74%, n=99) of the people 
responded that they cared at least a little about the decisions of the ICTY trials and the 
choice selected with the highest frequency (31%, n=41) indicated they cared “Very 
Much” (See Graph 4.1). This means many people do care if defendants are declared to be 
innocent or guilty and care about what sentence is given for punishment. The trials at The 
Hague are meaningful to the people in this community. However, caring doesn’t equal 
agreement with those decisions. In conversation people often say that defendants 
commonly known to be guilty weasel out of sentences proportionate to their crimes and 
they are angry about a lack of public acknowledgement for the severity of the crimes. In a 
similar vein, a survey by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) in 2002 asked Croatians how much trust they had in the international 
institution of the ICTY. Of the 1,010 participants 20.1% (n=207) answered “trust very 
much or trust a fair amount” (IDEA 2002). This finding also demonstrates that the 
tribunal’s decisions are of consequence in Croatia.  
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Graph 4.1: Do people care about the ICTY decisions? 
How much do you care about the decisions made by the ICTY in 
war crimes trials?
Very M uch, 31%
Some, 28%
A Lit t le, 15%
Not at All, 25%
 
 
 
A related question in the Gvozd survey asked, “Do the decisions of the ICTY 
affect how safe you feel to live in Croatia?” Concern about safety speaks both to the 
impact of the tribunal and the importance of a sense of security as an aspect of the rule of 
law. To this question almost half (49%, n=65 of people answered that the decisions of the 
ICTY affect how safe they feel to live in Croatia “some” (27%, n=36) or “very much” 
(22%, n=29) (See Graph 4.2). Fifteen years after the end of the violence, apprehension 
about safety is still prevalent. These results show that the tribunal’s decisions can 
influence future actions of the people involved in the conflict. Threats to safety could be 
used to justify new violence or perceptions of a safe environment could lead to the 
building of bridges between groups. Admittedly, the real degree to which safety is 
perceived and how that affects actions is complex to assess. These survey results simply 
show that the tribunal does have some effect on perceptions of safety for the majority of 
people in this community.  
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Graph 4.2:  Do the ICTY decisions affect feelings of safety? 
Do the decisions of the ICTY affect how  safe you feel to live in 
Croatia?
Very Much, 22%
Some, 27%
A Little, 22%
Not at All, 28%
 
 
In a rule of law context, safety is often equated with security or reliability. A 
sense of safety may refer to personal safety, financial security, job security, or a trust that 
certain repercussions will follow actions, such as a punishment after a crime. Based on 
my research experience I believe that locally the trials do affect a feeling of safety in the 
sense that successful trials (however that may be defined) may provide a satisfactory 
resolution to the wrongdoing and therefore reduce desires to “resolve” the wrongdoing by 
resorting to violence. Concerns about safety likely stem from the possibility of inter-
regional conflict recurring due to dissatisfaction with the current borderlines and power-
sharing arrangements. Other forms of insecurity exist as well. In my conversation with 
one woman in Gvozd she asserted that gaining financial security was the most important 
change needed to improve her life. She also stated that the future of her housing was 
uncertain because the government won’t definitively grant or deny her rights to the home. 
The trials won’t have a direct effect on these issues, but the incorporation of laws and 
policies required by the ICTY and EU integration may change her future prospects.   
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The impartiality of the courts is a key aspect of the ICTY’s goal to strengthen the 
rule of law. In most conversations people agreed that the tribunal’s judges are more 
impartial than those of Croatian courts, despite the concern over political biases noted 
above. Most often they also said that the tribunal was the best place for war crimes trials 
over domestic or regional options, except a few who expressed a strong opinion that such 
trials should only take place in domestic courts. In response to the survey question, 
“Which judges are better able to make impartial decisions in trials of war crimes that took 
place in Croatia?” most people answered ICTY judges (64%, n=85) over Croatian judges 
(25%, n=33). One interviewee elaborated that, “Croatian courts are not fair and effective, 
they don’t punish their own people”. In this statement impartiality is implied to be a facet 
of fairness. Do people want fair trials? Do fair trials bring justice for violations of human 
rights? According to the people who completed the survey in Gvozd fair trials are integral 
to achieving justice. When rating their agreement with the statement, “Conducting fair 
trials is the best way to achieve justice,” nearly half of the respondents (48%, n=64) 
completely agreed (See Graph 4.3). The level of agreement to this question was higher 
than I had anticipated and can be interpreted as substantial support for the tribunal’s 
mission. It also supports the need for trials in any post-conflict situation with human 
rights abuses.  
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Graph 4.3: Are trials the best way to achieve justice? 
Rate how  much you agree with the follow ing statement: Conducting 
fair trials is the best way to acheive justice (1=Completely Agree, 
5=Completely Disagree).
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Most people appear to have a general understanding of human rights and the 
UN’s role in defining and reinforcing those rights. The sources of their understanding are 
multiple and diverse. Based on my interviews, those sources include the media, 
politicians, word of mouth, and interaction with UN and ICTY representatives. 
Suncokret, the organization where I volunteered in Gvozd, received portions of its 
funding from the European Union, the World Bank, and various departments of the 
Croatian government which bring obligations to be a resource for public education on 
many different issues including human rights. Workshops are conducted there on conflict 
resolution and understanding human rights in addition to the provision of assistance 
navigating the bureaucracy involved with receiving aid. Representatives of Suncokret are 
often invited to national and international conferences regarding civil society and human 
rights and so become information sources on these topics. 
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The media is a great influence on conceptions of justice and perceptions of the 
ICTY because it includes daily news of alleged criminals-at-large and the trials. A 
question also exploring knowledge of human rights asked how often the participant read 
or heard something about the ICTY. Answers were varied and there seems to be two 
general trends, one in which people are regularly being updated with news of the ICTY 
and another in which people infrequently follow the news. Precisely half of the 
participants read or heard something about the ICTY daily or weekly (24%, n=32 said 
daily, 25%, n=34 said weekly), only 17% (n=23) selected the once or twice a month 
category and 33% (n=44) said that they rarely read or hear anything about the ICTY. I 
asked people about different sources of information on the ICTY and how much they 
trusted those sources. Only 17% (n=23) of respondents trusted news direct from the 
ICTY at a level of 4 or 5 (1 being no trust, 5 being complete trust) which was lower than 
trust in newspapers, television, friends and family as sources, but just higher than trust in 
the Croatian government and religious leaders.  Overall, friends and family were the most 
trusted source of information on the ICTY with 35% (n=46) choosing a 4 or 5 on the 
scale. Most likely those friends and family are getting their information the media and 
other friends and family.  
The views represented by the media are commonly dictated by politics. In 
Croatia, the HDZ, a successor to the old Communist Party, stepped in to be a strong force 
for Croatian independence. With the leadership of Franjo Tuñman Croatian nationalism 
became publicly accepted, though there was significant opposition, as it had not been 
under Tito’s long rule. Gagnon’s (2004:182) evaluation of the causes of the violent 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia points strongly to the media’s role in instigating 
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nationalistic ideologies, mainly as a tool of politicians scrambling for power after the fall 
of communism. That bias has surely not disappeared from the Croatian media today, and 
continues to be quite strong in some publications.  
Regarding the ICTY, the media presented a picture of Croatian outrage at General 
Ante Gotovina’s arrest and relocation to The Hague. Gotovina’s leadership of Operation 
Storm was portrayed as a completely defensive action and his success a thing to be 
celebrated by all Croats. Since that time there has been more public acknowledgement 
that some crimes were committed by Croats that extended beyond defense as noted 
above. One of my informants had friends who were soldiers under Gotovina who 
described their experience of the conflict to her. They said that during Operation Storm 
the non-Croat people they encountered were treated badly, more so than was needed to 
reclaim possession of the territory, but that was not how it was presented publicly. 
However, in the past few years politicians have publicly acknowledged some wrongdoing 
by Croats during Operation Storm and other situations, most of this change went along 
with a stated desire to join the EU and thus conform to international human rights 
standards.  
The overall reaction to the arrest of Karadžić’s was more positive, though the 
court’s weaknesses in taking so long for the arrest and still having Mladić at large were 
emphasized (since that time Mladić has been arrested and his trial is underway). Much of 
the media coverage focused on allegations that Karadžić had been traveling around the 
region in full sight and with seeming immunity for a number of years prior and that he 
enjoyed a hero’s status in Serbia. Still, most of the blame appeared to be put on the 
Serbian government for harboring a criminal rather than on the ICTY for incompetence. 
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When I asked people what they felt about Karadžić’s arrest many expressed a feeling joy 
and said they immediately called family and friends to share the news. No one said that 
the arrest was wrongful, including the Serbs I spoke with, which may be due to the lack 
of direct connection with Karadžić’s actions in Gvozd since most of his operations took 
place in Bosnia and targeted Muslim populations. The arrest was front page news in the 
newspapers and prominent on television for weeks.   
People’s confidence in the international courts and the domestic, Croatian courts 
to conduct fair trials was assessed for comparison. For the international courts, 5% (n=6) 
answered that they had lots of confidence, 36% (n=48) answered some confidence, 43% 
(n=57) answered a little confidence, and 16% (n=22) answered no confidence (see Graph 
4.4). Overall, these results were higher than the data regarding Croatian courts of which 
3% (n=4) answered that they had lost of confidence, 31% (n=41) some confidence, 38% 
(n=51) a little confidence and 27% (n=36) with no confidence (see Graph 4.5). When 
asked which judges are better able to make impartial decisions in trials of war crimes that 
took place in Croatia 64% (n=85) said ICTY judges rather than Croatian judges. 
However, only 24% (n=32) of participants stated that the ICTY has the best interests of 
Croatia in mind when making decisions in the courts. It can certainly be debated whether 
or not the ICTY should have Croatia’s best interests in mind or if that would be a breach 
of impartiality. Also this question could be reworded to be more specific and thus allow 
for clearer interpretation.  
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Graph 4.4: Confidence in International Court 
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Graph 4.5: Confidence in Croatian Courts 
How much confidence do you have in the Croatian courts 
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Human Rights and Domestic Courts 
The ICTY was created because the United Nations Security Council decided the 
crimes that occurred during the dissolution of Yugoslavia qualified as violations of 
human rights that required justice and accountability. The existing domestic courts were 
not considered to be capable of conducting fair trials (for various reasons) and the UN 
felt obligated (again, for various reasons) to provide a judicial mechanism for justice. 
Nearly twenty years after its inception the ad-hoc tribunal is struggling to complete its 
mandate. The volume of cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the court is well beyond 
its capabilities as a short-term court and so the referral of low- and medium-profile cases 
to Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia is a necessary part of its completion strategy. Many of the 
challenges to providing a fair trial in these domestic courts still exist even though the 
ICTY has taken some efforts to educate and inform politicians, judges, lawyers, and staff 
through the Rules of the Road program and legal reforms have taken place to comply 
with EU and UN standards. Throughout the existence of the ICTY trials have been held 
at the local and state-level courts, many of which, particularly earlier in this period, did 
not fit the criteria of international standards for war crimes trials. Common problems 
were the poor protection of witnesses, biased judgments, unqualified staff, trials held in 
absentia, and prosecution of only select ethnic groups. These problems reflect the social 
and political environment in Croatia and certainly are a factor in the local development of 
a rule of law culture. 
The ICTY and other international tribunals are criticized for the extensive length 
of time required for conducting investigations, trials and appeals. In response, the ICTY 
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previously announced a strategy to, “finish investigations by 2004, trials by 2008, and 
appeals by 2010. The remaining war crimes cases will be turned over to the former 
Yugoslavia for domestic prosecutions (Zoglin 2005: 42)”. As we now know, this 
schedule was altered several times and some trials will extend into 2014 (projection for 
Mladić’s trial, see icty.org). The UN has also created a new entity called the International 
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to commence in July 2013, overlapping with 
the ICTY’s completion, to take on some of the tasks required to fully complete the 
tribunal’s work and then maintain its records (Meron 2012:14). Zoglin (2005) and others 
present a grim picture of the domestic court systems in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbia, and warns of their inadequacy for carrying out war crimes cases passed down 
from the tribunal. The lack of witness protection measures and the lack of an independent 
and trained judiciary are the main domestic concerns (Zoglin 2005). The two Croatian 
trials against ethnic Croats that have attracted the most media attention are those of Lora 
and Gospić. Both included strong witness intimidation, carried further in the Gospić case 
with the murder of an ethnic Croat who had complied with tribunal investigators. These 
examples do not provide much faith in the ability domestic courts to enforce judicial 
accountability. A report by the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (CHC) 
lists the major problems of the Croatian courts as, “a large number of unsolved cases, the 
long duration of trials, the corruption of the judges, the lack of uniformity among the 
trials - especially the trials of war crimes, etc. (CHC 2007)”. This list reinforces 
complaints about inefficient bureaucracies and corruption in government.  
During my time in Croatia I met with individuals from Documenta in Zagreb and 
the Center for Peace, Human Rights, and Non-violence in Osijek. Along with a third 
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organization, the Civic Committee for Human Rights, they share the task of monitoring 
domestic trials for war crimes that are otherwise only sparsely documented and reported 
to the public. In addition the Center for Peace, Human Rights and Non-Violence in 
Osijek published its joint report on domestic war crimes monitoring where it stated that, 
“The greatest problems occurring year after year are yet again the adverse political 
context, insufficient personnel and technical conditions for the processing of war crimes, 
insufficient application of the existing legal instruments for witness protection, and a 
large number of verdicts reached in absentia” (Center for Peace, Human Rights and Non-
Violence 2009:7). The comprehensive report explains in detail the political climate that 
affects war crimes trials in Croatia and presents recommendations to resolve 
shortcomings. The NGOs monitoring domestic war crimes trials recommend: (1) 
strengthening the role and capacity of the special war crimes courts in Zagreb, Osijek, 
Rijeka and Split; (2) publishing list of verdicts reached in absentia to inform convicted 
persons; (3) increasing cooperation with judiciaries in the region; (4) alter constitution to 
disallow parliamentary immunity for serious crime; (5) adopt clear stance toward victims 
of war crimes (Center for Peace, Human Rights and Non-Violence 2009:28-29). These 
are substantial changes that directly relate to the rule of law.  
These three NGOs had a large presence in the recent ICTY Outreach 
Programme’s 2009 conference in Zagreb to evaluate the legacy of the ICTY in Croatia 
because of their knowledge of both the tribunal and domestic trials for war crimes and 
they will undoubtedly play a crucial role in the future of domestic war crimes trials. I 
attended a conference they organized titled “War Crimes Trials in Croatia: Analysis, 
Plans and Priorities” that discussed their joint report on domestic war crimes trials. There 
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was a revealing moment during President Mesić’s speech at the conference when Vincent 
Degart, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Croatia, 
made a snickering laugh in response to Mesić’s announcement that Croatia should 
comply with EU standards in its domestics war crimes trials, “not because we want to 
join the EU, but because this is needed for us to prevent collective guilt on all sides. To 
face the truth in ourselves and others we must establish individual responsibility.” It 
seemed that Degart was not convinced of Mesić’s sincerity. Mesić added later that it was 
important not to send clear or hidden messages to criminals that there can be impunity for 
war crimes and that there is no statute of limitations on such crimes. Also, Mesić stated 
that fair and effective trials were important in order to be a state that is trusted 
internationally. In this statement he is recognizing the impact of human rights abuses on 
reputation within the international community.  
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors 
domestic trials on behalf of the ICTY. Their assessment of domestic trials does show 
many areas that need improvement, especially regarding impartiality and the continued 
practice of trials in absentia, however they do indicate that progress has been made over 
time. Today there is a stronger commitment from the Croatian government to publicly 
support unbiased war crimes trials and to give the courts needed resources. Several 
county courts (Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka and Split) have been designated and equipped to 
deal with war crimes cases, though many cases are still being handled in the local 
community in which the crime took place, adding to the potential for impartiality. During 
my research in Gvozd I was not aware of any local war crimes trials taking place nearby 
and typically people paid less attention to domestic trials than to those at the tribunal. 
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Local Ideals of Justice 
 What is justice? What constitutes a just punishment? Is there any consensus on 
what justice for such an extreme crime as a violation of human rights should be? These 
are difficult questions to answer, but, nevertheless, are important to explore in order 
understand if the local legal consciousness is conducive to the ICTY’s rule of law 
initiatives. As in most communities today, people in Gvozd have a pluralistic legal 
system they can employ (or try to avoid) that intersects with all areas of life. In the past, 
and particularly in rural communities, most disputes with other community members 
were resolved within the community as similar to many other European and 
Mediterranean cultures (Pitt-Rivers 1954). Here I am referring to disputes over things 
such as land use, theft and those within families. In Gvozd the conflict and the resulting 
patchwork community of Serb returnees and Bosnian Croat refugees have altered the 
previously existing community framework to a great extent. The non-Serbs who lived 
there before the war did not return or are no longer alive so that segment of the 
population is not present. The Serbs who did return represent only a portion of who was 
there before and those that did return are disproportionately elderly and unemployed. 
This group did not have any previous ties with the Bosnian Croats who are now part of 
the community and that group is not a simple resettling of a town, but a hodgepodge of 
people from different areas in Bosnia who did not necessarily know each other prior to 
coming to Gvozd.  
The result is a flimsy network of relationships and no reliable history to inform 
social interactions, a very different situation than in the past. At the same time there is 
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this push to strengthen the rule of law which encourages the use of local and domestic 
legal institutions because they can be more impartial and consistent in their application of 
the law (“can be” doesn’t infer that they are so). Does this mean that people report more 
crimes to the police and are more aware of their legal rights? I hesitate to say yes. My 
research in Gvozd found that people generally do not have faith in legal institutions to 
enforce laws or act in a fair manner. How then to people resolve disputes? I will respond 
to that question in the next section. Here I present the findings that contribute to a more 
theoretical understanding of what justice means in Gvozd. 
 A revealing question that I posed in the survey asked, “Which of the choices 
below is most important to you personally regarding trials for war crimes such as 
genocide?” Response options were: 1) that major political and military leaders be tried in 
a court for their actions, 2) that local people who committed war crimes be tried in a court 
for their actions, 3) that all people involved in war crimes, regardless of whether they 
were a leader or not, should be tried in a court for their actions, 4) or that it is better not to 
have any trials for war crimes. The number of people including the first option, “that 
major political and military leaders be tried in a court for their actions,” was somewhat 
lower than expected at 34% (n=45). Only 13% (n=18) included, “that local people who 
committed war crimes be tried in a court for their actions”. The highest percentage of 
people, at 68% (n=93), responded, “that all people involved in war crimes, regardless of 
whether they were a leader or not, should be tried in a court for their actions. These 
results indicate that trials are a critical component of post-conflict reconstruction. The 
fact that only two people (1%) responded that, “it is better not to have any trials for war 
crimes,” is also substantial support for having trials, especially because one of these two 
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participants chose multiple options, including that all people should be tried regardless of 
being a leader.  
In an effort to understand priorities in achieving justice participants were asked, 
“If a serious crime took place, what would be most important to you: The victim feels 
that the criminal was justly punished/The victim forgives the criminal/The criminal was 
justly punished according to a court, though the victim may not agree with the 
decision/The criminal was justly punished according to the community, though the victim 
or a court might not agree”. The majority included the first option, “the victim feels that 
the criminal was justly punished,” with 69% (n=91) agreement. Some people who 
answered this way chose an additional response as well, though 63% (n=85) chose this as 
their sole answer. This ideal would be difficult for a court to attain and would be likely to 
go against legal procedures. Of the other participants, 8% (n=11) chose “the victim 
forgives the criminal”, 22% (n=29) chose “the criminal was justly punished according to 
a court, though the victim may not agree”, and only 1% (n=1) chose “the criminal was 
justly punished according to the community”.   
Participants were also asked to choose the best description of their personal 
reasoning for why wrongdoers should be punished and the options represented major 
theories in criminal philosophy. Based on the survey I conducted the purpose of 
punishment most closely resembles arguments of deterrence in which repercussions must 
be costly enough to outweigh the benefits one might get from breaking the law. The most 
common answer was for the reason of deterrence, “to make the crime costly so that others 
will think twice about committing the same crime,” with a total of 69% (n=93) 
participants including this answer (63% selected it only, n=84). Another 25% (n=33) 
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chose the retributive reasoning, “to equalize the harm done to the victim of the crime”. 
The smallest number of participants chose the rehabilitation option, “to reform the 
wrongdoer so they will become a better person,” with 11% (n=15). What I find 
interesting about this finding is that it goes along with what many studies of disputes say 
– that people make a decision to commit a crime or not based on an evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of the action – but there are good reasons to think that is not how 
people truly make those decisions. In Sibley’s review of legal consciousness she cites that 
ethnographic studies of law find that people are not making a cost-benefit analysis when 
posed with such emotional struggles that are instead influenced by local norms and 
morals (Silbey 2005:339). The low percentage of people who chose that rehabilitation is 
the purpose may also say something about this community. Perhaps there is not a strong 
belief that people can change their ways after committing a crime, but instead remain a 
“bad” person. If this is a true assessment then it would also help explain long-held 
grudges and cycles of violence stereotypical of this region.  
Other questions I asked referred to moral reasoning in particular scenarios. One 
scenario concerns debates over the responsibility of lower ranking perpetrators for their 
actions. It was presented as, “A soldier takes part in mass killings of people based on 
their ethnic identity. He was following orders from military superiors. He is declared 
innocent by the court when tried for those actions. Is this judgment just or unjust?” The 
crux of this debate lies with the degree of free will the soldier was able to exercise and 
that factor is left open to interpretation here. Based on the limited scenario presented, 
23% (n=31) of the participants felt it was just for the soldier to go free and 76% (n=102) 
felt it was unjust. This seems to show that people in Gvozd think that soldiers in the 
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conflict did have enough free will in their decisions to join the fighting and take part in 
certain actions to be responsible for what they did under orders.  
So what are the local ideals of justice? There are many views represented here. 
Holding wrongdoers accountable is a shared priority, though the emphasis on major 
political and military leaders is not shared by all. There is support for making crimes 
costly, i.e. providing hefty punishments for serious crimes. There is also support for 
victim-centered approaches to justice considering the large number of people who chose 
that it was most important that the victim be satisfied by the wrongdoers punishment. 
This type of approach has not been employed in the former Yugoslavia as much as in 
Latin American countries and in South Africa, most are part of grassroots organizations 
that focus on a specific town or municipality. A wider picture of local conceptions of 
justice will come from understanding how people maneuver through the conflicts they 
face daily. 
 
Negotiating Everyday Conflicts 
The ICTY is attempting to strengthen the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia 
and its success will depend on what people currently think about the rule of law within 
Croatia. It depends on perceptions of accountability for wrongdoing, the impartiality of 
the application of law, the predictability that rules will be followed and feelings of 
security. The extent to which people value these components of the rule of law is shaped 
by local experiences of conflict and resolution. The kinds of conflict and interaction with 
the law that people experience daily includes petty disputes, contestation of property 
rights, bureaucratic maneuvering to obtain permits and licenses, and access to 
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government assistance. My examination of everyday experiences with conflict shows that 
there are many challenges to public support for the rule of law as it is defined by the 
ICTY.  
To start, the general reputation of domestic institutions is far from stellar. There is 
a lack of trust in the Croatian government at all levels, including the court system and law 
enforcement. Croats’ level of confidence in their political and legal institutions is quite 
low. Members of parliament and other government positions hold little regard from the 
public. The democratic processes are viewed as corrupt, lacking true representation for 
the people of Croatia. The 2005 Eurobarometer reports that, “only a quarter of the 
respondents trust the legal/justice system which indicates that in Croatia legal insecurity 
predominates (Standard Eurobarometer 64 Jesen 2005)”. This survey also shows 
evidence that political parties are “considered disreputable organizations” and that there 
exists “continued very low confidence” in the Parliament. This extreme distrust in 
governmental institutions has a strong effect on the legitimacy of domestic trials for 
violations of human rights and extends to perceptions of the trials of the ICTY.  
All actors in the criminal justice system – judges, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and police – lack skills, training, resources, and the 
infrastructure to do their jobs effectively. Moreover, minority groups are 
poorly represented in the judiciary and law enforcement.  Unfortunately 
political pressure and ethnic bias are also all too common.  Not 
surprisingly, the public distrusts and lacks confidence in these legal 
systems. (Zoglin 2005: 45-46)   
 
It is the lower profile cases that will be transferred to Croatia’s courts and the outcome of 
these trials will hold great meaning locally. “The justice systems of almost all of the 
states of the former Yugoslavia are simply not equipped to provide fair and impartial 
trials for all ethnic groups, and this sad fact is even more true in the war crimes context 
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(Tolbert 2002:12).”  The European Court of Human Rights accused the Croatian 
judiciary system of violating citizen rights “due to lengthy proceedings and excessive 
delays” in 2002 (Zoglin 2005:54).  Zoglin declares that “citizens understandably have 
little confidence in the legal system (Zoglin 2005:55)”.   
 The political climate has been dominated by distrust in the government.  Pusić 
(1998) views the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) that included President Franjo 
Tuñman (elected in 1990, 1992 and 1997) as a counter-part to Milosević’s Serbian rule in 
many ways. Tuñman was a “communist-turned-nationalist” who was “seen by some as a 
guarantor of stability” and to others “as a warmongering, archaic autocrat” (Pusić 
1998:112). Many Croats supported Tuñman as a response to Milosevic’s threat of 
Serbian control over Yugoslavia. However, Tuñman went beyond a defensive stance and 
actively planned to control portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a battle between 
Croatia and Serbia over the country consisting of ethnic Croats, Serbs and Muslims. 
Pusić argues that Tuñman used manipulation to maintain control: 
The heavily majoritarian electoral system, bequeathed by the outgoing 
Communists and perfected by the current government, has magnified the 
HDZ’s relative electoral majorities into absolute parliamentary majorities.  
The HDZ has also launched several attempts to seize control of the 
judiciary. On the highest level (with the notable exception of the 
Constitutional Court), these efforts have mostly succeeded. (Pusić 
1998:115-116) 
 
This disturbing level of influence over the judiciary has lessened since Tuñman’s 
death and with the reforms required to comply with EU standards. The current 
government consists of many coalitions, some more conservative and nationalistic 
and others more progressive and eager for EU membership.   
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Political corruption, as opposed to consistent, unbiased application of law, is seen 
as the norm. A young man described the situation to be that the politicians pick the music 
and the Croatian people are forced to dance to it. He elaborated to say this meant that 
politicians do what they want with minimal accountability and that the general population 
has little to no political clout. This feeling of powerlessness applies to both national and 
local politics and goes beyond politicians to all government institutions notorious for 
their lack of consistency and favoritism. When asked to rate the importance of several 
problems in Croatia the clear “winner” was political corruption indicated by 59% (n=79) 
of the people choosing it as a 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not a problem and 5 being a 
major problem, see Graph 4.6). People were asked to rate the current importance of the 
following problems in Croatia on a scale of 1 to 5: Political corruption, Economy, Quality 
Education, Affordable Education, Ethnic Divisions, and Lack of Infrastructure. On this 
scale 1 represented no problem at all and 5 represented a major problem. The largest 
consensus was that political corruption was a major problem, 59% rated it a 5 (n=79) and 
22% rated it a 4 (n=29). Forming the second largest consensus, 42% rated the economy at 
a 5 (n=56), 26% a 4 (n=35) and 20% a 3 (n=27). The most common rating for quality 
education (38%, n=51) and affordable education (34%, n=45) was a 3 on the scale. The 
data regarding ethnic relations again appears to show polarization. For this social 
problem, 31% rated it a 5 as a major problem (n=42), 19% rated it a 4 (n=26), 24% rated 
it a 3 (n=32), 8% rated it a 2 (n=10), and 13% rated it a 1 (n=17). This shows that the 
people surveyed had quite different views about the degree to which ethnic relations are a 
concern. The problem of a lack of infrastructure was rated highest for 5 with 33% (n=44), 
then 4 with 27% (n=36) and 3 with 25% (n=34).  
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Graph 4.6: Rating of Problems in Croatia 
Rate the current importance of the following problems in Croatia on a 
scale of 1 to 5 (1=Not a Problem, 5=Major Problem).
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Law enforcement and courts are no exception to the institutions that lack trust by 
the public. In the survey I asked, “How often do you think people who commit serious 
crimes, such as theft, destruction of property, or violence, are justly punished for those 
crimes in Croatia?” and the most common response was that those crimes are rarely justly 
punished (54%). Notably, 12% responded that they were never justly punished and, in 
contrast, only 4% of respondents felt such crimes were always justly punished (see Graph 
4.7). If serious crimes are not justly punished, is it likely that smaller crimes are 
effectively resolved?  
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Graph 4.7: Just Punishment 
How often do you think people who commit serious crimes, such as 
theft, destruction of property and violence, are justly punished for 
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Based on the knowledge that there is a lack of confidence generally in the 
Croatian government I asked people in Gvozd specifically, “How much confidence do 
you have in the Croatian courts to conduct fair trials?” They answered that they had lots 
of confidence (3%), some confidence (31%), a little confidence (38%) or none (27%). 
These results are heavily weighed by people who said they had little or no confidence in 
the Croatian courts. This low level of confidence is likely a factor contributing to the low 
levels of crime reporting in Croatia. Only about half of the incidents of robbery and 
personal theft are reported and only 40% of incidents of assault or threats.  
There is little evidence of effectiveness in the domestic mechanisms of judicial 
accountability. Croatian courts are engaged in domestic trials for violations of human 
rights related to the conflict, but the legal processes are not considered a success. The 
defendants in the trials include ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs, which is an important step 
for any domestic trials (Zoglin 2005). This may be the only consequential success of 
domestic accountability and even this one requires further examination. The vast majority 
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of domestic trials have been of ethnic Serbs and the fairness of these trials is highly 
criticized (Tolbert 2002, Zoglin 2005, OSCE 2006).  The domestic legal institutions are 
not equipped to handle cases of war crimes and a strong bias against ethnic Serbs remains 
in effect. 
In interviews I heard a great range of opinions about crime in Gvozd. Although 
most people thought crime really did not exist, at least not above the level of petty 
crimes, some said that crimes were always punished and others said they were not 
punished. Several people complained about unfairness from the police and with the 
courts. A local policeman I interviewed said that probably small crimes like stealing take 
place in the town and that people who commit those crimes are punished if found 
(Interview #9 2008). This same person, an ethnic Croat who fought in the conflict, did 
not think the ICTY is effectively achieving justice because in his opinion Serbs and 
Croats are not held to the same standards. A waitress in Gvozd stated that many crimes 
take place, including fighting and stealing (Interview #12). In her opinion very little of 
those crimes are punished and it does affect her sense of personal security. At work she is 
pushed around by customers and reporting it to the police has not led to any action. She 
described an extreme incident when a man tried to physically assault her by stabbing with 
scissors. This man is locally known as being mentally unstable and overly aggressive. I 
was advised to avoid him as much as possible and did so, especially after learning about 
this incident.  The police gave her excuses that he was too troublesome to interfere with 
and she heard that he was related to one of the policemen and so the others didn’t want to 
get that person on their bad side. After realizing the police wouldn’t keep the man out of 
the café, her boss decided to take the matter into his own hands and physically threatened 
104 
 
and assaulted him as a way to resolve the situation. She was grateful for her boss’s 
actions and disappointed by the police. This woman’s boyfriend said these kinds of 
actions are often necessary there; people must fend for themselves because law 
enforcement is not dependable.  
Another woman in Gvozd stated that crimes are not often brought to justice in 
Croatia and gave a local example of corruption. She described a situation in which the 
defendant was well-known to be guilty and the trial appeared to be reaching the same 
verdict until the judge was bribed by the defendant. Though her knowledge was second 
hand, the perception of corruption is commonly held by people I spoke with there. 
Certain types of bribery appeared to be commonplace to the people I interacted with in 
Gvozd. I was told by several people that it was normal to give gifts of food and drink to 
doctors at the local clinic and in hospitals in order to avoid excessive wait times and 
receive better care. A special report on corruption in Croatia was conducted by the 
UNODC in partnership with the Institute of Economics, Zagreb in response to the high 
perception of corruption in this region. The study was based on administrative corruption 
mostly in the form of direct experience with bribery. It found that, “a considerable 
number of Croatian citizens (510,000, equivalent to 18.2% of adult population aged 18 to 
64) had either direct or indirect exposure to a bribery experience with a public official in 
the 12-month period in question” (UNODC 2011:13). These incidents were almost 
equally experienced by men and women, contrary to most other countries with high rates 
of bribery, and were most often with doctors, nurses, police officers, and car registration 
officers.  
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Other incidents of bribery in the special report included social protection officers, 
tax officers, judges/prosecutors, land registry officers and municipal elected 
representatives. Women were more likely to pay bribes with food or drink and men to 
pay with cash. The report states that, “bribery is often used to overcome deficiencies and 
weaknesses in public service delivery,” which is evidence by the percentage of bribes 
paid to speed up a procedure (35%), to receive better treatment (18%), and for the receipt 
of information (13%) (UNODC 2011:21). In general this report found that bribery was 
more common in urban areas, however, in the regions of Lika, Kordun and Banovina 
where Gvozd is located rural bribery occurred about as frequently as that in urban areas. 
Of the 11.2% of people who paid bribes in the twelve month period on average each 
person paid out four bribes, one about every three months. Note that some of the 18.2% 
people with direct or indirect bribery experience refused to pay the bribe. Overall this 
shows that bribes are a fairly regular part of interactions with representatives of 
government institutions and the perception of corruption has some grounding in reality.  
The number of people who responded that they knew of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was quite high at 86% (n=115). However, based on results of in-depth 
interviews, I expect that most of those same individuals cannot correctly identify specific 
rights listed in the Declaration. This knowledge of the Universal Declaration of human 
rights shows an awareness of human rights in Gvozd, though it is not clear how well the 
content of the Declaration of Human Rights is known. Nor is it apparent to what level 
people embrace these rights or claim them. There does seem to be a greater knowledge of 
domestic legal rights and successful effort to claim those rights. Interviews and 
observations indicate that domestic welfare programs are utilized by many people in the 
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local community who qualify as returnees, refugees and minorities who were displaced 
by the conflict. The high level of unemployment and tough economy likely contribute to 
the need for welfare assistance. In one case a local Serb woman declined to pursue 
divorce proceedings against her absent husband that would have allowed her to have 
significantly more welfare support for herself and three sons. This is an instance of not 
claiming rights that may be different because of its domestic nature and stigmas against 
divorce, but still it is also an example of how knowledge and even assistance with 
claiming rights is rejected. Members of Suncokret worked closely with this particular 
woman’s family, explained the law and options, and even arranged for the help of a 
lawyer, but ultimately the woman did not pursue the divorce. 
There are many people who live in Gvozd that are known to have committed war 
crimes, most of whom are Serbs who helped control the region as Serb territory from 
1991 to 1995. The people who know of these crimes are mostly other Serbs who were 
present, not the Bosnian Croat refugees. Those refugees from Bosnia mostly came to 
Croatia as victims of displacement from the area surrounding Banja Luka. There was one 
exceptional case of an ethnic Croat from Bosnia whose actions during the conflict came 
to light while I was living there. In Gvozd he was known as an ardent Croat nationalist 
who headed the local HDZ political organization. Rumors began circulating the village 
that he had committed war crimes in Bosnia as part of a surprising connection. He is 
wanted in Bosnia based on the claim that he joined a Muslim group that committed 
various war crimes against Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. It was sure that his name matched 
the one associated with the claims and that he came from the area in question, but it was 
not clear whether or not he admitted guilt for the accusations. This likely history of 
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violence against Croats did not sit well with leaders of HDZ and his position was soon 
stripped and membership revoked. His presence in Gvozd was also reported to a national 
Croatian NGO, though I don’t know that anything came of it. Other than these few 
situations, few people in Gvozd, regardless of their ethnicity, have close to a first hand 
experience of international human rights legal proceedings.   
Religion is a major part of Croatian culture which influences perceptions of 
justice in multiple ways. The Catholic Church is embedded in the Croatian government 
and so heavily influences policies and law. In Gvozd older women are only seen outside 
the home during the morning markets on Mondays and Thursdays or for church 
attendance. The Catholic Church in Gvozd used to be housed in an old, leaky building 
near the marketplace. Over the three years that I traveled to Gvozd I saw the building of a 
new Catholic Church and adjacent home for the priest that nearly overshadowed the 
impressive church structure. These buildings have a large presence located in the very 
center of town by the health care center, library and school. The priest has a reputation 
for being strict and some of his sermons include the dangers of Barbie as a role model for 
young girls because she is not married and is without children and the dangers of the 
practice of yoga calling it a cult. He uses his influence very actively to support certain 
political leaders and initiatives, such as the local mayoral elections that took place during 
my stay in 2009. My understanding from interviews and observation is that the people 
who attend church regularly do give credence to the priest’s advice. Others, particularly 
ethnic Croats less involved in the Catholic religion, look critically at the messages from 
church leaders. The Catholic religion is a major influence for many Gvozd Croats as it is 
it for the nation as a whole.  
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Gvozd does not currently have an Orthodox church so the devout must travel to a 
neighboring town for services in Vojnić or Topusko (approx. 15 minutes by car). There 
are several old Orthodox churches in the area which are now only ruins due to destruction 
during the WWII era, mostly by anti-Serb Ustaše forces. Gvozd Catholics I spoke with 
viewed the Serb population as being quite unreligious, saying that most Serbs stopped 
devout practices many years ago and now are without God. Some Serbs talked about how 
the Orthodox religion lost much of its following here because of the Ustaše actions and 
Tito’s policies, but stated that the Orthodox religion is still very strong in Serbia. 
Although I know of at least two Muslims living in Gvozd, none of the people I surveyed 
identified with the Islamic religion. However, I did interview a Muslim woman from 
Sarajevo who previously worked as a journalist. She appeared more interested in the local 
unemployment rate and assistance with extensive health problems than discussing 
religious practices. The survey data showed that most people who identify as Croat (48%, 
n=64) also identify as Catholic (n=58), reinforcing the link between these two forms of 
group identification. The same trend was found with people who identified as both Serb 
(44%, n=59) and Orthodox (n=53). Only one individual identified as Serb and Catholic, 
crossing the usual ethno-religious divisions. From the sample, 16% (n=21) gave atheist or 
blank responses for religious affiliation and 8% (n=11) opted not to identify with a 
particular ethnic label. Nearly half (48%, n=60) of all participants attend a house of 
worship only rarely or not at all. Of the people who identified as Catholic, 0% (n=1) 
stated they attend church daily, 34% (n=21) weekly, 20% (n=12) once or twice a month, 
6% (n=4) once or twice a year, 34% (n=19) rarely. Of the people who identified as 
Orthodox, 0% (n=0) stated they attend church daily, 8% (n=5) weekly, 8% (n=5) or twice 
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a month, 22% (n=11) once or twice a year, 56% (n=31) rarely. Though a large number of 
both ethnic groups only attend religious services rarely there is a distinct difference in the 
patterns that shows less attendance by the Orthodox population that may be partly a 
consequence of the distance from a place of worship.  
My own experiences with government institutions fit with the ones presented in 
this chapter. American citizens can stay in Croatia for three months without a special 
visa, but a longer stay requires an extensive visa approval process based on the reason for 
your stay. My first attempt to obtain a visa was with the assistance of friends who live in 
the United States and own property in Croatia near Zadar where their parents lived until 
their teens. A helpful language instructor also went to great lengths to facilitate the 
approval during inquiries at the police station. I found that although all the required 
paperwork was submitted the first time I requested the visa (after being literally elbowed 
out of line several times) each time I would return to check on the status the clerk would 
say I needed additional paperwork that usually needed official translation and notary 
approval. After months of attempts with no progress it became apparent that it would not 
be approved, at least not before I needed it to stay legally. I hoped my trip to neighboring 
Bosnia would “reset” my time allowed upon re-entering the country. It appeared to work.  
What is the message I received from this experience? It is better not to try to do 
things the “right” way. Although I was never asked to pay a bribe I did get the impression 
from the clerk that my request was not given any priority and one might have helped. 
However, before another extended stay I initiated paperwork through the Croatian 
Consulate in New York City for stay in Gvozd where I was already know by the 
community, including some police officers. It took some time, but the visa was approved 
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the day before I left for Croatia with the prodding of friends there. The bizarre 
bureaucratic twist was that even though it was the Gvozd police department that 
ultimately made the approval, my passport had to be stamped by the consulate in New 
York City - not Gvozd or Zagreb or anywhere else in Croatia. So after arriving in Gvozd 
I mailed my passport to New York for the official stamp and crossed my fingers that I 
would get it back quickly (or at all). Thankfully I did.  
Another peculiar interaction with the local bureaucracy caused quite a conflict for 
a friend of mine trying to help me stay in the country legally. My visa required that I be 
registered at a local house that would be subject to random checks by the police to ensure 
that all was as it should be. My friend was told by the local police that she needed to 
show proof of her house number in order to document that I was staying with her. The 
existing documents didn’t seem to count and we had to drive to the town clerk in 
Topusko for additional verification. After several trips to find out if they had concluded 
their research the office there said that her house number is not the one she thought it 
was, but is 17A rather than 16. This is despite her deed (the house was only purchased a 
few years ago) and utilities all listed as number 16. More paperwork was needed to 
correct the numbering and finally we could go back to Gvozd and prove the house 
number. All in all, this fairly simple task took about two weeks, several hours of driving 
and lots of waiting and arguing to complete. A policeman did come to check on me at the 
house there soon after.  
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Chapter 5 – An Assessment of the Rule of Law in Croatia 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will examine the reasons why conceptions of the rule of law are 
as they appear and analyze the connections between global initiatives and local 
perspectives. Each aspect of the rule of law is addressed separately and then reviewed 
together to establish if the local legal consciousness can be classified as a “rule of law 
culture.” This is done by identifying the norms and structures that represent conceptions 
of the rule of law. Then I single out the data on victim identification to explore 
connections between victimhood and perceptions of the tribunal. In the following 
analysis I often refer to information that was presented in the previous chapter including 
scholarly works and my own research data, but I will not repeat it in full.  
 
Understanding Local Legal Consciousness 
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the local legal consciousness 
regarding the rule of law with the intention to evaluate how salient the ICTY’s initiatives 
to strengthen the rule of law are locally. Legal consciousness is understood through a 
synthesis of many elements that have been presented above: the history of the region, the 
crimes that took place during the 1990s conflict, the proceedings of the tribunal, the 
interaction between Croatia and the tribunal, domestic institutions and politics, local 
perspectives of the tribunal, and, perhaps most importantly, local experiences with law 
and conflict. In general terms legal consciousness is not the law as written or law as 
action, but a conceptualization of the law that links the two.  
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Accountability 
One of the components of the rule of law that I have singled out for this analysis 
is accountability. Does accountability exist? Do people want accountability? The forms 
of accountability under consideration here are the accountability of political leaders to the 
public, the accountability of courts and law enforcement to the people, and personal 
accountability for wrongdoing. In the context of the rule of law accountability, at a 
minimum, refers to political leaders being held accountable for their actions toward 
citizens (or, in older times, a king to his subjects). Limits are placed on what leaders can 
do and must, to some degree, do as the people wish. More importantly, the possibility 
that leaders may abuse their power and the people is constricted. 
The tribunal represents an attempt for accountability, whether or not you consider 
it to be fair. People alleged to have committed war crimes have been arrested and held for 
trial, all those indicted were brought to The Hague with the exception of a few who died 
before arrest. Several have been convicted of war crimes and sentenced to time in prison 
as punishment. The question to answer about the tribunal is how much accountability 
does it provide? Some opportunities were missed with the deaths of Tuñman, Milošević 
and others. The way individuals in Croatia perceive the tribunal's delivery of 
accountability will likely depend on their personal experience in the conflict and, to some 
extent, be influenced by their ethno-religious identity. Based on my research many people 
think positively of the accountability provided by the criminal trials even if it is not 
considered to a full realization of justice. 
The tribunal’s conviction of political and military leaders for war crimes is a 
strong example of accountability at the international level. However, it does not 
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exemplify that domestic legal systems will hold violators of human rights accountable. 
Though the tribunal has its own meaningful implications, it is more of an imposed rule of 
law than an internal adoption of the rule of law. In fact, the tribunal was created precisely 
because the domestic courts were not considered to be competent in this regard. The 
tribunal’s role in creating accountability at the domestic level lies in its attempts to 
improve the legal and judicial systems in the states of the Former Yugoslavia where war 
crimes took place.  
The Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian governments are shaped by the existence of 
the tribunal and have conducted war crimes trials of their own. The majority of trials in 
Croatia have faced heavy criticism from international and domestic human rights 
organizations for their bias against Serbs, failure to try Croats, lack of witness protection, 
trials held in absentia, and the incompetence of judges and prosecutors. There is, 
however, a trend of improvement in these areas. The domestic monitoring and reporting 
of war crimes trials has helped to increase standards through the attention it brings to the 
media and politicians. The tribunal's Rules of the Road program has taken steps to 
address these issues through education, training and sharing resources. The capacity and 
motivation to hold perpetrators accountable have increased since the conflict period, but 
there are few instances to show it has really taken place at the domestic level.  
In Croatia there is a perception that very little accountability exists at all levels of 
government, as detailed in the previous chapter. There is a commonly-held belief that 
politicians are not working for the needs of people in their constituency, but instead base 
decisions on how the outcome will affect their own agendas. The widespread corruption 
is a major concern in the political realm and throughout government institutions. My own 
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research and many other sources noted above show that trust in government is extremely 
low which demonstrates that accountability of the political leadership to the people is 
weak.  
The situation in Croatia is similar to the one in Bosnia that Nettelfield describes: 
“Petty, nonresponsive, and power-hungry bureaucrats often violated the human rights of 
the country’s citizens through the exercise of significant influence and discrimination in a 
labyrinth of prewar, postwar and wartime institutions. This inefficient public 
administration affected the daily lives of most” (2010:235). People in Croatia also must 
contend with a bureaucracy that is seemingly impossible to navigate. The rules are not 
often known, understood or adhered to, especially because there is a confusing mix of old 
and new practices of democracy-building, development efforts, and compliance with EU 
standards makes them incredibly complex. The confusion and complexity also leave it 
open to circumnavigation from a position of power. Many media, utility and financial 
companies are state-owned, a continuation from socialist governance, and the lack of 
privatization calls into question their impartiality. This assessment leads me to say that 
the accountability of government institutions and representatives to the public is quite 
low. While there may be a trend toward more accountability (or at least the potential with 
EU compliance) and it gets a fair amount of lip service from politicians, the sum of the 
current corruption, distrust, and abuse present in government translates to a low degree of 
accountability.  
The research finding that more than half of the people believe crimes are rarely or 
never justly punished in Croatia demonstrates that people’s perceptions of accountability 
are also low. People I spoke with in Gvozd, Zagreb and Zadar gave examples of people 
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committing offences for which they were never held responsible. In addition to the 
situations already detailed there were many others that reinforced the lack of 
accountability locally. There were rumors that the mayor was caught drinking while 
driving, but the charge was dropped by people he was friendly with in law enforcement. 
Other allegations included school officials that hire only people of the same ethnicity 
(including at least two family members) without any way to effectively contest the 
choice. The librarian supposedly got her job as a favor to her boyfriend and barely works 
yet still gets paid well. There were several instances of petty theft (ex. a pig, small 
amount of cash) and a store break-in when I was there. The lack of repercussions for 
breaking the law was sorely felt by several individuals I spoke with on the subject of the 
company who promised to utilize a vacant factory for its business and create local jobs in 
return for government funded financial perks. After a good deal of media hype about the 
project the company never used the space or created the jobs, though it received the 
perks. People brought up this situation to me when trying to explain the difficulties they 
encounter finding jobs and lack of real government effort to help. In most of the 
anecdotal accounts I heard during interviews, like the scenario described in the previous 
chapter about the waitress who was threatened at work and no action was taken by the 
police, these everyday conflicts are not adequately responded to by local law 
enforcement. The result is that people generally do not feel protected against wrongdoing 
by the government. 
A separate question to answer is: do people in Croatia want accountability? Based 
on my fieldwork the answer is yes. Overall the international tribunal is considered to be 
“better than nothing” and a good percentage of people think the tribunal is effectively 
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achieving justice (25%, n=33). There is a great deal of support for holding the military 
and political leaders accountable, though who exactly is meant by that may depend on the 
person’s perspective. Basically everyone I spoke with felt their lives had been affected by 
the conflict and nearly half (48%, n=62) of the people surveyed considered themselves to 
be a victim of the conflict. There is a consensus that corruption is a major problem in 
Croatia, both based on my research and numerous other sources noted above. What can 
an individual do in a situation like the one in Croatia where there is clear evidence of 
little accountability by the government? How do you hold someone accountable? Who 
can you go to if you are wronged? If experience is telling you that governmental 
institutions are not effective means of resolving conflict then what do you do to get 
justice?  
 
Fairness (Consistency and Impartiality) 
Is the tribunal considered to be fair? Based on my local research fairness is best 
determined as a relative concept. When simply asked if the tribunal is fair most people 
answer in a negative way, but a full review of the work presented here leads to me to 
answer the question with a qualified yes. It is qualified because the fairness is generally 
perceived to be better at the tribunal when compared to domestic institutions and when 
compared to the theoretical absence of the tribunal. It is, therefore, a relative degree of 
fairness. The significance of this relative fairness should not be overlooked because the 
establishment of evenhanded procedures is a real benefit in any transition. Conversely, 
the lack of evenhandedness has the potential to produce a more volatile state of affairs. In 
this evaluation I combine consistency and impartiality under the category of fairness 
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because they are aspects of the rule of law that are closely related even if they could be 
separated to an extent. For example, one way to assess the impartiality of a law is to 
determine if it is consistently applied to all ethnic groups in the same manner. 
Impartiality has to do with the unbiased and fair application of law and punishment. 
Consistency refers to the consistent application of laws and the consistent consequence of 
punishment for wrongdoing. While the tribunal is considered to be relatively fair, at the 
same time there are several ways in which the tribunal could improve the fairness of its 
practices. Is the tribunal consistent in the application of law and in the consequence of 
punishment for wrongdoing?  
It can be argued that the tribunal is the only attempt to apply international human 
rights law and punish those responsible for the major crimes of the conflict, and, 
therefore, represents the most consistent application of human rights law for this 
particular conflict because there is no real alterative (to say this, domestic efforts must be 
considered irrelevant in this way). That may be so, but there are other criticisms of the 
tribunal’s consistency. There is a lack of consistency simple due to the fact that the ICTY 
is the first truly international war crimes tribunal and human rights law is developing 
through its decisions that have little precedent. It is difficult to argue that the application 
of law is consistent when there are few examples for comparison. The absence of 
examples for comparison may also be a way to critique the tribunal’s consistency in its 
own right because how can the prosecution of trials for the Former Yugoslavia be 
justified when many other violations of human rights take place without legal 
intervention. These criticisms are often voiced in Croatia and elsewhere in the region and 
while there is some basis for them, the arguments fall short when considering the crimes 
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that took place and need to establish the consequences for such atrocities. Nevertheless, 
this is a point that the ICTY, ICC and other international trials must bear in mind. 
Selectivity is an issue that affects both the consistency and the impartiality of trials. 
People in Gvozd, and throughout Croatia, point out the tribunal’s selectivity when 
choosing which alleged perpetrators from within the Former Yugoslavia to indict. In 
Minow’s analysis she considers the challenge of selectivity in any situation where there 
are so many people implicated in the crimes to be a negative of any transitional justice 
approach that includes trials (1998:40). The perception of fairness is also shadowed by 
aspects of the tribunal considered to be biased and therefore lacking impartiality. If it is 
not possible to prosecute all perpetrators then some criteria must be made and the fairness 
of those criteria will be questioned, especially when perceptions of responsibility are 
skewed by different factions so that there is not one unified narrative of the conflict. 
Allegations that the tribunal targets mostly Serbs or too many Croats were common in my 
research and in other data sources.   
The next question deals with the impartial application of law at the domestic 
level. Do biases affect government functions? My research indicates that they do. As 
presented in the chapter on a local perspective above, there is a clear lack of trust in 
domestic institutions which are thought to be biased, inconsistent and inefficient. One of 
the major critiques of domestic war crimes trials is that they are one-sided, with more 
trials against Serbs and harsher sentences for Serbs. The corruption that affects 
accountability is also significant in the analysis of fairness. Mafia-type networks are 
prevalent in Zagreb, the coastal cities and elsewhere. Rumors abound in Zagreb about the 
“hand shakes under the table” made in the construction business. A contact in Zadar 
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explained to me how a local group controls cafés by requiring regular bribes to be 
“allowed” to operate. The repercussion for not complying, at least in the example given, 
was progressive destruction to the property that led up to exploding a bomb and the 
owner giving up on the business venture altogether. As commented by people in Gvozd, 
hiring decisions are perceived to be far from impartial.  
Some 18 per cent of Croatian citizens, or members of their households, 
applied for a job in the public sector in the three years prior to the survey, 
but of those whose application was successful one in six (16%) admits to 
paying some money, giving a gift or doing a favour to help secure their 
position. Among those who failed, there is a widespread perception that 
factors such as cronyism, nepotism or bribery played a decisive role in the 
recruitment process, while only 16 per cent believe that the selection was 
made on merit. (UNODC 2011:4) 
 
The prevalence of bribery and preferential treatment for family and friends demonstrates 
that there is a lack of fairness that is sure to influence the local legal consciousness.  
Do people in Croatia value fairness? I think it is straightforward to answer yes to 
this question, but defining what is fair makes it much more complex. People do complain 
about unfair practices and mistreatment in their everyday interactions. In practice the 
desire for consistent application of law and impartiality may be reserved for situations 
when it is an advantage. This, of course, isn’t a true commitment to fairness, but in 
practice this limited application is hardly absent from any society. There are certainly 
many claims of unfair treatment and demands for justice as evidence of people’s wish for 
fair legal institutions. The research findings that showed people were concerned about 
biases and wrongdoers going free also add to the evidence that fairness is valued here.  
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Security 
Does the tribunal affect feelings of security in Croatia? In this analysis of the rule 
of law, security is looked at in a fairly broad manner to include security from violence, 
financial security, job security, and a general sense that there is a safety net in case of 
misfortune. It is manifest in the way that people interact, how they mitigate conflict, and 
in major life choices such as where to live. In most of Croatia people feel insecure about 
their job status, finances, housing and future prospects. Recovery from the destruction of 
the conflict and global economic crises had a great effect on the state’s economy and 
every sector of public life. This period of transition from socialism to democracy, 
communism to capitalism and from Yugoslavia to an independent Croatia is by nature a 
time of insecurity. As with all transitions, this is a time of social liminality in which old 
ways are shed and new ways learned. In the anthropological study of transitions and 
rituals this time is seen as precarious because normal rules of behavior do not apply and 
uncertainty prevails. This is a time when norms change. The future of Croatia is being 
shaped by decisions made today. The choice to join NATO and the European Union will 
impact how any future violence in the region is resolved. The reaction of politicians and 
the public to the tribunal is a gauge of tolerance between ethno-religious groups and the 
degree to which people are willing to scrutinize their own actions. The characteristics of 
Croatia’s next incarnation are not set, but rather are in a stage of development.  
One way that the tribunal impacted security is in conjunction with EU 
requirements and international pressures to adopt new standards and procedures that 
prioritize the rule of law and human rights. The tribunal influenced changes to Croatia’s 
legal and judicial systems as well as garnered support for further change from other states 
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and international organizations. The trials brought attention to minority issues in its 
determination of what qualifies as a crime against humanity, such as with the tribunal’s 
decision to include rape, and what is required to apply the term of genocide or ethnic 
cleansing. The tribunal is also linked to accountability and security because if 
perpetrators are not held responsible people may feel more vulnerable to future violence.  
A personal feeling of safety can be linked to the tribunal. The survey question 
targeting this subject revealed that 49% of the respondents believed the decisions of the 
ICTY affect how safe they feel to live in Croatia “Very Much” or “Some” (See Graph 4.2 
above). That the tribunal is seen to be so influential on feelings of security is telling of the 
importance placed on accountability through criminal trials. Based on participant 
observation and interviews I conducted the feelings of safety referred to in the question 
were likely related to the safety from violence as well as a general stability in the current 
state of affairs and the ability to make informed decisions. If violators of human rights 
aren’t held responsible than what else might take place without consequence? People are 
unclear about the current policies and don’t know if they may change, particularly those 
policies regarding refugees and returnees that impart a tenuous claim to housing and 
financial assistance.  
The Croatian government plays a major role in the security of its people through 
its laws, policies and interactions. It is at this level that many needs are not addressed. 
The lack of trust in politicians and government officials demonstrates that people have 
difficulty addressing conflicts and needs through government channels. The lack of a 
neutral government arbitrator forces people to resolve disputes in other ways. 
Unfortunately there are a number of divisions and challenges that contribute to feelings 
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of insecurity in Croatia. During a discussion I had with Vesna Pusić in Zagreb she 
identified the status of refugees and returnees to be an ongoing point of contention in 
domestic politics. The current economic challenges, housing shortages and high 
unemployment rates have led some Croats who lived there before the conflict to blame 
their hardships on the Bosnian Croats given housing and financial assistance by the 
Croatian government because of their refugee status. This is translated as less jobs and 
opportunities for the “Croatian Croats.” My survey research in Gvozd showed that ethnic 
relations are perceived to be worse now than in the 1980s, before the conflict and 
independence. Clearly, inequalities and fear persist while the Croatian state inadequately 
negotiates conflicts.  
An account of war-time violence related to me by a young woman from a small 
coastal town near Zadar demonstrates the hostility of some social environments that 
people must face, even now, in an attempt to return to life as it was before. In this town 
the home of the one family of Serb ethnicity was vandalized and a group of local men 
killed the owner in a grotesque manner by cutting off his head. The family has not come 
back to claim the property and it is falling apart from neglect and looting. It is easy to 
understand why the family would be hesitant to return despite the time that has passed. 
And it is easy to understand why that family might harbor resentment and hatred towards 
members of the town and more generally to people of Croat ethnicity. Public 
acknowledgement that crimes were committed by Croats in Croatia and the leaders put 
on trial might ease some of the resentment and hatred.  
Do people value security?  My research indicates the answer is yes. People’s 
feelings of security are shaped by their own interactions with family, community and 
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institutions. Tamanaha’s theory states that formal legality can be a positive addition in 
situations where “ties are thin” (2004). I have shown that ties are “thin” in the patchwork 
community of Gvozd for many reasons and to the extent that there is a real distrust 
among groups and no effective way to mitigate disputes through government institutions 
as they arise. People are left feeling unsatisfied and some find other means, like physical 
violence or animosity, to right the wrong. While people generally feel safe in their 
community, measures are taken to keep unwanted people at a distance. There is a 
common practice by people who believe that some protection for their home is warranted 
in rural areas like Gvozd to most keep a guard dog or have some sort of friendly 
arrangement with neighbors to keep watch (UNODC 2011:49). Many of the homes in 
Gvozd do have a dog that is left outside at all times and their incessant barking after dark 
is a continual reminder that only friends are welcome.  
People in Gvozd do not have an immediate fear of physical violence, but the 
horrific experience of the conflict, which ended only eighteen years ago, surely heightens 
a sense of insecurity. There is also a high degree in instability in the region because the 
cease-fire created by the Dayton Peace Accords left a political power-sharing 
arrangement that leaves no one satisfied, particularly across the very close border with 
Bosnia. Many of the Bosnian Croat refugees in Gvozd came from the area near Banja 
Luka which is now part of the Republika Srpska territory of Bosnia. These refugees have 
no close history with the Serb returnees in Gvozd, but know they participated in 
ethnically cleansing the town of non-Serbs in 1991 and may think it is possible to happen 
again. From the opposite perspective, before 1991 the Serb returnees were likely targets 
of efforts to purge non-Croats from job and positions of power when Croatia began its 
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separation from Yugoslavia and were certainly forced to flee the town by Croats in 1995 
during the destruction of Operation Storm. Some might feel justified to think the Croatian 
government would give priority to the Bosnian Croat refugees or even make things more 
difficult for the Serb population. A re-emergence of violence in Bosnia could spark 
turmoil in this area too. In light of these fears for security, the decisions of the tribunal 
are noticeably being watched. In theory, and with some reinforcement by my research, 
the tribunal’s success in holding major perpetrators accountable will ease tensions and 
lessen the possibility that additional violence will occur in response to unaddressed calls 
for justice.  
In the new patchwork community of Gvozd the building of security and trust is 
complicated, and even more so due to the new round of Bosnian Croat refugees due to 
join the village. The government is giving a group of Bosnian Croat refugees who have 
been in temporary housing outside of Zagreb since the conflict (for at least seventeen 
years) a permanent home in a section of the village that is walking distance from the 
center. People currently in Gvozd from both groups are not happy about this addition, 
especially because there will be a new general store in the settlement that many people 
fear will keep the two areas divided. The lack of a cohesive community in Gvozd impacts 
perceptions of security because it deters the building of social relationships and effective 
mean to resolve conflicts.  
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Comparison with Other Rule of Law Measures 
 Any evaluation requires the subject to be well defined and so there are many 
concerns about past and current efforts to strengthen the rule of law that have not taken 
this first step before deciding how to take action. Rule of law initiatives in general have 
been criticized for their difficulty to be evaluated. There is often a rote enthusiasm for the 
rule of law driving development and human rights initiatives without a solid research 
base that demonstrates real change is affected by the approach of those initiatives 
purported to strengthen the rule of law. Still, public support for rule of law initiatives 
grows and positive correlations are seen, even if their real cause is difficult to ascertain 
(Carothers 2009:50). It is possible to examine particular aspects of the rule of law once 
they are clearly identified and the need for research is starting to be recognized. Several 
methods of evaluation are currently being suggested and employed to better understand 
these connections. Sen proposes that comparison of multiple situations can bear 
meaningful information about the successes and failures of rule of law initiatives (Sen 
2009:58). A comparison of Croatia to its neighbors Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina does 
shed some light on the importance of the tribunal’s outreach and Rule of the Road 
initiatives. The ICTY concentrated most of its outreach initiatives to Bosnia with the 
rational that this is where most of the extreme violence took place. The outreach included 
communication efforts through conferences and presentations and more action by the 
Rules of the Road Program to build a domestic justice system capable of conducting trials 
of crimes against humanity to the standards of the United Nations. A special court was 
created for this purpose in Bosnia and later in Serbia, but not in Croatia. Instead, a 
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handful of courts in Croatia were selected for assistance to work toward international 
standards of justice for war crimes trials, but these courts do not exclusively handle war 
crimes cases and their capacity to do so is heavily criticized. Generally, communication 
efforts of the ICTY in Croatia and Serbia were less extensive than those in Bosnia. Some 
of these shortcomings are reflective of a lack of funding and the prioritization of Bosnia 
as the place where most human rights violations occurred.  
Statistical comparison of crime in Croatia to other states is useful for a frame of 
reference. One common statistic used is a homicide rate which tells how many intentional 
homicides occurred per 100,000 people over the course of a year. This rate does not 
include war-time killing or homicides orchestrated by a large group. According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 1995 the homicide rate in 
Croatia was 3.6 per 100,000 people and that has trended down to 1.1 in 2009. Relatively 
speaking the homicide rate in Croatia is low. In 2009 the homicide rate of the United 
States, known for high levels of crime, was 5.0 and in Japan, known for low levels of 
crime, it was 0.4 (UNODC 2012). The rule of law may actually be considered strong in 
this aspect, since homicides are relatively rare and people generally feel safe walking 
alone at night. However, at the same time, the amount of corruption and lack of trust in 
government are areas in which the rule of law is not strong so how you assess the rule of 
law makes a difference and it can span a wide range of issues.   
The World Bank aggregates a number of independent studies to come up with a 
series of reports on world governance. They include the rule of law as one indicator of 
world governance in a report that uses data from 1996-2009 to rank countries (Kaufman 
et al 2010:6). Croatia starts off in 1996 at the 30th percentile, meaning 30% of countries 
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rank worse than Croatia on measures of the rule of law and 70% rank higher. In 2009 
Croatia’s rank increased to about the 60th percentile which does appear to be a significant 
increase using this method of assessing the rule of law. The increase may be due in part 
to the change in the political climate, the incorporation of EU standards and the tribunal’s 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law. This method of measurement gives only a very 
general idea of the rule of law that requires a great deal of extrapolation to determine 
what data was used and the related drawbacks.  
The quantitative method developed by the World Justice Project (WJP) along 
with the American Bar Association identifies several aspects of the rule of law and breaks 
them down into small measurable components. Their assessments are claimed to evaluate 
the de facto rule of law, law in action rather than in books. The WJP Rule of Law Index 
for 2011 found that Croatia ranked in the middle of most categories when compared to 
the other 65 countries indexed that year (World Justice Project 2011). The report states 
that, 
Despite recent progress, Croatia’s institutions still lag behind those of 
other high-income countries. Its public administrative bodies, for example, 
are inefficient, and the judicial system, while generally accessible, is still 
slow and subject to political influence and corruption. The country is safe 
from crime (ranking 6th), but further work is needed in terms of openness 
(ranking 33rd) and equal treatment of ethnic minorities. (World Justice 
Project 2011) 
 
This evaluation supports many findings of my research in Croatia and the 2011 
UNODC report on bribery discussed previously. It points out that adherence to 
the rule of law is not the norm in Croatian politics and law, even so many years 
after the conflict. Some of the factors where Croatia ranked the lowest were in the 
stability of laws, the clarity of laws, limitation of government powers by the 
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judiciary, effectiveness of correctional system, a criminal system free of 
discrimination, unreasonable delays in civil justice, and the effective enforcement 
of civil justice. 
 It also found that people resort to violence to redress grievances which 
may be the most pertinent factor in relation to the argument that effective justice 
can end cycles of violence, though it must be interpreted in conjunction with the 
finding that there is a relatively low level of crime and civil conflict. It seems that 
the occasional times when people do have a grievance the justice system is not 
effective and so alternative methods are used and that often means the use of 
violence. The justice system’s lack of effectiveness, still a major issue in 2011, 
does validate the uncertainty people have about their future prospects that 
perpetuates ethno-religious divisions. The general lack of enforcement and 
corruption does little to instill confidence that the Croatian government will step 
in to end and impartiality resolve future conflicts.  
 
A Victim Perspective 
Thus far I have examined components of the rule of law, accountability, fairness 
and security, based on my research to show that the local legal consciousness does show 
some congruence of norms with rule of law initiatives. In order to look closer and 
determine what differentiates people on their opinions of the tribunal and the rule of law I 
looked for correlations between certain questions in the survey conducted in Gvozd. I 
was reminded of similar discussions with many people in Croatia that brought up the idea 
of victimhood. They said that some people identify strongly as a victim such that it 
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shapes their perceptions of nearly all social relations. There were complaints that people 
used their victim status to receive economic assistance unfairly and acted as though 
entitled to a “free ride.” Other complaints were that some people wallow in self-pity with 
a worldview that their hardships were caused by what people did to them, not based on 
their own choices in any way. A common sense of being a victim is reinforced by its use 
as a justification for violence by all sides during the conflict. All of the people living in 
Gvozd can make some claim to victim status as a refugee or returnee, yet about half said 
they felt they were victims and half said they were not. Considering oneself a victim is 
clearly complex and what it says about someone’s outlook on life could be quite 
meaningful for understanding the impact of the tribunal.  
The self-identification as a victim of war crimes says much about a person’s 
experience and view of justice. There is an important psychological dimension to the 
study of human rights abuse and the feelings of victimhood that often follow such 
tragedies (Hamber 2009).  In this particular region of the world, identification as a victim 
has been long connected with ethno-religious identities and conflict, whether Serb, Croat 
or Muslim. In the survey conducted in Gvozd 46% said yes (n=62), they were a victim of 
war crimes, and 51% said no (n=68). This question could be thought of in different terms 
and certainly all of the participants could have some claim to being a victim by reason of 
forced displacement and, in most cases, the permanent loss of their home and jobs. Many 
people were affected to an even greater degree by the loss of loved ones, decline in 
physical and mental health, or other consequences of the violence.  
Self-identification as a victim may be linked to other factors like ethno-religious 
identity. Interestingly, my survey did not show that ethnicity correlated with a person 
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answering that they were or were not a victim of war crimes. Actually an exact 50% 
(n=31) of Croats answered yes and no to being a victim of war crimes. The situation was 
basically the same for people who identified as Serb of whom 45% (n=26) answered that 
yes they were victims of war crimes and 55% (n=32) answered no. If about the same 
proportion of each ethnicity identifies as a victim that indicates ethnicity is not a predictor 
of victimhood and nearly an equal amount of Serbs and Croats identify as a victims.  
What else could be related to that identification as a war crimes victim? My data 
showed that age was not a good predictor of victim identification when comparing people 
who were adults at the start of the conflict period to those who were younger. As 
presented above, knowledge of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights only 
correlated with a person’s identification as a victim of war crimes to a small degree when 
looking at people who did not have knowledge of the UDHR. Victimhood seems to be 
more correlated with the person’s gender and their ratings of the ICTY. The men who 
completed the survey were slightly more likely to answer that they were victims of war 
crimes (53%, n=39 said yes; 47%, n=34 said no) and the women were more likely to say 
that no they were not a victim of war crimes (38%, n=21 said yes; 62%, n=34 said no). 
Still, there was not a significant difference between genders regarding victimhood.  
There does appear to be a greater connection between identification as a victim 
and the whether or not the ICTY is considered to effectively achieve justice – a key 
question for this study. Of the 25% (n=32) of people who said that the ICTY is 
effectively achieving justice for the human rights violations they were twice as likely to 
say that they were NOT a victim of war crimes than that they were a victim (69%, n=22 
said not a victim, 31%, n=10 said yes a victim). Another way to look at this data is to 
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consider only the people who said that they were not victims of war crimes. Of these 
people, 33% (n=22) said the ICTY is effectively achieving justice and 67% (n=45) said it 
was not. So when compared to all people who completed the survey, people who did not 
consider themselves victims were more likely to hold a positive view of the ICTY  (See 
Table 5.1). Conversely, people who did identify as victims were more likely to be 
negative of the ICTY.  
 
Table 5.1: Is the ICTY effective? 
 
Do you think the ICTY is effectively achieving justice for 
the violations of human rights that occurred during the war 
in the 1990s? 
  Yes No Total 
10 52 62 Yes 
31% 54%   
22 45 67 
Do you feel that 
you are a victim 
of war crimes? 
No 
69% 46%   
Total 32 97 129 
Lambda (sym.) = .074, p = .476; Pearson Chi-square = 4.819, p = .028 
 
 
The most interesting links with identification as a victim are with the two survey 
questions that ask about how the ICTY decisions affect individuals. When looking 
separately at who identifies as a victim and who doesn’t the “spread” of responses is 
different. People who identify as victims are more likely to care “very much” about the 
decisions of the ICTY than those who do not identify as victims (Table 5.2). People who 
identify as victims are also more likely to say the decisions of the ICTY “very much” 
affect how safe they feel to live in Croatia (Table 5.3). I interpret these results to indicate 
that regardless of ethnicity some of the population “buys in” to the ICTY as a necessary 
and legitimate institution for pursuing justice and some people of each ethnicity also 
132 
 
reject it. The people who identify as victims are more critical of the ICTY while at the 
same time they indicate its decisions are more meaningful. It makes sense that people 
who feel like victims would be more concerned about holding violators of human rights 
responsible and concerned about their safety. For these people the ICTY holds more 
meaning.  
  
Table 5.2: How much do you care? 
How much do you care about the decisions the ICTY makes in war crimes 
trials? 
  
Very 
Much Some A Little Not at All Total 
28 14 6 14 62 Yes 
70% 38% 32% 41%   
12 23 13 20 68 
Do you 
feel that 
you are a 
victim of 
war 
crimes? 
No 
30% 62% 68% 59%   
Total 40 37 19 34 130 
Lambda (sym.) = .18, p = .005; Pearson Chi-square = 12, p = .007 
 
 
Table 5.3: Does the ICTY affect how safe you feel? 
Do the decisions of the ICTY affect how safe you feel to live in Croatia? 
  
Very 
Much Some A Little Not at All Total 
20 12 16 14 62 Yes 
69% 34% 57% 39%   
9 23 12 22 66 
Do you 
feel that 
you are a 
victim of 
war 
crimes? 
No 
31% 66% 43% 61%   
Total 29 35 28 36 128 
Lambda (sym.) = .143, p = .09; Pearson Chi-square = 9.863, p = .02 
 
 In this evaluation of the rule of law it is important to find out what precisely the 
tribunal contributes to local populations in this period of transition.  The research 
presented here shows that being a victim is based on perceptions rather than simply an 
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experience of war crimes. It also shows that people who perceive themselves as victims 
have a heightened need for the rule of law in that it increases accountability, fairness and 
security which are lacking in the Croatian government.  
 
A Rule of Law Culture? 
In this section I will discuss if the components of the rule of law - accountability, 
fairness and security - present in the community of Gvozd are evidence of a local legal 
consciousness that values the rule of law. I use my own research and experience in 
conjunction with other studies to look at the rule of law at the level of norms and the level 
of structures (such as institutional reforms). A positive valuation of the rule of law may 
be indicative of what we can term as a “rule of law culture.” What is needed to make 
such a distinction? In order to claim that a rule of law culture is in existence the 
principles of the rule of law must be integral to decision-making processes and 
perceptions of the law in its many facets. There must be a pathway for people to 
effectively dispute the actions of the government and fellow citizens. In the context of 
Croatia, rule of law and human rights initiatives are inter-related. The UN’s intentions for 
the ICTY include the promotion of human rights and the rule of law or, perhaps more 
accurately, the promotion of human rights through the strengthening of the rule of law. 
 I will examine the presence of a rule of law culture in a manner similar to that 
taken by Julie Mertus to evaluate the presence of a human rights culture in the United 
States (2005). Mertus states that, “Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a 
population develops its own shared (although often contested) understanding of the 
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prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the 
identity, interests and expectations of individuals and groups (Mertus 2005:325).” Her 
assessment recognizes the use of human rights talk and the presence of human rights 
movements that influence policy making, but determines that the shared belief and 
understanding of human rights norms in the U.S. falls short of a human rights culture 
(Mertus 2005:326). A rule of law culture is viewed similarly as norms manifest in 
“identity, interests and expectations of individuals and groups.” The norms valued by a 
human rights culture overlap with a rule of law culture, at least they do when based on 
the definition of the United Nations that explicitly states the rule of law is consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards (UN Secretary General 2004:4).  
In Gvozd people do engage in human rights talk and have an awareness of human 
rights norms. The findings of my survey in Gvozd showed that 86% of the participants 
had heard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), knowledge that 
contributes to the way human rights and the rule of law are perceived in society. This 
finding is quite striking when compared to surveys in the United States. Mertus cites 
Amnesty International’s survey that found, “94 percent of American adults and 96 
percent of American youth have no awareness of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (Mertus 2005:326). That data translates to only 6% of American adults having 
knowledge of the UDHR compared to the 86% reported by adults in Gvozd. How can we 
account for this enormous difference in findings, particularly when the United States 
professes to be a global proponent of human rights (which is contested on many fronts)?  
My own survey of undergraduates at the University of Connecticut found that 
67% of the students knew of the UDHR, still notably lower than the results in Gvozd and 
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from a small range of people in terms of age and education. All of the community 
members in Gvozd have direct experience of human right violations – be it genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, or otherwise. Very few Americans alive today 
have had this type of experience that compels people to alter their worldview to make 
sense (as may be possible) of the events in their life. What may be most important is the 
perceived relevance of human rights and the rule of law to everyday life. For people 
dealing with refugee policies and appealing to minority rights in order to defend claims to 
property and employment “rights talk” is a useful language to learn. 
Rights talk is becoming part of the norm in Croatia. People across the country that 
I spoke with had opinions to share about crimes against humanity and used some of the 
terminology like “genocide”, “ethnic cleansing” and “victim rights”. Most people could 
identify violations of human rights that had occurred during the conflict and identify who 
was responsible. The language of human rights and the rule of law is widely used by the 
media and in government communications. At one time I was even told by a very 
adamant Zagreb college student that “Smoking is a human right!” during a debate about 
the newly enacted policy banning smoking in public areas and restaurants.  
Based on my research people in Gvozd and more generally in Croatia do share 
values consistent with the rule of law, to some degree. The fairness of the ICTY over 
domestic courts is viewed as important. Trials are considered to be a legitimate method to 
address wrongdoing. Another reason to say that some elements of a rule of law culture 
exist is that people are concerned about the government’s ability and willingness to help 
secure their jobs, homes and investments. There are complaints about the high level of 
corruption and ethnic biases in government and hiring decisions. People who consider 
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themselves to be victims place more meaning on the decisions of the tribunal. Does that 
mean there is a rule of law culture? Not quite, to say there is a rule of law culture is too 
strong of a statement in this case. The rule of law is valued, but its tenets sometimes clash 
with other norms.  
One problem with stating there is a rule of law culture is that calls of 
accountability are too often biases toward about getting personal issues addressed rather 
than the consistent application of law. This may, however, be an artifact of the past and 
influence of the current situation that forces people to look out for themselves in order to 
navigate complex and inconsistent bureaucracies. A mindset like this that seeks some 
personal advantage is understandable, though not implicitly moral, where corruption 
pervades. That situation appears to be changing with indications that the rule of law is 
gaining strength in the content of law and policies of institutions, at least partially due to 
the tribunal.  
It could be said that a rule of law culture is present in Croatia, but it is not one that 
matches exactly the definition of the rule of law advocated by the UN and ICTY. There 
are reasons to say the rule of law is valued and some aspects of a rule of law culture exist. 
It is one thing to say whether or not a rule of law culture exists in Croatia and another to 
say whether or not the local legal consciousness values the rule of law. My research 
indicates the later. The rule of law is valued in the local legal consciousness, but not to 
the degree that it constitutes a rule of law culture. Accountability, fairness and security 
are reflected in people’s norms through their criticisms of the ICTY and Croatia’s 
attempts to provide justice. This may seem an odd statement, to say that norms of the rule 
of law are evidenced by critiques of attempts to strengthen the rule of law, but I think it is 
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a legitimate claim. For example, though the ICTY professes to hold high standards, and it 
made great progress from previous attempts, it is not the ideal of the rule of law realized. 
It is only “fair” that its own degree of accountability, fairness, and security be evaluated 
as it attempts to strengthen the rule of law in the Former Yugoslavia. The fact that people 
are critical demonstrates that they are aware and interested in its proceedings.  
Another indicator of the rule of law is the degree to which people comply with the 
law. How do people make their choices to conform with or disobey the law? My survey 
found that most people consider deterrence to be the biggest motivator in decisions to 
comply or disobey the law, but that assessment conflicts with the findings of other 
research on this subject. “Most people, most of the time, conform to laws because they 
are part of the taken-for-granted world they inhabit, not because they calculate the 
relative costs of violation and compliance (Merry 2006:979).” This explanation relates 
back to the importance of norms in understanding the feasibility of rule of law initiatives. 
If people have share a rule of law culture then compliance with initiatives to strengthen 
the rule of law will be more salient and therefore likely to be more successful. This can 
be so even when the influence of taken-for-granted norms is not explicit, maybe even 
more so in this scenario. I interpret the survey results valuing deterrence to show that 
people want accountability. Deterrence refers to an actualized punishment for 
wrongdoing that sends a message that future crime will also be punished, certainly 
congruent with the rule of law.  
To get a sense of the rule of law before the conflict period I spoke with people 
about life under Tito in Yugoslavia and there was a fairly even division between people 
who thought more positively and those that thought more negatively of that regime. 
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Those with negative connotations cited instances of being shut out of opportunities, 
mostly jobs, for not completely supporting the communist political party or referenced 
the suppression of the Croat identity. The people who were positive about Tito’s 
Yugoslavia romanticized it as a time when there was little to no crime, everyone got 
along, and everybody had what they needed, though most had few material possessions. 
There is evidence of a desire for a rule of law from both sides views presented here – 
people felt wronged by the lack of impartiality in job selection and wished for less 
corruption. In this analysis I do not fully analyze the rule of law in Tito’s Yugoslavia, but 
discuss it only for some knowledge of previous circumstances that certainly continue to 
shape current norms.  
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Chapter 6 - Obstacles to Rule of Law Initiatives 
  
 
During my investigation of the local legal consciousness it became clear that any 
initiative to strengthen the rule of law would encounter several challenges. This is 
particularly so when considering that strengthening the rule of law requires a fundamental 
change to power relationships within the society. Several groups and individuals that I 
interacted with in Croatia were attempting to make changes in the political, legal and 
civil sectors, some directly related to the rule of law and others not, but they confronted 
similar and significant obstacles to their initiatives. Those obstacles can be summarized 
as: (1) the nature of law, (2) the prevalence of ethno-religious nationalism, (3) the impact 
of insecurity and (4) a lack of political agency. In this chapter I explain each obstacle in 
turn and relate it to the ICTY’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule of law.  
 
The Nature of Law 
 There is a basic conflict when the rule of law is sought to be a remedy for mass 
atrocities. The benefits of trials that determine responsibility for crimes against humanity 
cannot fulfill all of the many needs of a society in transition. Trials are valued for their 
impartiality and consistency that cause them to be impersonal, technical, and “by the 
book.” It is because trials are intended to be disconnected from emotion that strictly legal 
approaches will fall short of some expectations. Judges and lawyers apply the law rather 
than create it. As discussed earlier, international human rights law in particular is in a 
state of development. Law may change and is subject to interpretation, in other words it 
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is not truly objective. A declaration of guilt or innocence depends on the crimes charged, 
evidence presented and the definition of crimes. Terrible deeds may be carried out and 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Evidence may not exactly fit the strict 
criteria for proving guilt allowing wrongdoers to avoid a public declaration of guilt and 
punishment. Some of the complaints I heard about the ICTY stemmed from these 
problems. People were upset that certain defendants were given short sentences, only 
proven to be guilty on some charges, or acquitted based on technical definitions of the 
crimes and lack of evidence. From their perspective, it was quite clear that the defendant 
was guilty and committed horrible crimes, yet the tribunal failed to provide justice.  
Decisions made at the tribunal are a strong statement about what is permitted and 
what is not in our increasingly global community. For example, if someone is acquitted 
of a genocide charge who is widely known to have ordered a great number of deaths of a 
particular ethnic group with intentions to exterminate that population it makes a 
statement. The statement is not that genocide is wrong, but that the targeted mass 
extermination of a group is permissible under some circumstances. The outcome of trials 
is not always in agreement with a “commonsense” determination of right and wrong. 
Defenders of legal approaches say that the detached nature of law is what allows law to 
work as a mechanism of justice; the separation of emotion from an evaluation of 
responsibility is what can break a cycle of violence. This is true, but the law is only one 
aspect in a complex context.  
This dilemma of the nature of law that conflicts with expectations of justice ties in 
with Tamanaha’s point discussed earlier about the shortcomings of the rule of law in its 
formal legality. It also relates to the people in Croatia who value principles of the rule of 
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law while their experience with conflict leads to a personal notion of justice rather than a 
lofty, idealistic one. People who hold hope that the tribunal can provide justice are 
usually looking for more than a trial that follows due process. The extent to which that 
expectation is feasible is a separate topic.  
 
Ethno-religious Nationalism 
How do ethno-religious divisions obstruct rule of law initiatives? Everyday 
conflicts are often not handled impartially or consistently and representatives of the law 
are not always held accountable for corrupt practices. It seems that the best way to 
navigate the tricky web of bureaucracy is to fall back on ethno-religious connections, and 
the resulting importance of those networks bolsters nationalist zeal. Ethno-religious 
identity is often the starting point of analysis for studies of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. 
Nationalist calls for ethnically-pure states are named as the cause of the 1990s violence in 
a way that makes it seems inevitable, though the situation was certainly more complex 
and other factors played more prominent roles (Gagnon 2004:5). My research in Croatia 
demonstrated that ethnic identities are not the singular motivation for people’s actions 
and that an ethnic identity is far from being a uniform, static concept. In fact the 
identification of someone to a specific ethnic group is far from clear cut and even if 
ethnicity is known the person’s experience during the conflict cannot be delineated. I met 
Serbs who were pacifists, Croats who fought with Muslim extremist groups against 
Croats, individuals whose parents were from different ethnicities who had to choose an 
alliance or leave (or worse) and Croats who publicly voiced disagreement and disgust 
with Tuñman’s policies against Serbs and Muslims.  
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This research approaches the labels of ethnicity, religion, and nationality with 
care, attempting to understand the situational nature of identity rather than accepting as 
given the ethnic compartmentalization of  people in this region (Verdery 1998; Bringa 
1999).  It adopts Jansen’s (2002) approach that focuses less on ethnic identity and more 
on “home and belonging”, terms that have a less problematic history and I think come 
closer to a true understanding. This research also takes on Sen’s (2006) call to consider 
the complexity of people’s identities, rather than emphasizing singular, often religious, 
identities. Sen sees theories that generalize at the level of civilization, religion, or 
ethnicity as over-simplifications that play into the hands of fundamentalists and 
politicians manipulating identity to gain power. This sounds famailiar in the context for 
the Former Yugoslavia. Conceptions of justice as found in the “plural social relations” of 
people in Croatia serve as the premise for theorizing identity and justice in this research. 
“The socially situated nature of ethnicity is made even more complex by the many 
different ways it is situated (e.g., nationally, politically, historically, internationally) and 
the many different ways it is mediated (e.g., by economic inequality, by territory, by 
language, by physical markers) (Ragin and Hein 1993).” The way in which this approach 
to ethnicity shapes an understanding of local conceptions of justice and the rule of law 
will be clarified next. 
The labels of Croat, Serb and Muslim are regularly used as part of the way people 
refer to each other. They may be used derogatively or simply as a way to differentiate 
cultural practices, religion, experiences or background. These labels are associated with 
historical instances of autonomy and power as well as oppression, persecution, and 
struggle. The many descriptions of corruption and lack of trust in government presented 
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above led me to wonder about how these problems connect with persistent ethno-
religious divisions. Croatia, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslavia, has 
institutionalized ethnic labeling. In Gvozd two flags fly by the town government building, 
one Croatian and one Serbian, because there is a large enough ethnic Serb population that 
it is required by law. Several Croats complained about the Serbian flag to me, saying that 
this is Croatia, not Serbia, and the flags only encourage separation. Also, only certain 
minorities are given such distinction, for example throughout Croatia Jewish and Roma 
populations are not recognized in the same way as Serb or Muslim populations. In Gvozd 
several cafes are associated with only one particular ethnic group and nationalistic music 
is played at times. Here the two main populations have different ethno-religious 
backgrounds and experiences of the conflict, on top of continuing clashes over 
conflicting claims to housing and competition for the few available job opportunities. 
One goal of the local organization Suncokret recognizes this division and explicitly sets 
out to combat it. That goal is to “support development of dialogue and interpersonal 
tolerance in a multi ethnic community,” by creating a space and opportunity for members 
of all groups to learn about each other as individuals (www.suncokret-gvozd.hr, accessed 
8/15/2012).  
I spoke with several youth at Suncokret who were open to talking about ethno-
religious labeling in their community. Most young children aren’t very aware of who is 
considered a Serb or Croat, but that changes by their teens. In one discussion a group of 
three described to me how people start spending more time with friends of the same 
ethnicity when they get to the high school level. They explained that part of the change 
has to do with the history that is taught in those grades. The curriculum perpetuates 
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labeling by using an “us versus them” mentality in explaining the regional history. The 
local schools in Gvozd are equivalent to a K-8 school in the United States, so teens must 
be bused to neighboring towns and cities to attend the high school level grades. A new 
school separated from old multi-ethnic groups of friends seems to encourage new 
friendships developing more exclusively within ethno-religious groups. This may be 
especially so because kids are now starting to date and family pressures to choose 
someone viewed as marriageable, meaning within their ethno-religious group, are voiced.  
One young man considered to be against the continuation of ethnic divisions and 
a steady participant and volunteer at Suncokret seemed to be changing as my stay in 
Gvozd came to an end. He was starting to listen to Thompson, a singer with a reputation 
for being a strong Croat nationalist, and shunning some of the multi-ethnic activities. 
More recently he also talks about getting a stable, decent paying job as a waiter on the 
coast, at least for the summertime. This job path is common for people in the area, going 
to the Croatian coast or even to Germany or Austria to work in hospitality for many 
months. One local mother of three travels to Austria for up to six months at a time to earn 
money for her family that lives with her husband and in-laws. To get a job nearby you 
must have an “in” which usually means you share ethnicity and have a family connection 
with the person hiring. Several people complained to me that they were well qualified for 
local job openings at the school, but were passed over because the principal is a Serb who 
doesn’t like them (coming from a Bosnian Croat background). In Gvozd where resources 
and opportunities are scarce, ethno-religious labels are reinforced as people look to 
support themselves and their families. 
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 Corruption in hiring practices reinforces the ethno-religious divisions because 
much of the time favors are to people of the same ethnicity, whether that is because those 
people simply know each other better or it is an ethnic bias is unclear. In Gvozd 
particularly and in Croatia more generally the people an individual knows best are of the 
same ethnicity and those are the people who get better treatment and more attention from 
people in positions of power. In Gvozd a Serb is most likely to know other Serbs better 
than Croats in the town because they have known each other longer, even over 
generations, and have a shared experience of the conflict period. Likewise, Croats are 
more likely to have a common experience of the conflict with other Croats as refugees 
from Bosnia and the shared challenges of creating a new home in a new country, though 
they may not have known each other personally because the people in Gvozd came from 
several locations in Bosnia to Croatia. The persistence of divisions along ethnic lines may 
be more defined by the prevalence of corruption and the patchwork communities created 
by the conflict than differences associated with ethno-religious labels.  
One of the major obstacles for rule of law initiatives is the acceptance of ethnic 
Croats as war criminals. There is great hesitation to call any ethnic Croat who committed 
violations of human rights a criminal instead of a hero. They are heroes from the 
perspective of preserving the independence of Croatia and protecting the people from real 
harm. They are criminals if your perspective prioritizes international human rights law 
and a “clean” reputation in the international or European Union communities. Initially, no 
ethnic Croats were transferred to the ICTY voluntarily by Croatia and this only changed 
due to strong international pressure to comply with ICTY from the European Union and 
the United States (Tolbert 2002). 
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 The first ethnic Croats handed over were from Bosnia, not Croatia, which was an 
easier thing to accept. Zoglin states that, “Croatian authorities have sent inconsistent 
messages to the public regarding war crimes, and the European Commission has 
described Croatia’s attitude toward the ICTY as ‘lukewarm’. They have not turned over 
indicted war criminal General Gotovina, who remains at large and is regarded by many 
Croats as a hero (Zoglin 2005: 58).”  Since then Gotovina was found in the Canary 
Islands and stood trial in The Hague before being sentenced to twenty five years in prison 
for war crimes. While in Zadar in 2007 I noticed pillows and trinkets for sale with 
Gotovina’s picture on them and graffiti labeling him as a hero. The area is known to be 
strongly in support of Gotovina because he was born on an island off the coast and his 
military actions helped to free the area from Serb bombardment. Many people I spoke 
with throughout Croatia explained Gotovina’s actions as defensive and the only plausible 
alternative to doing nothing. The United States backed the Operation Storm offensive. If 
there had not been a military response to Serb take-overs it was thought the Croat people 
would suffer unjustly with no real hope of outside intervention. Pusić explains the denial 
of criminal acts as an act of defense in an unstable time, “A confrontation with the truth 
about this war has been postponed by the Croatians’ sense of relative instability and their 
feelings that the country still faces an outside threat (Pusić 1998:114-115).” There is 
evidence that people in Croatia of all ethnicities are beginning to confront some of these 
truths. 
Under Tito’s regime ethno-religious identities were forced to take a backseat to a 
Yugoslav identity with the motto “brotherhood and unity,” but the suppression of 
religious beliefs and calls for autonomy did not cause those aspects of identity to 
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disappear. Nationalism may lose ground if there are effective alternatives to the problems 
of corruption in Croatia. There are other avenues to unite and build trust among people 
besides the pretension of one-dimensional identities; some that can even embrace 
complicated and inter-related social relationships. A commitment to human rights and the 
rule of law may prove to be one path if trials publicly demonstrate that perpetrators will 
be held accountable regardless of ethnicity, if politicians follow through with institutional 
reforms, and everyday experiences with conflict have a fair chance at being fairly 
resolved.  
 
The Impact of Insecurity 
 Some of the same reasons that ethno-religious nationalism is an obstacle for rule 
of law initiatives apply to our understanding of how insecurity makes an impact. The 
dissatisfaction with the current situation - political, social, economic and otherwise – 
looms over the region. A persistent lack of trust in government to genuinely work for the 
good of the people is at the root. This type of insecurity is hardly a unique problem for 
Croatia, but here it has its own set of complications. The level of trust citizens have in 
their government has real consequences for their interpersonal relations, cooperative 
undertakings and observance with the law (Levi 1998:82). In the discussion of security as 
a component of the rule of law in the previous chapter I argue that a lack of security 
exists in many areas of life. That lack of security affects the local legal consciousness and 
although it demonstrates a need for the rule of law to be strengthened that is reinforced by 
people’s demands it also inhibits the development of a rule of law dependant on trust in 
governmental institutions. The violence, displacement, and destruction of the conflict that 
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occurred only about twenty years ago continue to be felt in daily life making it 
understandable that people are concerned about security and the government’s 
commitment to look out for their interests.  
 The ineffective civil and criminal justice systems lead people to look elsewhere 
for resolution of conflict. In trying to understand the alternatives sought for conflict 
resolution I look to the region’s history with some hesitation. For hundreds of years this 
was a border zone between the Christian and Muslim empires that required people living 
here to experience conflict on a regular basis which lead to classification as a warrior 
society. My hesitation to bring up this history stems from the trend of journalists and 
some scholars to overemphasize the violent past and use it to claim that recurrent 
violence is inevitable because of ancient hatreds (Gagnon 2005). That is not my purpose 
here. Instead I would like to explain past conflicts and the methods of their resolution as 
one aspect of many that informs the current local legal consciousness. There is a history 
of blood feuds along with a culture of honor and shame in this region similar to those 
documented throughout the Mediterranean and other areas of the world. In the Former 
Yugoslavia the practice of feuding goes back hundreds of years and some instances are 
recorded up through recent history.  
Boehm (1984) compiles accounts of feuding by Serbs of Montenegro and 
Albanians throughout history and analyzes how the feuding system actually serves to 
regulate and minimize violence in many ways rather than incite chaotic anarchy as it may 
be perceived. Many of his observations are reinforced by contemporary theory of conflict 
resolution. The Montenegrins studied by Boehm were more likely to engage in a feud 
with a clan from a different tribe versus a clan within their tribe which would have more 
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social, economic and political repercussions. Feuds that included an entire tribe against 
another tribe were rare because they also were disruptive to the welfare of everyone. 
Feuding was initiated by an insult that dishonored someone to the point that they felt 
inaction would cause unbearable shame. Boehm describes the feuds as being an activity 
only for men to the point that women could stand outside homes with torches at night to 
help their men aim their guns at enemies with no fear for their own lives.  
The history of feuding does inform my discussion of the local legal consciousness 
in many ways. It helps to understand why conflict starts and under what circumstances a 
truce or resolution of conflict could come about. In Croatia, to some degree, elements of a 
culture of honor still exist as does a paternalistic control of power. The history of feuding 
in the area gives some insight into possible sensitivities and pathways for reconciliation. 
The truces that were required before an agreement to end the feud came about when the 
death score was even according to the strict scorekeeping and the group that held the 
position of more honor, as opposed to the group that would be the next to retaliate due to 
a lower position of honor, suggested the truce. A truce was most often agreed upon at 
times when the men needed to be outside to harvest or plough the fields, also a time when 
they would be vulnerable to attack. Other factors included the prolonged emotional and 
physical toll on the clan and relative size of the clans that may lead one or the other to 
have a disadvantage. Outside efforts by religious leaders and later government officials 
sometimes aided the pacification. The aspects of the culture that reinforced the feuding 
were the importance of a “manly” or “macho” character, an honorable reputation, and the 
clan as an organizational unit.  
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Today families often do have a paternalistic structure and honor is valued, but the 
emphasis is less and a clan-based structure is not the norm. Still, during the 1990s 
conflict many people did turn toward members of their ethnic group for solidarity and 
against others even though they may have been long-time neighbors and friends. I should 
note there were many exceptions to this trend as well (for example in Tuzla, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). Now that the conflict is over and Croatia is a developing democratic 
political system, the claim of a rule of law that embraces accountability, fairness and 
security is that government will resolve conflict justly and without the need to rely on 
ethno-religious groups for security. But the justice system is not very effective and does 
not hold the confidence of the people.  There appear to be two choices: (1) try to change 
the government or (2) use an alternative means to resolve conflict and injustices. The 
alternative often means relying on ethno-religious group connections.   
 
The Role of Political Agency 
When people attempt to make positive changes that combat ethno-religious 
nationalism or motivate people to create a stronger civil society they often face great 
challenges. According to several evaluations the civil sector is identified to be under-
developed in Croatia (OSCE 2006). There are some grassroots organizations founded to 
address various post-conflict issues that continue to operate and often collaborate with 
European and international organizations (some mentioned in earlier discussions). The 
organization that I interacted with most in Croatia was Suncokret in Gvozd. The main 
objective of the NGO is to combat ethno-religious nationalism and the people who work 
there and participate in its activities do come from diverse backgrounds. While the 
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organization is clearly popular with the local youth, mixed messages are sent from the 
adults. It is sometimes difficult to bring together adults from each ethnicity to work 
jointly on projects and initiatives. Some adults and older youth avoid the center because 
of the emphasis on interaction between groups.  
The organizers of Suncokret recognize that their goal is not shared by everyone in 
the community and aim to win critics over. Aside from the political challenges to 
securing space and funds locally one of the most difficult tasks is to motivate community 
members of all ages to take charge of certain projects or come up with their own ways to 
make improvements. This goes along with the previous topics of ethno-religious 
nationalism and insecurity because the lack of political agency is related to self-
identification as a victim and a general disenchantment with government. There is a 
pervasive attitude that efforts to alter the status quo are destined to fail. There are 
numerous factors contributing to why this is so, including the history of Tito’s policy of 
suppressing dissidents and Yugoslavia’s bureaucracy. The close relationship between the 
Catholic Church and the Croatian government discourages actions perceived to be a 
threat to those institutions.  
The persistence of corruption in Croatia certainly adds to the feeling that 
movements to improve the political climate will not succeed. In a 2009 news report by 
the BBC local Croatian journalist Gordan Malić is quoted saying, “Organised crime has 
become part of the establishment. It's a problem to recognise it, to see what makes it 
different from the other parts of the establishment. And it organises itself far better than 
the country, than the government, and the society" (Prodger 2009). There appears to be a 
choice to work against corruption or work with it for personal gain, yet most people seem 
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to do something in the middle. They complain about the high level of corruption, but use 
connections or pay bribes because that is “how it works.”  
This is echoed by the conclusions of the UNODC report on bribery that says, “In 
general, corruption is not accepted by Croatian citizens – they voiced great concern about 
it in the survey – yet bribery appears to be tolerated as a tool for getting things done and 
receiving better treatment” (UNODC 2011:52). It will require a change of norms to alter 
the perception that some bribes are merely signs of gratitude. Instead, a rule of law 
culture views bribes as an unfair practice and places value on the consistent and unbiased 
application of rules and regulation. My research shows that value is placed on a rule of 
law, but the reality experienced is quite different. While this inconsistency persists the de 
facto rule of law will not be strong in Croatia. For the development of political agency 
this presents a dilemma because to make political change without building alliances and 
connections through existing channels (i.e. corrupt) seems to be a nearly impossible task.  
The lack of transparency in government is a major deterrent to political agency. 
Without knowledge of when and how decisions are made people cannot try to influence 
the outcomes. An example of this occurred during my time in Gvozd when a garbage 
dump was proposed to be located close enough to affect water quality and contribute to 
other pollution concerns. This site would be the dumping grounds for roughly half the 
population of the country because it would include the areas of Zagreb and Sisak. 
Members of Suncokret followed the developments as they could, tried to raise awareness 
locally and protested to government representatives. After it was reported that another 
solution would be found details came to light that a behind-the-scenes agreement had 
been made to go ahead with the garbage dump in that location anyways. Rumors are that 
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the deal was heavily influenced by a politician who did not want a dump in her own 
district. While it is important to differentiate between facts and perceptions, the volume 
of examples like this certainly add to a culture that has little faith in their government’s 
commitment to the rule of law and an individual’s ability to alter the political system.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter I return to the guiding question of this dissertation: To what degree 
are the tribunal’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule of law in post-conflict 
Croatia reinforced or opposed by a local experience of the rule of law? I have presented 
evidence that the tribunal’s efforts to instill international norms of the rule of law took a 
mostly institutional approach by focusing on criminal trials of the highest level 
perpetrators, gaining support of domestic politicians by leveraging international alliances, 
encouraging and aiding domestic courts to operate according to international standards, 
and taking some steps to educate the public. Those efforts by the tribunal must now be 
examined from the viewpoint of the local legal consciousness to understand how the local 
experience of the rule of law reinforces or opposes the tribunal’s agenda. The tribunal is 
an institution that both lifts expectations of a highly idealized conception of the rule of 
law and falls short of those expectations. Here I am assessing the impact of the tribunal in 
the sense that I can explain local attitudes based on my research and compare them to 
declared and actual efforts by the ICTY to strengthen the rule of law. If there is local 
support for a strong rule of law we can say the ICTY is attempting to fulfill peoples’ 
needs and desires and therefore those efforts will find a more receptive audience and have 
a greater chance of success.  
 
155 
 
The Tribunal and the Rule of Law 
The perception of fairness is crucial for the tribunal’s credibility and public 
support. In 2002 former ICTY Deputy Chief Prosecutor Tolbert made the claim that, 
“The critics have been proven wrong: the ICTY has grown into an effective court, which 
has painstakingly administered trials that are widely perceived as fair (Tolbert 2002:8)”. 
In the sixth annual report of the tribunal, Judge McDonald reported the ICTY’s advances: 
“The tribunal’s decisions on both procedural and substantive matters are on the cutting 
edge of the development of international humanitarian law. Many of the legal issues 
adjudicated by the tribunal have either never been dealt with before, or have been 
dormant since the end of the Second World War (Sixth Annual Report of the ICTY 
1999)”. The ICTY’s implementation of human rights law helped create the momentum to 
finally put into place the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) conceived at 
Nuremberg (Robertson 1999).  Its example has “served as the sine qua non of the ICC 
(Tolbert 2002:18),” establishing a new permanent and international mechanism for 
judicial accountability. These are significant contributions to the future of human rights 
law and achievements that surely do impact Croatia in particular and extend to all states 
to some degree. In terms of a “justice cascade” the ICTY does play a significant role that 
I do not wish to downplay, but do want to be realistic about in this assessment.  
The prosecutions of the ICTY document an authoritative historical account of the 
conflict. Wilson (2005) stresses the importance of this role in de-mystifying local, biased 
accounts.  “In the most general terms, justice is compromised because history occupies a 
central place in nationalist myth-making and because domestic trials become a battlefield 
over the official history and future identity of a country (Wilson 2005:919).”  The ICTY, 
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situated in The Hague, avoids this danger because it is an international effort, rather than 
an instrument of the victor’s will.  The historical accounts do not blame “ancient ethnic 
hatreds” or consider the violence to have been inevitable.  Additionally, they are at odds 
with extremists in Serbia and Croatia that deny any wrongdoing during the conflict. 
Subotić (2009) emphasizes that real change in the Former Yugoslavia must come from 
within rather than imposed from the outside. This is true, and only calls to end a culture 
of impunity from the public can facilitate a rule of law system.  However, the tribunal has 
certainly not been ignored by the media, politicians, or public in Croatia, in other words it 
does have influence and the positive impacts it has made should not be overlooked. I 
agree that improvements to the rule of law are only cosmetic if they do not go beyond the 
level of institutions and coincide with a true development of faith in the rule of law.  
The success of the ICTY is also measured by the status of the individuals who are 
arrested and prosecuted. The indictment and arrest of Slobodan Milošević along with his 
fall from power in Serbia, were pivotal in the perception of the ICTY as a legitimate 
mechanism for judicial accountability (Chiclet 2001, Tolbert 2002). Milošević was 
charged with crimes against humanity in Croatia and Kosovo, and genocide in Bosnia 
Herzegovina.  Milošević’s death in 2006 before conclusion of his trial left many people, 
in the former Yugoslavia and internationally, disappointed at the lack of authoritative 
record that would have come from a fair prosecution (Zimonjic 2006). It also left some 
space for supporters of Milošević to maintain his hero image for some Serbs. The trial of 
the Croatian General Gotovina demonstrated that the military actions of Croatia were not 
all defensive and crossed the line to violate human rights. The tribunal took the stance 
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that people from all sides of the conflict committed war crimes and the case of Gotovina 
represents the impartiality of the court.  
Statistically, it is difficult to evaluate the ICTY’s record for enforcing retributive 
justice because there is no true comparison for the tribunal. The closest comparison 
would be with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, though each situation has 
unique circumstances and context. The ICTY lists 161 persons indicted for the violations 
of crimes under its jurisdiction of which none remain at large. Proceedings against 136 of 
the accused have concluded including 69 sentenced as guilty (www.icty.org, accessed 
3/10/2013). Twenty five cases are still in progress. Certainly, these proceedings have 
been more effective and larger in scale than any other attempt at judicial accountability 
for war crimes. 
 The results of the ICTY are mixed, falling short of expectations in some key 
areas. The lack of enforcement powers that were such an obstacle at the beginning, have 
been overcome to a degree. The ICTY was instrumental in the development of the ICC, 
but also provided examples of what not to do in future international prosecutions. The 
major difficulty stems from the distance between the ICTY and the region it is 
investigating, the former Yugoslavia. Surely, this separation has some advantages in 
minimizing the influence of nationalist agendas.  However, the ICTY’s impact in the 
region will not be significant without improvements in the education of domestic legal 
professionals, strengthening of the local legal institutions, and the education of the public 
on human rights (Tolbert 2002).   
These issues are so critical because it is the domestic courts that will continue the 
war crimes trials after the dissolution of the ICTY and present domestic courts do not 
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meet international standards (European Court of Human Rights 2002). Tolbert condemns 
the absence of a provision for outreach to domestic courts in the ICTY’s mandate: “While 
the tribunal was established as a mechanism to restore peace and security in the region, it 
was not given any specific role in constructing or improving the domestic justice systems 
or assisting in local war crimes prosecutions (Tolbert 2002:12).” 
The lack of public education has been discussed as one of the greatest downfalls 
of the ICTY and a major difficulty domestically. Zoglin emphasizes the critical 
importance of internal reform and education for long-term changes to take place. “The 
international community needs to focus on capacity-building and public education in the 
former Yugoslavia if war crimes trials are to be fair and meaningful and for the rule of 
law to take root (Zoglin 2005: 72).”  There have been some efforts in this area, but 
without sufficient funding and authority it has fallen short. The ICTY has an Outreach 
Program funded by voluntary contributions, not by the United Nations.  “This program, 
which has been in operation since 1999, is aimed at educating the peoples in the region, 
starting with local legal professionals, about the tribunal, its purposes, and its work 
(Tolbert 2002:13).”  This program was created because a lack of authoritative 
information on the ICTY had led to many misconceptions and manipulations of the 
ICTY’s role.  The program has had some successes, but the impact has been small.  
Tolbert elaborates that, “Despite the importance of the Outreach Program, it was only 
intended to serve a limited purpose and role as a public information vehicle, and there has 
been little systematic effort by the tribunal or by the international community at large to 
make the work of the tribunal relevant to the national justice systems in the region 
(Tolbert 2002:14)”.  The activities of the Outreach Program include helping transfer 
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cases from The Hague to domestic courts and working to increase the impartiality and 
competency of those domestic courts. The 2005 annual report from the ICTY recognizes 
the great need to educate legal professionals and the public about war crimes 
prosecutions in order for the ICTY to be effective in the region. The external reforms 
were given a “major emphasis,” including “efforts to build capacity through training of 
judges and lawyers in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICTY 2005).”  These 
actions are reviewed by Judge Meron to show that, “The Tribunal has laid the legal and 
logistical groundwork for the successful transfer of lower-level prosecutions to national 
jurisdictions (ICTY 2005).”  Zoglin and others dispute this analysis.   
In conjunction with general public education, there is a lack of qualified legal 
professionals in Croatian courts. The Rules of the Road Program added to the efforts of 
the Outreach Program in this endeavor. This program includes a review of all war crimes 
prosecutions by the ICTY prosecutor before proceeding in domestic courts. The review 
against international standards checks for legitimate reason to proceed with a prosecution 
for war crimes. Again, this was only a small step because the Rules of the Road program 
gives no training to domestic prosecutors and is only viewed as a side note to the ICTY’s 
purpose (Tolbert 2002). More recently, the ICTY does claim that it has aided the 
development of local judiciaries as evidenced by reforms, higher standards of education 
and new witness protections written into Croatian law (www.icty.org/sid/10642, accessed 
March 10, 2013). To date, two war crimes cases have been transferred by the ICTY to 
Croatian courts. One of these, the Ademi-Norac case, is reported to have been 
“successfully dealt with” by the Croatian courts.  
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More recently, the tribunal has tried to focus more of its efforts on outreach 
activities and given some attention to its potential long term impact in the region. With 
the assistance for the ICTY four county courts in Croatia have been designated to handle 
war crimes cases, Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka, and Split, though war crimes cases continue to 
be conducted at other courts and their ability to conduct these trials is questioned (Center 
for Peace, Human Rights and Non-Violence 2009). The Outreach Program also 
represents the ICTY at regional conferences and other public events, but does not have a 
presence in the rural community of Gvozd or generally in areas outside the major cities.  
In response to the many critics calling for more outreach activities the United 
Nations Security Council created The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
(MICT) (www.icty.org, accessed 3/10/13). Unfortunately its ambiguous name will leave 
people wondering about its purpose. The ICTY’s website describes the activities of the 
“mechanism” to be continuing the trial proceedings, though not initiating new trials, and 
archiving records of the trials. It does not seem that communication to local populations 
will be part of its work. The creation of the MICT allows the ICTY to officially close in 
the near future while proceedings may continue under the authority of this new entity.  
The tribunal as an institution representing international interests set out to change 
the way people view the rule of law and, more generally, law itself. The intended change 
goes beyond an adjustment of individual cost and benefit analyses (ex. to make it more 
costly to commit a war crime) to alter the social and political relationships people have 
within communities and across states. It is not just the criminal trials in The Hague that 
are the mechanism for change, the tribunal’s investigations have influenced domestic 
courts, judges, lawyers and staff, it has affected domestic laws and their interpretation, it 
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allowed victims and witnesses to contribute to the trials (at least to some degree), and it 
persuaded other states and organizations to pressure the Croatian government to comply 
with international rule of law standards consistent with the protection of human rights. 
What is the sum of these efforts? How are they responded to by individuals and social 
communities such as Gvozd? Have they made the level of change describe by Borneman 
to be necessary? 
The impact of EU membership rivals that of the ICTY in strengthening the rule of 
law. Both have likely prompted Croatia to pass reforms on the election of judges, 
political financing, and transparency. Croatia also ratified the Council of Europe’s 
Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption in 2000 and Civil Law Convention 
Against Corruption in 2003 as well as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
in 2005 (UNODC 2011:9). Internal capacities to scrutinize and take action against 
corrupt practices have increased showing a commitment to strengthen the rule of law. On 
its website the UNODC lists about thirty laws enacted in Croatia that relate to anti-
corruption efforts. These include witness protections, public access to information, court 
procedures, criminal codes, conduct of civil servants, police regulations, and laws 
preventing conflicts of interest (www.track.unodc.org/legallibrary, accessed 3/3/13). The 
critical question to ask is whether or not these reforms improve people’s everyday 
experiences to a point that justifies faith in the rule of law.  
 
Local Experience of the Rule of Law 
It is clear from the information presented in this dissertation that the local 
experience of the rule of law diverges from the way it is conceptualized and idealized by 
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the ICTY. All of Croatia continues to wade through repercussions of the violence and 
destruction in some way or another. Patchwork communities like Gvozd face additional 
challenges due to the distrust that is felt towards the government and people in the 
community from different backgrounds. Throughout Croatia the bureaucracy is slow and 
corrupt, leaving crimes unpunished. Few Croats have been held accountable for war 
crimes by domestic courts. Civil cases are left unresolved because of their volume and 
inadequate resources.  The fairness of politicians and institutions is highly doubted by the 
public and specific examples of corruption are easy to come across. People live with 
uncertainty regarding basic needs such as employment and rights to housing and the 
potential for future regional violence is a valid concern. These are difficult circumstances 
for anyone to overcome.  
The local legal consciousness is shaped by the conflicts that people encounter on 
a daily basis. Though many of these conflicts are petty in comparison to the crimes of the 
1990s they are telling of the larger problems and are meaningful for the people involved. 
The government does not provide effective channels or a neutral setting for the resolution 
of disputes or for the placement of complaints about unfair treatment. There are few 
negative consequences for government representatives if they act inconsistently or with 
bias in their duties; some act more based on personal agendas than as representatives of 
the state.   
Some two thirds of the population believe that corrupt practices occur 
often or very often in a number of important public institutions, including 
central and local government, parliament, hospitals, judiciary and the 
police. Almost half of Croatian citizens (47%) believe that corruption is 
actually on the rise in their country, 44 per cent believe it to be stable and 
a further 9 per cent think it is decreasing. Perceptions, it should be 
underlined, are nothing more than opinions and are not to be confused 
with the actual experience of corruption that provides the main focus of 
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this report. Nevertheless, such a perception can be interpreted as an 
expression of citizens’ awareness of one of the principal challenges facing 
Croatia, both now and in the years to come. (UNODC 2011:5) 
 
In this quote the United Nations acknowledges that perceptions of corruption in Croatia 
are very high and perceptions, though distinct from actual incidences, are significant.  
I agree with Jensen (2002) that the idea of “home” plays a major role in places 
like Croatia and is useful in understanding the root of problems often blamed simply on 
ethno-religious divisions. Home is a place that is safe and brings together the people you 
love. When it is threatened people do strange things in the name of that home. When it is 
secure it is much more difficult to convince someone to take part in violence. People in 
Croatia want to feel secure and there are promises that it is so, but their experience tells a 
different story. The concept of home for returnees and refugees in particular has been 
turned upside down.  
One woman’s account of life in Gvozd exemplifies why people have little trust in 
the government’s commitment to the rule of law. She describes people of different 
ethnicities getting along well and intermarrying before the conflict period. Then, in 1991 
things changed and ethnicity mattered. In 1995 she and her family were forced to flee 
from their homes to Serbia where they lived in refugee camps for four years. Raising 
young children under those conditions was quite a challenge. At that point they were told 
by the Croatian government that they could not return to their homes because Bosnian 
Croats were now living in them. Instead her family was sent to Canada for another four 
years until the Croatian government allowed them to return to their homes in town, 
apparently forcing the Bosnian Croat family occupying the house to a new location. This 
change in the government’s policy is likely a consequence of international influence on 
164 
 
domestic policies toward minorities and people displaced during the conflict and the end 
of Tuñman’s leadership. She is glad to be back in her home and proud that Croatia 
provides health care to its citizens, pointing out that the U.S. does not do this, but doesn’t 
understand why she was forced from her home and kept from returning for so long. Most 
of the Serb residents in Gvozd had similar experiences that leave many questions 
unanswered and, understandably, little faith that the government is looking out for their 
interests.  
Despite some obstacles, my research findings provide substantiation that the local 
legal consciousness includes norms that are consistent with the rule of law. A majority of 
people surveyed do think that trials are the best avenue to provide justice and the major 
political and military leaders are considered to be the most important to hold accountable. 
People, especially those who consider themselves to be victims of war crimes, care about 
the ICTY’s decisions and consider those decisions consequential enough to affect their 
feeling of safety living in Croatia. There is a segment of the population that considers the 
ICTY to be effectively achieving justice. The complaints of corruption and insecurity 
also point to a desire for a stronger rule of law. People want more transparency in their 
government and justice to be served.  
The people in Gvozd that I knew best shared their everyday conflicts with me as 
well as their times of togetherness and joy. It was obvious that family and friends are 
greatly valued and their support is what makes it possible to live through hardships. 
Disruptions to social networks, like those that occurred during the conflict, are hard to 
repair. The strength of those bonds is apparent in the importance of sharing meals and 
frequency of favors exchanged. The gatherings for a group meal were the highlights of 
165 
 
my experience both because I learned about relationships and social practices and 
because I felt included in the strong personal networks that tie people together. In this 
community there exists a high regard for a good joke, spot-on nickname or story. 
Hospitality and generosity continue to be prioritized even when there is little to give, 
making it all the more meaningful. These qualities were present in both groups of people 
in Gvozd and have the potential to bring the community together.  
 
Reinforced or Opposed? 
This dissertation is an evaluation of local experience of conflict as it informs the 
local legal consciousness, in order for a rule of law culture to be successfully cultivated 
there must be faith that the principles of the rule of law will be followed by people in 
positions of power. This faith indicates confidence in a social contract between the 
members of the society, that mysterious quality that makes the rule of law “work.” The 
rule of law as perceived in local legal consciousness is such a significant factor in 
understanding the impact of the tribunal because without a real connection between the 
two the tribunal’s actions do not bear meaning locally. Ursula LeGuin, daughter of 
anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, writes about the idea that “all knowledge is local” in her 
science fiction novel Four Ways to Forgiveness that is perhaps similar to Tip O’Neill’s 
well-known quote that “all politics is local.”  
To me LeGuin’s quote refers to the relationships between knowledge, truth and 
culture. What is considered to be true in one society may be viewed as a falsehood 
somewhere else; this is a basic idea behind cultural relativism. For me “all knowledge is 
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local” is a reminder of the strength personal experience has to develop an individual’s 
worldview and the amazing flexibility of that worldview which can seem to be solid as a 
rock or fluid as water. The concreteness of the local knowledge, despite its known or 
unknown validity elsewhere, can be incredibly strong, so much so that people deny the 
possibility of its untruth and may defend it with violence. The implications of going 
against the norms formed by that knowledge, be they social, economic, political, religious 
or whatever, are real and alter people’s lives. The power of local knowledge is very 
influential in this manner. This poses many questions regarding the universality of truth 
in the face of strong local knowledge which is experienced rather than read about or 
theorized. In a way the tribunal, as an instrument of the United Nations, is asking people 
to change their worldview from one shaped by local knowledge to one based on 
principles considered to be universal that may be conflicting. 
Public support and “buy in” are critical for a strong rule of law system. A true 
belief in the rule of law must be consistent with experience, at least to some degree.  
Law is also a normative system that resides in the minds of the citizens of 
a society. As rule-of-law providers seek to affect the rule of law in a 
country, it is not clear if they should focus on institution-building or 
instead try to intervene in ways that would affect how citizens understand, 
use, and value law. To take a simple example, many rule-of-law programs 
focus on improving a country’s courts and police on the assumption that 
this is the most direct route to improve compliance with law in the 
country. Yet some research shows that compliance with law depends most 
heavily on the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the laws, 
characteristics that are not established primarily by the courts but by other 
means, such as the political process. An effort to improve compliance thus 
might more fruitfully take a completely different approach. (Carothers 
2003:8-9) 
 
It seems that Carothers is referring to what I am defining as legal consciousness in his 
discussion of law as a “normative system” and interventions that “affect how citizens 
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understand, use and value law.” He considers the possibility that institution-building is 
not the best route to strengthening rule of law, but rather targeting a change in what I am 
labeling as the local legal consciousness. The specific ways that can be done are not 
detailed by Carothers, though he does point to perceptions of fairness and legitimacy of 
law as well as the political process. I presume he alludes to a greater transparency in the 
political process as is valued with substantive definitions of the rule of law.  
The answer to the question of whether the local experience of law reinforces or 
opposes the ICTY’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Croatia is not simple. The 
concept of the rule of law itself refers to many different aspects of society and 
experiences of the rule of law vary. The best answer to this question based on my 
research is that local experience reinforces rule of law initiatives in some respects and 
opposes it in others. There is evidence that the ICTY’s imposition of formal legality is 
increasing security and lessening corruption to some degree at the institutional level. The 
local legal consciousness does appear to value principles consistent with a strong rule of 
law like that conceptualized by the UN. Yet I don’t see evidence of a transformation in 
power relations on a scale that would indicate a tipping point has been reached and norms 
truly altered. Croatia does appear to be on this path, but the obstacles of the nature of law, 
ethno-religious nationalism, insecurity and lack of political agency are substantial. Most 
people simply want to live in a safe home with their family comfortably. They do not 
rally for change. Still, there are some influential individuals and organizations that are 
embracing norms of the rule of law and those of human rights. These “norms 
entrepreneurs” push issues like corruption and institutional biases into the public’s eye 
and are gaining support.  
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Another way to understand how local legal consciousness affects the success of 
the tribunal’s agenda to strengthen the rule of law is to go back to Tamanaha’s statement 
that, “Pervasive societal attitudes about fidelity to the rule of law – in each of the three 
meanings – is the mysterious quality that makes the rule of law work” (Tamanaha 
2004:141). Does the rule of law “work” in Croatia? This dissertation sought to determine 
what the “pervasive societal attitudes” are in this context. Those attitudes do place value 
on a fidelity to the rule of law and that has some significant implications for the future of 
Croatia’s adherence to accountability, fairness and security, both by government and in 
the public sector. People who consider themselves to be victims of war crimes do look to 
the ICTY to hold perpetrators accountable. The trouble is that the fidelity to the rule of 
law is hindered or even contradicted by other existing norms thus making the 
transformation called for by Borneman more difficult. The rule of law does not entirely 
“work.” Croatia is a state in transition and the path it follows is not set in stone. This is 
what is so exciting and daunting about transitions, Croatia and elsewhere. Despite the 
obstacles there are reasons to believe Croatia’s rule of law will continue to strengthen and 
edge closer to the idealized conception of the United Nations: 1) the influence of EU 
membership, 2) desire for a good international reputation, 3) internal demands to end 
corruption, 4) to reduce future divisions and violence, and 5) economic advantages.  
It is not clear how much importance the ICTY places on transformative, local 
changes to the legal consciousness in a self-assessment of its success. At times it is 
recognized and at others it is left out. Most statements focus on the court proceedings 
rather than the communities affected by war crimes.  
While hybrid and international tribunals have done much to prosecute the 
main perpetrators of international crimes, a lot remains to be done 
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regarding residual mechanisms, in particular with regard to the transfer of 
pending cases to the concerned States in accordance with international fair 
trial standards, witness and victim protection and the location, 
management and securing of archives and records. (United Nations 
Secretary General 2011:64) 
 
In this quote the UN Secretary General recognizes that the goals of the ICTY and other 
international tribunals go beyond trials for high-level leaders to include a change in 
domestic legal institutions, but does not go beyond that to consider the local legal 
consciousness as a critical component of strengthening the rule of law.  
 Later, in the same report, a more critical statement is made that acknowledges a 
disconnect between the international courts (the ICTY and others) and the people affected 
by war crimes. “International transitional justice mechanisms are often detached from the 
reality of the concerned States as regards language, acceptance in the population, 
outreach, influence on good governance and rule of law initiatives” (United Nations 
Secretary General 2011:64). Here the UN Secretary General acknowledges that 
international tribunals are disconnected from the “reality of concerned States” in regards 
to what amounts to aspects of the local legal consciousness. Overall, the statements say 
that intentions of international tribunals to strengthen the rule of law have not gone far 
enough in the vein of institution-building and have done little beyond that to affect local 
norms of the rule of law. It does not, however, stipulate if or how that may be corrected. 
Although I find that the local legal consciousness reinforces the rule of law 
initiatives of the tribunal and, at the same time, opposes it in other ways, I do consider 
there to be enough support for the rule of law to indicate people are open to initiatives. If 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law target an improvement of people’s everyday 
experiences with conflicts that may meet with success. The UNODC report of bribery in 
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Croatia concludes by saying, “As the data pertaining to the perception of corruption in 
this report reveal, public opinion about corruption in Croatia shows a considerable level 
of concern about the issue. A window of opportunity is, therefore, open and it is likely 
that the citizens of Croatia would warmly welcome the further implementation of anti-
corruption policies” (UNODC 2011:52). I also interpret my research findings that people 
value tenets of the rule of law to show a “window of opportunity” for a stronger rule of 
law to develop in Croatia. 
 
Legitimizing Authority with the Rule of Law 
How is a democracy legitimized? Core principles must be reinforced by the 
society’s values, and the worldview must justify authority. Is the ICTY’s authority 
justified? Is the Croatian government’s? Whose authority is justified by the current 
worldview? The existence of a rule of law culture is needed to justify the authority of the 
international tribunal because it depends on a belief in rule by rules. The ICTY’s agenda 
to strengthen the rule of law is also an agenda to alter the local worldview to one that 
favors the authority of the United Nations. The ICTY requires support from politicians in 
Croatia to be effective. Politicians in Croatia do not depend so heavily on a rule of law 
culture to justify their authority and indeed may find it counter-productive in some cases. 
This is why aligning the agendas of the ICTY and Croatia is such a tremendous task. 
Croatian politicians have more success when aligning themselves with ethno-religious 
groups, or at least in not offending them.  
The success of the ICTY and more generally the success of international human 
rights law rely on a certain level of legitimization that can be measured by the degree to 
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which a rule of law culture is adopted. Does this mean that a rule of law culture is 
necessary for the existence of a human rights culture? Not exactly, but the two do support 
each other. A human rights culture may exist separately in a commitment to human rights 
ideals, but any enforcement must include the components of the rule of law singled out 
here: accountability, fairness and security. These components are complementary to 
human rights ideals of freedom from torture, then need for due process, et cetera. It is 
important to keep in mind the caution from Carothers and Tamanaha that a strong rule of 
law does not infer fairness or equality as is often assumed. Any rule of law initiatives that 
are intended to reinforce a substantive concept of the rule of law that fits with ideals of 
human rights and democracy must be explicit about that relationship.  
Instead of asking if people in Croatia trust in their government this research has 
asked if people in Croatia trust in the ICTY as an institution taking over some functions 
of state government. As it turns out, understanding how much people in Croatia trust their 
government helps to answer this question about the ICTY. As stressed by Borneman, 
political and personal accountability are crucial to establish the state as a “legitimate 
moral authority” (1997:165). He considers adherence to the rule of law to help end cycles 
of violence and facilitate the success of a new regime. Ideally this is a transformation to 
what we can term a “rule of culture.” The ICTY has contributed to a stronger rule of law 
in Croatia in ways that would not have been likely without its efforts.  
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A Justice Cascade in Croatia? 
Sikkink’s idea that support has grown for the norm of individual criminal 
accountability in Latin America and beyond in a justice cascade ties in well with this 
evaluation of the rule of law. In her analysis of human rights trials in Latin America 
Sikkink recognizes that the promotion of the rule of law and human rights often occur as 
parallel and complementary processes and rejects the notion that the rule of law must be 
in place before initiating prosecutions for human rights violations (Sikkink 2011:155). 
She centers on one definition of justice, that of judicial accountability, and evaluates that 
on an international scale. Her definition encompasses the components of the rule of law I 
focus on here: accountability, fairness and security.   
Three key ideas underpin the justice norm: the first is the idea that the 
most basic violations of human rights – summary execution, torture, and 
disappearance – cannot be legitimate acts of state and thus must be seen as 
crimes committed by individuals. A second, related idea is that the 
individuals who commit these crimes can be, and should be, prosecuted. 
These seem like simple, even obvious ideas. But they run counter to 
centuries of beliefs about the state. It took a major movement to move 
such new ideas forward, embed them in law, and put them into practice. 
The third idea is that the accused are also bearers of rights, and deserve to 
have those rights protected in a fair trial. (Sikkink 2011:13) 
 
The connection regarding accountability is outright. Fairness is present in the call for 
recognition that summary execution, torture, and disappearance are basic human right 
violations and in the recognition that the accused bear rights as well. Security is implied 
by the expectation that individuals who violate human rights will be punished and the 
idea that all people should live free from violations of human rights. Does the research 
presented here demonstrate that people in local Croatian communities hold this norm?  
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When broken down in this way by Sikkink, people in Croatia do not show great 
support for justice through individual criminal accountability. With the very first idea 
underpinning the justice norms we already encounter some doubt. There is still a 
significant population in Croatia that views the state’s actions during Operation Storm to 
be valid defensive actions. There does seem to be support for the idea of individual 
accountability for violations of human rights, but decisions about who should be held 
responsible are not without bias. The third idea proposed by Sikkink, that the accused are 
also bearers of rights, probably gets the least amount of support in Croatia. People are 
more inclined to place responsibility based on public opinion than on a trial that follows 
due process. This, however, may be more a result of the lack of trust in government and 
the ICTY than rejection of the idea.  
 Croatia does not follow exactly the example of Argentina described by Sikkink 
(2011). It has its own unique set of circumstances yet it may be more similar to the 
average state in the degree to which the public and government embrace individual 
criminal accountability for violations of human rights. In Argentina local groups gathered 
support for this cause that then partnered with international organizations to initiate 
domestic trials. In Croatia a few groups and individuals called for scrutiny of the 
government’s actions during the conflict period before the tribunal began international 
trials, but there is little doubt that domestic trials at that time would have fallen short of 
the UN’s standards. Like in Argentina, critique of the state’s actions during the conflict 
period has grown.  
The example of Croatia also differs from Argentina in that Croatia became 
independent during this period and human rights violations that took place in Croatia are 
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inter-related with those that occurred elsewhere in the Former Yugoslavia. It is not only 
an issue of holding Croatia’s leaders accountable, but also those from neighboring states. 
These circumstances complicate a call for the end of impunity. The conclusion of the 
ICTY’s trials will mean that domestic trials take on a higher level of consequence. How 
they fare by international human rights standards is yet to be seen. They will be a good 
measure of Croatia’s commitment to the rule of law.  
There is a progressive trend of public support for trials of human rights violations, 
regardless of ethnicity, but a clear “tipping point” doesn’t stand out and the obstacles to 
the rule of law outlined above present a real challenge for the justice cascade to gather 
momentum. Rather, to take the analogy further, the cascade must contend with dams built 
up to block it and occasional droughts. Still, it trickles through and norms of individual 
criminal accountability are taking hold. The political climate has changed and I present 
evidence that the rule of law is, at least in part, compatible with the local legal 
consciousness.  
 
The Intersection of the Local and Global  
Is there local validation for the international agenda? There is, but more 
communication and interaction with the local population is needed to make a greater 
impact.  
For those states that fail to live up to their obligations, the consequences 
are mostly shame and pressure from other states and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), along with economic pressures such as reductions 
in foreign aid, foreign investment, and foreign tourism. Some activists 
seek to humiliate heads of state at international public events. But these 
pressures are indirect and serendipitous. Moreover, as sociolegal studies of 
law within nation-states indicate, compliance depends largely on 
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individual consciousness and commitment, not policing and force. Most 
people, most of the time, conform to laws because they are part of the 
taken-for-granted world they inhabit, not because they calculate the 
relative costs of violation and compliance (see Ewick and Silbey 1998). 
Thus, the creation of a new global legal order depends on the creation of 
new global cultural codes. Here, the gaps between normative ideas 
generated in international meetings and those within local communities 
pose enormous challenges for the implementation of human rights. The 
insights of sociolegal scholarship about how rights operate in everyday 
social life are highly relevant to the human rights domain. Sociolegal 
research shows that rights do not constitute a coherent system but are 
contingent, fragmented, and unevenly supported by the general public. 
Much work suggests that the articulation of rights does not guarantee their 
performance. (Merry 2006:979)  
 
In this quote by Merry she places great importance on the congruence of local and 
international norms as a requirement for the success of international human rights law, a 
system of law built upon principles of the rule of law. She indicates that global initiatives 
cannot succeed without local support, which is exactly why I chose to look at the local 
legal consciousness in Croatia to evaluate the success of the international tribunal. I think 
it is clear that in the case presented here not enough attention was paid to the local 
population by the tribunal, particularly in Croatia. You could argue that it was not the 
tribunal’s job to do so; rather the task was to conduct trials. Still, the tribunal was always 
more than criminal prosecutions. It had a mission to promote peace, justice and the rule 
of law. It was a non-military way to attempt condemnation of the atrocities that took 
place, thus saving lives of a peace-keeping force. It was also just one of many tools for 
the United Nations to alter global norms of the rule of law and human rights.  
One thing that has surprised me about this research is that although it is 
examining the relationship between the international and the local much of that 
relationship hinges what is happening at the level of the state. Local experience and 
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interpretation of what is happening at the international level is greatly influenced by how 
the state interacts with other states and international organizations and how the state 
interacts with local communities. Much of the ICTY’s efforts to strengthen the rule of 
law are filtered through state government and this is critical to keep in mind when 
international efforts like this are organized. On the other hand, the ICTY represents the 
possibility of bypassing the state government to right grievous wrongs and pressure the 
state from the outside to make institutional changes. The increasing emphasis placed on 
rule of law and human rights by policy makers across the globe changes the “rules of the 
game” in this respect which is a sign that norms are changing. It also point out that local 
legal consciousness has the potential to be more influential beyond its borders than ever 
before. 
 
Implications for Transitional Justice and Beyond 
In this dissertation I utilize legal anthropology to show micro-mechanisms that 
facilitate and obstruct norms of the rule of law. Some aspects of the rule of law are valued 
in local communities and while the ICTY appears to have some positive influence other 
factors are also significant. A sense of fairness or even-handedness is critical in post-
conflict situations. The ICTY contributes to a sense of fairness, though only to a degree 
and not without controversy. Its presence is significant, but only a partial solution. The 
local experience of law must be considered by initiatives to impose change and the result 
will be less of an imposition and more of a partnership. This type of approach is more 
likely to be a productive one.  
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The success, and even the possibility, of war crimes trials is often hard to fathom 
soon after violations of human rights. This time of transition amplifies a need for the rule 
of law. The passing of time creates distance from the volatile emotions that come with 
violations of human rights. Sikkink (2011) points this out as well. She states that early on 
in Argentina people didn’t even consider trials as an option and later it became a 
possibility, a necessity and a reality. Does that mean trials should be stalled until there is 
more public support for them? I don’t think so. Trials for the political and military leaders 
should take place as soon as possible and in a short time frame, though not at the expense 
of the alleged perpetrators’ rights to due process. Often this means international trials 
must start the process, as in the case of the Former Yugoslavia. The end of international 
trials and “passing on” of trials to the domestic level is just as significant. For a fledgling 
democracy in particular this is a critical step to break the present from the past and create 
the new regime’s moral legitimacy. It makes the statement that from now on violations of 
human rights will not be tolerated.  It also shows that the government places value on 
accountability, fairness and security.  
In the case of Croatia domestic institutions play a major role in connecting or 
disconnecting the local legal consciousness with the tribunal’s initiatives to strengthen 
the rule of law. The government institutions do not provide accountability, consistency, 
impartiality, or security, in fact divisions are deepened by distrust and justice is sought 
elsewhere. People in Croatia are attentive to the proceedings of the international tribunal 
and the decisions it makes have an effect on perceptions of the rule of law, both in 
Croatia and internationally. The tribunal can contribute to the rule of law at the 
international level through the war crimes trials. It can contribute to the rule of law at the 
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domestic level by influence over law and policy. At the individual level the significance 
is more difficult to pinpoint, but I think my research shows it is meaningful there too. It 
does not assist individual catharsis, but through the higher level acknowledgments of 
wrongdoing and changes toward a human rights-based rule of law it does impact 
individuals. 
While this research did not explicitly seek to understand why people violate 
human rights it does contribute to a discussion of this by helping to identify what is 
needed by the survivors to move on to a new future without violence. To achieve justice 
the elements of the rule of law (violators held accountable, evenhandedness, consistency, 
security) are more important than the method (international, domestic, or local trials), 
though at present in many cases international trials are most capable of incorporating 
those elements. The findings show that international actions are locally meaningful. The 
tribunal’s prosecution of war crimes, though flawed and obstructed, is crucial in this post-
conflict situation. Other factors that contribute to the rule of law should be given greater 
emphasis by the international human rights community. At present most rule of law 
research does not give much consideration to the local legal consciousness. This is 
needed to understand the mechanisms that shape norms of the rule of law. Knowledge of 
what those norms are and how they can be altered is instrumental in creating effective 
change to strengthen the rule of law and protect human rights. It is also significant for the 
development of a culture that not only values human rights, but enforces them.  
Levi and Epperly (2009) bring up the concept of a costly signal given by their 
“principled principals” in order to strengthen the rule of law. While the dynamics of 
costly signals are usually the domain of behavioral ecologists and economists, they are 
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usefully applied here as well. I agree with Levi and Epperly that politicians who take a 
strong stance of commitment to the rule of law and demonstrate that through actions 
rather than give it only lip service or passing attention are giving what can be considered 
as a costly signal and that this level of commitment is necessary to provoke real change. 
It is costly because in the political environment of Croatia it could end your political 
career and likely your social life and financial standing as well. It is a gamble with great 
risks if it is not successful. In their evaluations of Croatian politics both Del Ponte (2009) 
and Peskin (2008) recognize the dilemma faced by anyone who shows strong support of 
the tribunal and its objectives in this fragile, new democracy. That support comes at the 
price of alienating much of the population and risking potential political coalitions which 
are conditions that do not portend great success for the agenda or individual. The degree 
to which this is true was certainly higher when Tuñman was president and has lessened 
since, but there still exists a perception that alignment with the tribunal is a move against 
Croatia’s independence.  
What are the best ways to strengthen the rule of law? Institutional approaches 
must go hand-in-hand with approaches that more directly alter the local legal 
consciousness. Those include the creation of fair and efficient bureaucracies through the 
implementation of grievance procedures without fear of retaliation that are treated with 
consequence, incentives for government representatives to conduct business without bias 
with clear consequences for the contrary, and open communication about policies to the 
public. The importance of targeting a change in norms as well as structural changes to 
institutions must be given serious attention. Samuels builds on the analysis by Carothers 
(2003) in her critique of rule of law initiatives to say, “A key point to emphasize is that 
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law reform in any country requires demand for change. For the changes to be sustainable 
and implemented there must be a demand among the population, and local champions of 
the changes to drive the reform, be it citizens, membership organizations, human rights 
activists, opposition parties, etc.” (2006:20). Local champions like these are the “norms 
entrepreneurs” that Sikkink (2011) credits as building the internal momentum to change 
the prevailing norms of the society to demand individual accountability. I know several 
people in Croatia that qualify as norms entrepreneurs and they are affecting change, some 
on a small scale in local communities and others in the scene of domestic politics.  
The research presented in this dissertation shows that the tribunal’s initiatives to 
strengthen the rule of law are missing a critical component. Too much emphasis is placed 
on institutional changes that assume, incorrectly, that normative change will 
automatically follow. An understanding of the local legal consciousness can allow 
initiatives to build upon existing norms that support the rule of law and combat those that 
conflict. If rule of law initiatives are implemented in a way that is more salient to the 
population they will gain more local support, and only then can transformational change 
take place. Critics from a legal perspective may claim that the tribunal’s role is only to 
prosecute war criminals, not alter societal norms, but the tribunal is removed from 
political, social and economic realms only in theory and its explicit purpose goes well 
beyond holding trials. If the tribunal did more to embrace and promote its potential 
impact in local communities its proceedings would contribute more to a positive, 
peaceful future. If the people directly involved in war crimes don’t see and feel a stronger 
rule of law exemplified in the resolution of their everyday conflicts the tribunal’s 
influence remains limited.  
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Epilogue 
 
 
The outcome of Gotovina’s trial was reversed on appeal in November 2012. He 
was acquitted of all charges by a close margin (3-2) and with reservations by the judges. 
The public reaction to the acquittal rivaled the one to Milošević’s death mid-trial. 
Generally speaking Croats reacted with joy and Serbs with a new outcry of injustice. The 
reaction from human rights advocates has also been mixed, mostly consisting of 
disapproval and frustration. Strikingly, Gotovina has taken some steps to distance himself 
from Croat nationalists since his return from The Hague. In an interview with a Serb 
newspaper he called for a move forward from the past and supported the return of 
displaced Serbs to their homes in Croatia (Tanjug 2012).  
The success of the appeal may be interpreted in many different ways locally. It 
might help the ICTY to be viewed more positively by some people in Croatia because 
ultimately their “war hero” was not convicted of wrongdoing, despite the commentary by 
the judges that wrongdoing did occur though Gotovina was not responsible in the specific 
way charged by the prosecution. The technical definitions of crimes and the way in which 
responsibility was placed on Gotovina both led to the acquittal, but in the Croatian media 
and by the public the outcome is commonly understood to simply mean that Gotovina, 
and therefore Croatia, did no wrong. This is problematic for many reasons. It is also an 
example of how the nature of law can be an obstacle to efforts to strengthen the rule of 
law due to the complexity of legal proceedings on issues that are viewed in more black 
and white terms of morality by the public. Others in Croatia may view the success of the 
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appeal to be evidence that the tribunal is not a better alternative than domestic courts who 
likely would have declared Gotovina innocent with much less to do. Alternatively, 
minority Serbs in Croatia are not likely to think positively about this outcome that 
appears to justify the Croat displacement of Serbs from the Krajina region and cannot 
give them great trust in their future security. It is likely that the appeal will shape the 
tribunal’s pending cases of Karadžić and Mladić at the ICTY and others at the ICC.  
A second turn of events took place after my research period which highlights the 
symbolic power of place names. As explained in the dissertation above, several of the 
Serbs who I interviewed or who participated in the survey commented that the town 
should not be called Gvozd. Soon after the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 the town and 
county names were changed from Vrginmost to Gvozd apparently in an attempt to break 
the area away from its Serb-majority past. Serb returnees came back to a town with a new 
name and new neighbors, or even someone living in their home. Complaints did not fade 
away and in October 2012 the town officially changed the name back to Vrginmost by a 
narrow vote and by the initiative of a political party associated with the Serb ethnicity 
(Špadina 2012). Perhaps it is better that the town’s future is connected with its past or 
perhaps it is an omen that the past will not leave the minds of people here. In any case it 
leaves me feeling like the town and people I spent so much time with were from an 
imaginary place that has since disappeared with the name Gvozd.
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Appendices 
 
 
Structured Interview in English 
 
 
 
Anthropology Survey 
 
This survey is part of a project researching the opinions of people in Croatia about the 
effectiveness of trials for war crimes. You are invited to participate if you live in Gvozd 
and are between 20 and 60 years old. Participation is completely voluntary. The 
information collected anonymously will contribute to the researcher's anthropology 
dissertation and may be used to help improve the way international and domestic courts 
attempt to achieve justice for various crimes. Please email 
(katharine.hawkins@uconn.edu) or call (099 754 0841) with questions. 
 
Title of Study:  
Evaluating Retributive Justice in Croatia 
Researcher:  
Katharine Hawkins, PhD Candidate 
University of Connecticut, USA 
 
Complete the questions below by writing or circling your answer: 
 
1. How old are you?  _______ 
 
2. How many years have you lived in Gvozd?  __________ 
 
3. Where else have you lived for more than a 6 month period?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
 
4. Are you currently employed?         Yes   No 
 
5. What is your occupation?  ____________________ 
 
6. Which statement is most true: 
 
A. If you work hard you can succeed in life 
 
B. Who you know is more important than how hard you work 
 
7. Rate the current importance of the following problems in Croatia on a scale of 1 to 5: 
 
       Not a Problem            Major Problem 
A. Political corruption  1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Economy   1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Quality education  1 2 3 4 5 
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D. Affordable education  1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Ethnic divisions  1 2 3 4 5 
 
F. Lack of infrastructure  1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Do you feel that you are in a better situation now than before the war of the 1990s? 
 
Better Now  Better Before 
 
9. Which of the following would most greatly improve your life in Gvozd? 
 
A. More job opportunities 
 
B. Owning a home 
 
C. Greater trust within the community 
 
D. Better health 
 
E. Other: _______________ 
 
 
Continue on back of page 
10. Do you think young people in Gvozd will have a better life than their parents? 
 
Yes   No 
 
11. Have you heard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?    
 
Yes    No  
 
12. How often do you read or hear something about the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)? 
 
Daily  Weekly  Once or Twice a Month  Rarely 
 
13. Rate how much you trust the following as sources of about the ICTY: 
 
       No Trust            Complete Trust 
 
A. Newspaper   1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Television   1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Family and friends  1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Croatian government  1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Religious leaders  1 2 3 4 5 
 
F. ICTY    1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Do you feel that you are a victim of war crimes? Yes  No 
 
15. How much do you care about the decisions the ICTY makes in war crimes trials?    
 
Very Much  Some  A Little  Not At All 
 
16. Do the decisions of the ICTY affect how safe you feel to live in Croatia? 
 
Very Much  Some  A Little  Not At All 
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17. Do you think the ICTY is effectively achieving justice for the violations of human rights 
that occurred during the war in the 1990s? 
 
Yes   No 
 
18. What is the biggest obstacle to achieving justice for the violations of human rights that 
occurred in the 1990s? 
 
A. Political biases in the courts 
 
B. Witnesses scared to testify 
 
C. Governments hiding war criminals 
 
D. Too many people need to go on trial 
 
E. Other: ___________________ 
 
19. Which of the choices below is most important to you personally regarding trials for war 
crimes such as genocide? 
 
A. That major political and military leaders be tried in a court for their actions 
 
B. That local people who committed war crimes be tried in a court for their actions 
 
C. That all people involved in war crimes, regardless of whether they were a leader 
or not, should be tried in a court for their actions 
 
D. That it is better not to have any trials for war crimes 
 
 
20. How much confidence do you have in the Croatian courts to conduct fair trials? 
 
Lots   Some   A Little  None 
 
21. How much confidence do you have in the international courts to conduct fair trials? 
 
Lots   Some   A Little  None 
 
22. Which judges are better able to make impartial decisions in trials of war crimes that took 
place in Croatia? 
 
A. ICTY judges 
 
B. Croatian judges 
 
23. Do you think the ICTY has the best interests of Croatia in mind when making decisions 
in the courts? 
 
Yes   No  
 
24. If a person committed an act of genocide in Croatia, what is the best way to address the 
crime?  
 
A. Croatian court 
 
B. Court in country where the criminals came from 
 
C. ICTY 
 
25. A soldier takes part in mass killings of people based on their ethnic identity. He was 
following orders from military superiors. He is declared innocent by the court when tried 
for those actions. Is this judgment just or unjust? 
 
Just    Unjust 
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26. How often do you think people who commit serious crimes, such as theft, destruction of 
property, or violence, are justly punished for those crimes in Croatia? 
 
Always  Most of the time Sometimes  Rarely 
 
27. Rate how much you agree with the following statement:  
 
Conducting fair trials for alleged criminals is the best way to achieve justice. 
 
 Completely Agree       1    2       3          4            5      Completely 
Disagree 
 
28. Rate how much you agree with the following statement on a scale of 1 to 5:  
 
A court must base its judgment only on concrete evidence provided at the trial. 
 
 Completely Agree       1    2       3          4            5      Completely 
Disagree 
 
29. Should punishments depend on the circumstances of the situation or always be the same 
for the same crime? 
 
A. Depend on the circumstances of the situation 
 
B. Always be the same for the same crime 
 
30. If a serious crime took place, what would be most important to you: 
 
A. The victim feels that the criminal was justly punished 
 
B. The victim forgives the criminal 
 
C. The criminal was justly punished according to a court, though the victim may not 
agree with the decision 
 
D. The criminal was justly punished according to the community, though the victim 
or a court might not agree 
31. Which of the following best describes your personal reasoning for why wrongdoers 
should be punished for their crimes? 
 
A. To equalize the harm done to the victim of the crime 
 
B. To make the crime costly so that others will think twice about committing the 
same crime 
 
C. To reform the wrongdoer so they will become a better person 
 
32. Have the relationships between Croats, Serbs, and Muslims in Croatia improved since 
1995? 
 
Yes   No 
 
33. Compared to 10 years before the last conflict, the relationships between Croats, Serbs and 
Muslims in Croatia today are: 
 
Better   Same   Worse 
 
34. Do you think Croatia should join the European Union?     Yes               No 
 
35. How do you think Croatia joining the European Union will effect you: 
 
Positively  Not much  Negatively 
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Read the paragraph below and answer the following questions: 
 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer.  
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her.  It was a form of radium that 
a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.  The drug was expensive to make, 
but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make.  He paid $200 
for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug.  The sick woman’s 
husband, Tom, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together 
only about $1,000, which was half of what it cost.  He told the druggist that his wife was 
dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later.  But the druggist said, “No, I 
discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.”  Tom got desperate and 
broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.   
 
36. Should Tom be punished for stealing the drug that saved his wife’s life?       Yes 
 No 
 
37. Why?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
 
38. What is your religion?  ______________  
 
39. How often do you attend a house of worship? 
 
Daily      Weekly         Once or twice a month       Once or twice a year       Rarely 
 
40. What is your ethnicity?  ______________ 
 
41. Are you male or female?          
 
Male   Female 
 
Thank you. 
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Structured Interview in Croatian 
 
 
 
 
Antropološka anketa 
 
Ova anketa je dio projekta koji se odnosi na istraživanje mišljenja ljudi u Hrvatskoj po 
pitanju učinkovitosti suñenja za ratne zločine. Ukoliko živite u Gvozdu i imate izmeñu 20 
i 60 godina, slobodno ispunite ovu anketu ukoliko to želite.  Ispunjavanje ankete je u 
potpunosti na dobrovoljnoj bazi. Anketa je anonimna i sve informacije prikupljene kroz 
anketu, pomoći će u antropološkoj disertaciji istraživača, a mogu se iskoristiti i u svrhu 
poboljšanja načina na koji domaći i meñunarodni sudovi pokušavaju postići pravdu za 
razne zločine. Molim da za bilo kakva pitanja pošaljete mail na adresu 
(katharine.hawkins@uconn.edu) ili nazovete na mobitel broj (099 754 0841). 
 
Naziv ankete:  
Istraživanje zadovoljenja pravde po pitanju 
ratnih zločina u Hrvatskoj   
Istraživač:  
Katharine Hawkins, kandidat za Dr.sci 
Univerzitet u Connecticut-u, SAD 
 
Odgovore na niže navedena pitanja napišite u produžetku ili zaokružite Vaš odgovor tamo 
gdje je predviñeno (gdje su već ponuñeni odgovori):  
 
1. Koliko imate godina?  _______ 
 
2. Koliko godina živite u Gvozdu?  __________ 
 
3. U kojem mjestu/gradu/državi ste još, osim Gvozda, živjeli duže od 6 mjeseci?  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
4. Jeste li trenutno zaposleni?         Da   Ne 
 
5. Što ste po zanimanju?  ____________________ 
 
6. Koja Vam je od ovih tvrdnji najbliža istini?: 
 
A. Napornim radom možeš uspjeti u životu 
 
B. Nije važno koliko radiš, već je važno koga poznaješ i imaš veze gdje treba 
 
7. Ocijenite ocjenom od 1 do 5 prema trenutnoj važnosti sljedeće probleme u Hrvatskoj:  
 
       Nije uopće problem  (1)           Gorući problem 
(5) 
A. Politička korupcija  1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Gospodarstvo   1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Kvaliteta obrazovanja  1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Dostupnost obrazovanja 1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Etničke podjele   1 2 3 4 5 
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F. Nedostatak infrastrukture 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Smatrate li da ste danas u boljem položaju nego što ste bili prije rata, prije 90-ih godina?  
 
Sad  je bolje  Prije je bilo bolje 
 
9. Što bi od niže navedenog u najvećoj mjeri poboljšalo Vaš život u Gvozdu?  
 
 
A. Više mogućnosti zaposlenja 
 
B. Vlastiti dom 
 
C. Više povjerenja u zajednicu  
 
D. Bolje zdravlje  
 
E. Drugo (napišite što): _______________ 
10. Mislite li da će mladi ljudi iz Gvozda imati bolji život nego što su imali njihovi roditelji?  
 
Da   Ne 
 
11. Jeste li čuli za Opću povelju za ljudska prava?  
 
Da    Ne  
 
12. Koliko često čitate ili čujete informacije o radu Meñunarodnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju 
 (Haški sud)?  
 
Dnevno  Tjedno                Jednom ili dvaput mjesečno               Rijetko 
 
13. Ocijenite od 1 do 5 koliko vjerujete niže navedenim izvorima informiranja o Haškom 
sudu:  
 
         Uopće nemam povjerenja (1)           Potpuno vjerujem (5) 
 
A. Novine   1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. Televizija  1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Obitelj i prijatelji 1 2 3 4 5 
 
D. Hrvatska Vlada  1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Vjerske voñe  1 2 3 4 5 
 
F. Haški sud  1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Smatrate li da ste žrtva ratnog zločina?  Da  Ne 
 
15. Koliko Vam je bitno kakve odluke i presude donosi Haški sud ?  
 
  Vrlo mi je važno    Donekle mi je važno     Malo mi je važno     Uopće mi nije 
važno 
 
16. U kojoj mjeri odluke Haškog suda utječu na činjenicu koliko se osjećate sigurno živeći u 
 Hrvatskoj?  
 
U velikoj mjeri  Srednje  Malo  Uopće ne utječu   
 
17. Smatrate li da je Haški sud učinkovit u ostvarenju pravde za kršenja ljudskih prava, koja 
su se  dešavala u ratu 90-ih godina? 
Da   Ne 
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18. Što je po Vašem mišljenju najveća prepreka u postizanju pravde za kršenja ljudskih prava 
iz  rata 90-ih? 
A. Politizacija samog Suda 
 
B. Svjedoci se boje svjedočiti 
 
C. Vlade bivše SFRJ još skrivaju bjegunce 
 
D. Previše ljudi treba biti suñeno 
 
E. Drugi razlog (napišite): ___________________ 
 
19. Koja Vam je od niže navedenih tvrdnji najvažnija kad se radi o suñenjima za ratne 
zločine  poput genocida?  
 
A. Svim političkim i vojnim  voñama treba biti suñeno  za zločine 
 
B. Ljudima iz lokalnih sredina koji su počinili zločine treba biti suñeno za njihova 
djela  
 
C. Svim ljudima koji su na bilo koji način umiješani u zločine, bez obzira jesu li 
visoko rangirani ili ne, treba biti suñeno za njihova djela  
 
D. Bolje bi bilo da nema nikakvih suñenja za ratne zločine  
 
 
20. Koliko vjerujete u pravednost hrvatskih sudova?  
Puno   Srednje   Malo  Nikako 
 
21. Koliko vjerujete u pravednost meñunarodnih sudova?  
 
Puno   Srednje   Malo  Nikako 
 
22. Koji suci su po Vašem mišljenju nepristraniji prilikom donošenja presuda za ratne zločine 
 počinjene u Hrvatskoj?   
 
A. Suci Haškog suda 
 
B. Hrvatski suci 
 
23. Mislite li da Meñunarodni sud u Hagu ima na umu ono što je u najboljem interesu za 
Hrvatsku  prilikom donošenja svojih odluka?  
Da   Ne  
 
24. Ako je osoba počinila ratni zločin genocida u Hrvatskoj, kome je najbolje prijaviti taj 
zločin?  
 
A.  Hrvatskom sudu 
 
B.  Sudu zemlje iz koje potječe  zločinac  
 
C. Meñunarodnom sudu u Hagu 
 
25. Vojnik je sudjelovao u masovnim ubijanjima ljudi na osnovu njihove etničke pripadnosti. 
On je samo slijedio zapovijedi svojih nadreñenih. Nakon suñenja, proglašen je nevinim 
za takvo djelo. Jeli ovakva presuda pravedna ili nepravedna?  
 
Pravedna    Nepravedna 
 
26. Koliko često su u Hrvatskoj pravedno kažnjeni oni ljudi koji počine ozbiljne kriminalne 
radnje poput krañe, uništavanja imovine ili nasilja? 
 
  Uvijek          U većini slučajeva            Ponekad   Rijetko  Nikada 
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27. Ocijenite od 1 do 5 koliko se slažete sa sljedećom tvrdnjom (1-U potpunosti se slažem 5 
–  Uopće se ne slažem):  
 
 Voñenje pravednog suñenja za navodne počinitelje ratnog zločina je najbolji način da se 
 postigne pravda. 
 
             U potpunosti se slažem       1         2          3            4              5     Uopće se ne slažem 
 
28. Ocijenite od 1 do 5 koliko se slažete sa sljedećom tvrdnjom:  
 
Sud mora donositi presude samo na osnovu konkretnih dokaza predočenih na suñenju  
 
      U potpunosti se slažem       1         2          3            4              5     Uopće se ne slažem 
 
29. Da li bi kazna trebala ovisiti o okolnostima odreñene situacije ili bi za isti zločin uvijek 
trebala biti ista kazna?  
 
A. Ovisno o okolnostima odreñene situacije  
 
B. Uvijek ista kazna za isti zločin 
 
30. Ako se dogodio ozbiljan zločin, što bi po Vama bilo važnije:  
 
 
A.  Da žrtva ima osjećaj da je zločinac pravedno kažnjen  
 
B. Da žrtva oprosti zločincu  
 
C. Zločinac je pravedno kažnjen sa stanovišta Suda, iako se žrtva možda ne slaže sa 
odlukom suca  
 
D. Lokalna zajednica smatra da je zločinac pravedno kažnjen, iako se žrtva ili Sud s 
takvom odlukom ne slažu  
31. Koji od navedenih razloga najbolje opisuje Vaš osobno poimanje zbog čega bi to trebalo 
 kažnjavati ljude koji su počinili ratne zločine?  
 
A. Da bi se izjednačila nepravda koja je počinjena prema žrtvi zločina  
 
B. Da bi se zločin skupo platio, te da drugi u budućnosti dvaput promisle prije nego 
 počine isti zločin  
 
C. Da bi se grešnici preobrazili i postali bolje osobe  
 
32. Jesu li se odnosi izmeñu Hrvata, Srba i Muslimana popravili od 1995. godine na ovamo?  
 
Da   Ne 
 
33. Usporedivši odnose izmeñu Hrvata, Srba i Muslimana u vrijeme 10 godina prije zadnjeg 
 konflikta (npr. 1980-ih godina) i današnjeg vremena, ti odnosi su danas:  
 
Bolji   Isti   Gori 
 
34. Mislite li da bi Hrvatska trebala ući u Europsku Uniju?     Da               Ne 
 
35. Što mislite na koji način će na Vas osobno utjecati ulazak Hrvatske u EU:  
Pozitivno  Neće puno utjecati  Negativno 
 
Pročitajte ovaj odlomak i odgovorite na sljedeća pitanja:  
 
Jedna žena u Europi bila je skoro na samrti, bolovala je od težeg oblika karcinoma. 
Postojao je jedan lijek, za koji su liječnici mislili da ju može spasiti. To je bio jedan oblik 
kemijskog elementa Radija, kojeg su nedavno otkrili farmakolozi u tom istom gradu. Bilo 
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je jako skupo napraviti taj lijek, a farmaceut je zaračunavao 10 puta više nego što je lijek 
uistinu koštao. Radij je farmaceuta koštao 1000 k, a malu dozu lijeka prodavao je za 
10.000 k. Muž bolesne žene, Tom, išao je okolo i posuñivao novac za kupnju lijeka od 
ljudi koje je poznavao, no uspio je skupiti samo 5000 k. To je bilo samo pola iznosa koji 
mu je trebao. Zamolio je farmaceuta da mu proda lijek jeftinije ili da mu plati kasnije 
ostatak, jer mu je žena na samrti. Ali farmaceut je rekao "Ne, otkrio sam ovaj lijek i na 
njemu želim zaraditi." Tom je bio očajan, provalio je istu noć u apoteku i ukrao lijek za 
svoju suprugu.  
 
36. Treba li Toma kazniti za krañu lijeka, koji je spasio život njegovoj ženi?       Da 
 Ne 
 
37. Zašto?  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________ 
 
 
38. Koja je Vaša vjeroispovijest?  ______________  
 
39. Koliko često posjećujete crkvu / džamiju? 
 
Svaki dan    Svaki tjedan     Jednom ili dvaput mjesečno    Jednom ili dvaput godišnje    
Rijetko 
 
40. Što ste po nacionalnosti? ______________ 
 
41. Kojeg ste spola?         Muško           Žensko 
        
 
Hvala Vam. 
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